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METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 



AN ESSAY IN EPISTEMOLOaY 



BY 

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WALTER SMITH, Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN LAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

LONDON : MACMILLAN & CO., Ltd. 
1899 

All rights reserved 



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Copyright, 1899, 
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J. S. Cushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith 
Norwood Mass. U.S.A. 



PREFACE 

)ME parts of this work have already been pub- 
lished in articles in the philosophical journals. The 
germ of it is in an article that appeared in Mind 
for October, 1895 ; and a few of the discussions 
have been presented in The Philosophical Review, 
Education, and The International Journal of Ethics. 
I wish to thank the editors of these journals for 
the courtesy by which I have been allowed to make 
use of this material. The portions of it which 
have been selected have been in most cases con- 
siderably changed. 

I wish to express my indebtedness to my brother, 
Professor William G. Smith, of Smith College, for 
criticisms and suggestions. 

WALTER SMITH. 

Lake Forest University, 
July, 1899. 



n 



CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTION 



1. The love of knowledge 



religion 



3. The benefits of science . 

4. The conflict of science with morality, art 

5. The widespread influence of science 

6. The need for a critical examination of knowledge 

7. Has philosophy already made this criticism ? . 

8. The assumption of science and philosophy that know 

ledge consists in concepts . 

9. The need to examine this assumption 

10. Psychology indispensable in this criticism 

11. Result of this criticism anticipated . 

12. Misapprehension to be avoided 

13. Plan of this investigation 



PAGE 
1 

2 
2 
3 
6 
6 
7 

8 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 



CHAPTER I 
Definition of Knowledge 

1. A survey of epistemological theories necessary . . 14 

2. Empedocles. "Like is known by like." This view of 

knowledge characteristic of the Greek mind . . 14 

3. Plato. Metaphysical theory. The vision of ideas. Unity 

with the ideas 17 

4. Aristotle's metaphysical theory. Definition of truth. 

Knowledge by sense and by reason. Identity of 
thought with its object 19 

5. The mysticism of Plotinus. Mysticism as a form of 

knowledge-theory 21 

vii 



viii CONTENTS 

PAGE 

6. Transition to modern philosophy. Contrast of spirit 

and nature .23 

7. Modern agnosticism 24 

8. Locke 24 

9. Hume. Unknown cause of impressions. Philosophical 

ideas of relation 24 

10. Kant. Things in themselves unknown. The categories 

are not knowledge of things in themselves. Hints 

toward another theory of knowledge ... 26 

11. Later agnosticism 28 

12. The agnostic view of knowledge 28 

13. Absolute idealism. Hegel. T. H. Green ... 28 

14. The element of truth in this view. Its neglect of the 

problem, how individual persons and things are 
known. Its treatment of matter . . . .30 

15. Theory of truth as consistency. Its inadequacy . . 33 

16. Summary. Theories fall into two groups: one regards 

knowledge of the not-self ; the other self-knowledge . 34 

17. Definition of knowledge 35 



CHAPTER II 

Sensation, Feeling, and Volition as Cognitive Factors 

1. The unreflecting view of the cognitive value of sensation 37 

2. Distrust of the senses 38 

3. The transcendental and scientific grounds of this distrust 38 

4. The extent to which the criticisms of sensation are valid 40 

5. Sensation is cognitive of sensation. Sensations are facts ; 

not mere utilities or instruments of reason. Know- 
ledge of them by what is like them .... 41 

6. Importance of sensations as being facts of consciousness 

and as largely constituting experience ... 44 

7. The connection of sensation with self-knowledge . . 46 

8. Feeling and volition as cognitive 47 

9. Connection of the three factors to be studied ... 48 
10. Relation of feeling to sensation. Study of mental growth 

necessary. The emotions . . . . . .48 



CONTENTS IX 



11. Relation of volition to sensation. Attempts to identify 

the two ......... 61 

12. Testimony of physiology to psychical continuity . . 52 

13. Evolution of mind 53 

14. Meaning of psychical continuity 53 

15. Evidence from this discussion that the mental elements 

are intelligible and cognitive. Introduction to the 
study of concepts . . . . . . .54 

CHAPTER III 
The Conceptual View of Knowledge 



1. The history of this view to be presented ... 

2. Socrates. The concept used by earlier thinkers. Soc 

rates used it as the explanation of things . 

3. Plato's idea. His treatment of sensation. His system 

of ideas 

4. Aristotle. His account of the relation between the indi 

vidual and the universal. His system of concepts 
The place assigned to sensation .... 

5. Later thinkers 

6. The testimony of logic as the ethics of thought to be con 

sidered 

7. The account of the concept given by logic 

8. The relation of the judgment to the concept . 

9. The relation of the syllogism to the concept . 

10. Induction and the concept. The induction of Aristotle 

Modern induction. The ideas of energy and law 

11. The emphasis in modern logic on the judgment 

12. Summary 



57 

57 
58 



60 
61 

62 
64 

65 



67 
70 
71 



CHAPTER IV 
The Origin of Concepts 

1. The evolution of the concept to be studied. Order of 

investigation 72 

2. Concept may be any sense-quality, or idea . . .78 

3. Complex concept 74 



K CONTENTS 

PAGB 

4. Concept of individual 74 

5. The concept that is unlike any particular reality ; being 

a first vague image that has survived ; or a composite 
image 75 

6. The relation of the general concept to individuals : the 

concept is the essence. Is it numerically repeated ? 
Unrerlective thinking. The doctrine of the one in the 

many 77 

80 
80 
81 
81 



7. Other changes in the concept 

8. Substitution of words for other ideas 

9. Conclusion : concepts are sensory in their origin . 

10. The " categories " to be studied .... 

11. The doctrine that categories are not sense-derivatives 

Its basis. Its incorrectness 82 

12. Particular categories to be considered .... 83 

13. Space. All contents of consciousness are spatial : illus- 

trated by time. Extensity may not be necessary to 
all experience, but belongs to human experience. The 
qualitative manifold. Quantity derived from quality. 
The study of touch, etc. , omitted. Concept of space 
as indicating its own origin. Its universality. In 
what sense it is conceptual. Conclusion reached . 83 

14. Time 89 

15. Being derived from touch. Why touch is the reality- 

sense. The category is a composite image. Its 
universality 90 

16. Transition to higher categories. Ejection of inner feelings 92 

17. Essence. Feeling of the strain of holding by anything . 94 

18. Similarity. Not a part of the ideas of objects, but an 

idea distinct from them. Probably a visceral feeling 95 

19. Substance. The self-feeling or the "somatic conscious- 

ness." The unknowable substrate of phenomena . 97 

20. Causality. Feelings of effort 101 

21. Energy and force the modern substitutes for causality . 103 

22. Categories derived from observation of mind and will . 104 

23. Teleology due to observation of a special sequence of 

phenomena. Immanent teleology .... 104 

24. The categories of self, reason, will . .... 106 



CONTENTS xi 



25. The categories are the products of experience. Univer- 

sality of categories explained 106 

26. Are the categories implicit in all experience ? Meaning 

of " implicit." How can categories absent from con- 
sciousness act upon it ? The sensuous content of the 
categories 107 

27. Kant's view of the origin of the categories considered. 

The newness of each part of experience . . . 109 

28. Kant's view that principles of synthesis are requisite for 

experience. Sense-experience is not made of discrete 
units, and the act of the mind is not synthesis . . 110 



CHAPTER V 
The Cognitive Value of Concepts 

1. The problem stated 112 

2. The composite image is unlike individuals . . . 112 

3. The concept as an abstraction is unlike individuals . 113 

4. The one in the many. The relation not found in spatial 

forms, or in conscious experiences. The universal if 
not separate from the individuals ceases to be cogni- 
tive of any one of them 115 

5. Knowledge of the universal is outside the knowledge of 

the concrete 118 

6. Is the individual to be known as a plexus of universals ? 118 

7. The universal as synthetic is not cognitive . . .119 

8. Reason and the validity of the doctrine of the one in the 

many 119 

9. Requisites of knowledge 120 

10. Categories to be considered 121 

11. Space. Its claim to universality. It does not resemble 

the sense-data from which it is derived. Intensity of 
psychical states not truly given in quantitative terms. 
Is space objective ? Yes ; in other finite minds. Is 
it independent of the mind ? It is an idea. If objec- 
tive, it is not made known by mathematics . . 121 

12. Time 125 



xii CONTENTS 



13. Being. Not the truth of touch-sensations. Its universal 

application unwarranted : not applicable to other sen- 
sations ; or to nature 125 

14. Essence. Its claim to objectivity examined . . . 127 

15. Similarity is a relation that is purely mental . . . 128 

16. Substance. Not the truth of the soul. Its application 

to matter. Spinoza's use of the category. The scien- 
tific use of it 128 

17. Causality. Its claims do not find support in conscious 

experiences ; or in physical phenomena . . . 130 

18. Energy. Transformations of energy ; the doctrine of 

the one in the many ; the problem of transformation ; 
correlation of forces. Conservation of energy: a 
quantitative account of what is qualitative. Value of 
these principles for science ...... 133 

19. The will in modern metaphysics . . . . 136 

20. Teleology. No special efficiency in the idea of the end. 

Immanent teleology not given in any experience. The 

use of the category in recent philosophy . . . 137 

21. Reason 139 

22. The self 140 

23. Concepts found to be wanting. The faith in them to be 

put aside 140 

24. Even if a priori in their origin, they are not cognitive . 141 

25. Other criticisms of the concept 142 

26. Necessities of thought. Laws of thought. Meaning of 

necessity 143 

27. Utility of concepts 145 

CHAPTER VI 
Empiricism 

1. Reason for estimating empiricism 147 

2. The doctrine of empiricism. Natural history of mind. 

Influence of evolution-theory. Recent psychology . 147 

3. Its failure to deal rightly with the problem of episte- 

mology. Agnosticism 149 

4. Yet empiricism is not necessarily agnostic . . . 151 



CONTENTS 



Xlll 



6. 



7. 



10. 
11. 



12. 

13. 
14. 
15. 



It makes contributions to epistemology in its emphasis 
on sensation and the historical method 

The empirical account of universals. Locke. Berkeley. 
The denial of universals by Hume and the later em- 
piricists. Recent modifications of empiricism . 

Even when universals are denied the method of empiri- 
cism is that of universals in disguise .... 

Association of ideas. Fact of association to be distin- 
guished from the recognition of association. The 
recognition is the scientific ideal of empiricism 

This recognition means a return to the doctrine of cate- 
gories. Coexistence. Succession. Similarity 

The principles of association are not cognitive 

If emphasis be put on the particular ideas that are asso- 
ciated together, there is offered, instead of knowledge, 
continual reference from one thing to another . 

Empiricism fails more fatally than transcendentalism 
to reach the method of knowledge .... 

Microscopic research 

Utility of association 

Examination of the claim that science seeks laws for the 
sake of facts, not facts for the sake of laws 



151 



152 



156 



157 

159 
160 



160 

162 
163 
163 

163 



CHAPTER VII 
Knowledge by Sympathetic Imitation 



1. Thesis : Knowledge of the not-self is possible through 

sympathetic imitation • 167 

2. Illustrations of imitation in the lower animals and man . 168 

3. Imitation is association 170 

4. It depends on past experience 171 

5. Yet habits are modified by the imagination . . .171 

6. Imitation defined as a mode of perception . . .172 

7. The place of the external movement in imitation. The 

thought of an action is incipient action. In the child 
it often becomes overt action. In observing an action 
the child thinks it so as to act it. Hence the extent 
of its imitation 173 



XIV CONTENTS 

PAGE 

8. Is imitation an act of will ? 177 

9. Keasons for referring to the child's imitations . . 177 

10. Results stated 178 

11. Imitations in which muscular movement is absent or 

imperceptible. They may have various physiological 
consequences, but are not images of motor ideas . 178 

12. This method of knowledge designated the method of 

sympathetic imitation 180 

13. Comparison of the knowledge it offers with that offered 

by science and philosophy 182. 

14. Summary 184 

15. The relation of imitation to utility to be considered . 184 

16. Actions useful and useless : the actions of the organism 

are not necessarily utilitarian 185 

17. Imitation is not necessarily utilitarian. It is determined 

by the object. It has now this objective character, 
even if it was originally utilitarian. Spencer's deri- 
vation of imitation 187 

18. Imitation not due to the desire for pleasure . . . 190 

19. Imitation due to growth of perceptive power. It is a 

form of play 191 

20. The new departure in psychical development . . . 192 

21. The cognitive faculty is always imitative. Animism. 

Philosophy. The true principles of imitation not 
observed 193 

CHAPTER VIII 
Sympathetic Imitation in Art 

1. Imitation cultivated by art 196 

2. Widespread interest in art. It flourishes beside science 196 

3. Art, in contrast with science, deals with the concrete . 197 

4. Its treatment of the concrete : sensuous and sympathetic 

art 198 

5. Why sensuous art is here considered .... 199 

6. Its function is to minister pleasure, but not merely to do 

this 199 

7. Sensuous art probably the earliest 200 



CONTENTS XV 

PAGE 

8. Illustrations of sensuous art : colour ; sound ; muscular 

sensations, etc. 200 

9. Art, to reach the concrete, must also be sympathetic . 201 

10. Transition from sensuous to sympathetic art . . . 202 

11. Even the immediate sense-experience may be objectified 

by the artist. Meaning of the sympathetic imitation 

it seems to involve 202 

12. Treatment of inorganic nature by sympathetic art . . 204 

13. Architecture. Schopenhauer's theory of burden and 

support. The character of the knowledge of this 
principle 204 

14. How far the painter and sculptor appreciate the beauty 

of a living creature by sympathetic imitation. Their 
presentation of the inner life is sympathetic . . 206 

15. Possible objections to this interpretation of these works 

of art. Yet sympathy is unmistakably present in 
music and poetry 208 

16. Music is in part sensuous ; yet sometimes, at least, it 

evokes sympathy 208 

17. Poetry uses symbols which suggest conscious experiences 

associated with them. The lyric expresses the poet's 
subjective experience : it evokes sympathy with the 
poet. In the epic the poet sympathizes with others. 
The novel. Limits of sympathy in epic and novel. 
Complete objectivity reached in the drama . . 209 

18. Summary of results 214 

19. The theory, that art is meant to give pleasure, shown to 

be incorrect. Art is objective, and may even give 
pain. The theory of Mr. H. E. Marshall . . . 215 

20. The idealistic theory. Hegel. The idea cannot be known 

to sense. Unity in diversity not the distinctively 
aesthetic factor 217 

21. Art truer than history, for history adopts the methods of 

science. Truer than other sciences . . . .218 

22. Yet it cannot take the place of science, for it idealizes, 

and fails to give knowledge of what is actual . . 219 



xvi CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IX 
Sympathetic Imitation in Morality 

PAGE 

1. Sympathy as the ideal of man's social relations . . 222 

2. The Christian view of social duty 222 

3. There is a form of love which is the pleasure of the lover. 

Its legitimacy. It is not the only love. Benevolence 
exists even if love was originally selfish . . 223 

4. But sympathy does not seem indispensable to benevo- 

lence. And it is not inculcated by moralists as if it 

were of supreme moment 224 

5. Yet it is part of the Christian ideal 225 

6. Its relation to self-regarding love 226 

7. The relation of love to knowledge 226 

8. Criticism of the Kantian doctrine of knowledge through 

morality 227 

9. Limitations of morality : it is utilitarian ; does not regard 

the whole of the universe ; does not contemplate the 

past 228 

10. Morality and art compared 229 

11. The doctrine that knowledge is a virtue .... 229 

12. Result reached 230 

13. Sympathy in religion 230 

CHAPTER X 
Synthesis of the Methods 

1. Need to combine the methods of science and art . . 232 

2. Sense-data or phenomena to be observed . . . 233 

3. Coexistences and sequences of sense-data. The true 

rendering of the concept 234 

4. Space and time not to be taken as metaphysical entities, 

but as the empirical forms of experience . . . 235 

6. Space and time described as symbols .... 236 

6. Other categories have a symbolic value .... 238 

7. Reality is that which is matter for knowledge. F. H. 

Bradley's definition of the judgment .... 238 

8. Substance indicates a certain coexistence . . . 240 



CONTENTS xvii 

PAGE 

9. Causality indicates the order of phenomena . . . 241 

10. The laws of energy refer to the order of phenomena . 241 

11. Essence ; similarity ; teleology 241 

12. Summary of the conclusions in regard to concepts as 

symbols 242 

13. The meaning of the universality of laws . . . 242 

14. Restatement of need for synthesis of science with method 

of sympathetic imitation 243 

15. Kant's theory of knowledge. Space and time are forms 

of sense. The function of thought is to unite or syn- 
thetize this material 244 

16. The value of this account of science .... 245 

17. Yet thought is not merely synthesis. Kant's treatment 

of the analogies 245 

18. Kant's "intuitive understanding." Its function is dis- 

charged by sympathy 247 

19. The validity of the distinction between phenomena and 

things in themselves 249 

20. The synthesis of the methods in the light of the develop- 

ment of intellect 251 

21. The synthesis as applied to the relations of mind and 

brain 252 

22. Correlation of physical and psychical states. Doctrine 

of parallelism 253 

23. Meaning of the parallelism : both series of facts are 

conscious facts ' . . . 254 

24. The place to be assigned to matter. "Double-aspect" 

metaphysical theory 255 

25. How is knowledge of the person observed to be gained ? 

It is ideally complete in scientific observation of his 
brain and sympathetic imitation of the associated 
conscious states . . 257 

26. Is there not a science of these conscious states ? Falsity 

of psychology 257 

27. Apparent inconsistency of discrediting the categories 

and at the same time representing them as essential 
to knowledge. The categories are used as symbols, 
but into the truth gained by sympathy they do not, 



xviii CONTENTS 

PAGE 

as universals, directly enter. Further, they may be 
used for the overthrow of their own claim to be the 

absolute truth 259 

28. Categories are necessary because of human finitude . 261 



CHAPTER XI 
The Limits of Knowledge 

1. Is this method of knowledge practicable ? 262 

2. Idealistic claim to absolute knowledge. Its rejection . 262 

3. Agnosticism. Its general principle .... 263 

4. Kant's agnosticism. Its connection with his view of the 

function of thought. Its derivation from the idea of 
substance. The contradiction involved in it . . 263 

5. Spencer's arguments : the absolute exists out of relation ; 

and cannot be classed 265 

6. The agnosticism of positivism 267 

7. Dogmatic agnosticism being unjustifiable, the practical 

difficulties in the way of knowledge must be considered 268 

8. How far the knowledge of a thing is changed by a know- 

ledge of the whole of which the thing is a part . . 269 

9. The knower cannot in knowledge pass beyond his 

conscious states. Yet these may be a copy of the 
not-self 271 

10. Infinite minuteness needed in the knowledge of any 

phenomenon. Knowledge of the brain. Memory. 
Element of uncertainty in the problem ; Weber's 
law. The difficulties are practically those which 
science has to face in its effort to know a concrete 
fact 272 

11. Distinction between method and its application. By 

aiming at sympathetic imitation we move toward 
truth 276 

12. Application to the various orders of being. Extent of 

sympathy with other men ; with animals . . . 276 

13. Knowledge of our own bodies 278 



CONTENTS xix 

PAGE 

14. Sympathy with inorganic nature. Doctrine that matter 

is sentient. Poetical view 279 

15. Possible extension of sympathy in the future . . . 281 



CHAPTER XII 

Self-consciousness 

1. The method of sympathetic imitation may apply to a 

man's knowledge of his past, but not to present self- 
consciousness 282 

2. Need to examine the doctrine of self-consciousness which 

implies that there is a distinct idea of the self as a 
separate entity 282 

3. This distinction not found at the beginning of the con- 

scious life 283 

4. Its development. Its prominence in the life of practical 

activity 283 

5. It may be absent in intellectual activity .... 284 

6. It is a particular idea, and may be excluded by other 

ideas. There is a sense in which it is specially 
persistent 285 

7. It is not necessarily present in its complete form as the 

centre to which experience is referred . . . 286 

8. Even when it is present, it does not give knowledge of 

the self 287 

9. The transcendental doctrine of the self as a universal 

given in its particular experiences .... 288 

10. Self-consciousness not a cognition that imitates the de- 

tails of experience 288 

11. Self-consciousness explained : conscious states are self- 

conscious 289 

12. Confirmation of this view by reference to sympathetic 

imitation 290 

13. Knowledge of the self not in psychological concepts 

more than in any conscious state. Kant's "intuitive 
understanding" 290 

14. How far subjective idealism is justified , . . . 292 



XX CONTENTS 

PAGB 

15. The absoluteness of self-knowledge 292 

16. All knowledge is in a sense self-knowledge. How the 

self is transcended. Individuality preserved, yet 
unity with others. Lotze's view of the relation 
between knowledge and its object .... 292 

17. The tendency in human life to individuality, and the 

tendency to sympathy 296 

18. Definition of knowledge recalled 297 



CHAPTER XUI 
The Philosophical Problem 

1. Epistemology is part of philosophy 298 

2. It is the foundation of philosophy. Some theory of 

knowledge is always adopted by philosophy. Influ- 
ence of epistemology illustrated by reference to the 
history of philosophy. The present doctrine of 
knowledge may bear on the philosophical problem . 298 

3. The function which has historically been assigned to 

philosophy must be studied, and its true function 
discovered 300 

4. Philosophy ceased early to be merely practical . . 301 

5. The claim of philosophy in relation to the special sci- 

ences. The science of the sciences .... 301 

6. Materialism. Its prevalence 303 

7. Materialism and physical science. The achievements 

and hopes of science 304 

8. The successful explanation of the physical world. Me- 

chanical energy 305 

9. Materialism and the organic world 305 

10. Materialism and human consciousness .... 306 

11. Summary of materialistic claims ..... 307 

12. Criticism of materialism, as offering a system of concepts ; 

and as being self-contradictory in its account of 

knowledge 307 

13. Dualism. Partly materialism. Partly an implicit idealism 308 

14. Idealism. Its criticism of conception of matter . . 309 



CONTENTS xxi 

PAGE 

15. Undeveloped forms of idealism 310 

16. Developed systems of idealism. Hegel. The Absolute 

is self-consciousness. The process of thought is nec- 
essary. Relation of the Absolute to human experi- 
ence. The place of science. Philosophy as science 

of the sciences 310 

17. How far idealism is justified by epistemology . . 313 

18. Idealism has sought knowledge in categories . . . 314 

19. Claim of Hegel that he presents the concrete , . . 314 

20. Empirical origin of the categories recalled. No necessary 

connection among them 315 

21. The failure of philosophy illustrated by Hegel . . 316 

22. True function of philosophy. It is not a system of the 

universe 317 

23. Philosophy is not an explanation of things . . .317 

24. It gives the ideal of thought 31 8 

25. It gives the method of knowledge 319 

26. Can truth be exhausted ? 320 



CHAPTER XIV 
Practical Applications 

1. The practical questions to be considered . . . 322 

2. The effect on scientific work. Science may be merely 

utilitarian 322 

3. As truth-seeking it is imperfect by itself. Need for a 

poetical science 323 

4. Lesson for art. Rhyming philosophy not needed. The 

place that abstractions may have in poetry . . 324 

5. Is a scientific treatise a poem ? 325 

6. Influences that affect poetry and pervert it 327 

7. The dependence of poetry on sympathetic imitation . 328 

8. The sensuous function of art. The revelation of the self 328 

9. Education. Its aims 330 

10. Place of utility 330 

11. Utility in its relation to truth. Its ministry to self- 

consciousness 331 



xxii CONTENTS 

PAGE 

12. Education in the truth of other things .... 332 

13. Science and truth. Emerson's view .... 332 

14. The educational curriculum. Classics versus science . 333 

15. The "humanities" deal with the subjects most accessi- 

ble to human knowledge 335 

16. Literature often a pretext for scientific study . . 335 

17. Absence of truth-giving literature 336 

18. Cultivation of the faculty of sympathetic imitation . 336 

19. The moral life. The inspiration of examples . . . 337 

20. Is knowledge always desirable ? 339 

21. Is knowledge of other things an end in itself ? . . 339 



METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 



INTRODUCTION 

1. "Who loves not knowledge?" "The desire 
to know," says Aristotle, the master of them that 
know, " is natural with all men, and an evidence of 
this is the love we bear our senses, they being loved 
for themselves alone even apart from their practical 
use ; " and he further finds that man has his per- 
fect happiness in the exercise of his rational faculty. 
Aristotle in ascribing supreme value to truth is only 
expressing the conviction of very many of the sages 
of antiquity. 

Knowledge is desired not less earnestly in modern 
times. The zeal shown in its pursuit is one of the 
remarkable characteristics of the present age. It 
would be too much to say that the love for science 
and philosophy is greater now than in ancient times. 
It would be difficult to match the enthusiasm of 
Plato or Aristotle. There was, similarly, an ardour 
in the love of the early Christians, which in the 
present day is seldom, if ever, reproduced. There 

B 1 



2 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

is generally a glow in the zeal of pioneers which 
their successors do not exhibit. Yet the work of 
the pioneers, if it prove of value, can still call for 
devotion and sacrifice. Christianity is probably 
more fruitful now than at any period in its history. 
And, likewise, the devotion of modern workers for 
knowledge, if less rapturous than that of its first 
great apostles, is not less capable of disinterested- 
ness. Some may say with Spinoza and Hegel that 
knowledge is the highest ideal of life ; and many, 
who hesitate to go so far in words, show that they 
are offering their lives on the altar of science. 

2. Not less remarkable is the modern advance of 
knowledge. Many questions which baffled the an- 
cients have been answered. Many illusions which 
dazzled them have passed away. Moreover, many 
problems in mental and physical science of which 
they did not dream have presented themselves and 
have received their solution. The conquests of 
science are among the greatest achievements of 
modern times. 

'3. The knowledge thus gained is gradually work- 
ing a revolution in the world. The advantages at- 
tending the revolution are apparent. By means of 
science man is able to control nature and to increase 
the comfort of life. The discoveries of physics are 
followed by mechanical inventions ; the researches 



INTRODUCTION 3 

of the physiologist and pathologist are made tribu- 
tary to the medical art ; psychology teaches how 
the mind should be trained. In every sphere of 
life it is being found that science is giving men 
new and better methods of living. Even in the 
redemption of those who are evil the procedure is 
becoming more scientific. The crimes of men are 
not regarded as the expression of an inexplicable 
freedom, as if a thunderbolt had fallen from a clear 
sky, but are traced back to physical and mental 
antecedents ; and this knowledge of their relations 
is turned to account in the work of reformation and 
prevention. Moreover, science is inducing a certain 
habit of mind in the contemplation of the universe. 
The world is no longer thought of as full of capri- 
cious and malevolent powers. Everywhere there is 
felt to be order and unchanging law. Light has 
come into the world, and superstition and other 
creatures of the night have vanished. And many 
other benefits might be credited to science. If 
these are the works of knowledge, who would not 
love her. "Let her mix with men and prosper." 
4. This revolution, however, has phases of a more 
doubtful kind. The knowledge which is most 
eagerly sought is of the kind yielded by the positive 
sciences. These sciences profess to offer nothing 
but facts and the principles or laws on which these 



4 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

facts may be strung. A system of Positive Philos- 
ophy is thought to present the sum of knowledge. 
There has consequently come into view a certain 
want of harmony between science and other im- 
portant human interests. 

Thus it seems to come into conflict with the moral 
consciousness. It represents man as simply part of 
the world of phenomena, woven like everything else 
into the network of causes and effects, or sequences 
and coexistences. It considers him only in these 
relations, and finds in him no other value. Further, 
science shows its opposition to morality in its 
neglect of human emotions. Even when these are 
considered by the science of psychology, they are 
studied in that dry light which Bacon commended ; 
they are viewed simply in their casual connection 
with other facts. It is charged against the scientific 
man that he can " peep and botanize upon his 
mother's grave." 

There is a similar opposition between science and 
art. There is, indeed, a sense in which science 
helps art, even as it helps morality. When science 
cultivates close attention to the details of objects, 
the art which aims at the faithful reproduction of 
the appearance which things present to the senses 
is promoted. But when art claims to find pleasure 
in the colours and sounds of the world, science is 



INTRODUCTION 5 

indifferent ; and if the artist claims, further, that he 
feels, as he moves among the objects about him, the 
throb of their inner life, his pretensions are met 
with scepticism. Even aesthetics has a certain 
alienation from the sentiments it investigates. 

Again, science wears a look of indifference or 
hostility toward religion. The scientific way of 
looking at the world is not the religious way. 
Science is interested only in facts and their con- 
nections ; religion regards the world as derived 
from and guided by a living Being. It is inter- 
esting to observe that Spencer assigns to science, 
as its province, the knowable ; to religion, the un- 
knowable. True, science also ultimately admits 
that there is an unknowable, but it is the business 
of science to follow out the knowable, as it is 
that of religion to recognize the unknowable. 
This theory points, at least, to the conviction that 
science, in prosecuting its task of investigating 
facts, does not find any object of worship. Since 
there is this conflict, and since science absorbs 
attention in an increasing degree, religion, which 
was wont to be the supreme interest, must have 
its territory correspondingly reduced. The revolu- 
tion is great and is of momentous import. It 
should be added that even the science of theology 
has often a blighting effect upon piety. 






6 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

5. The revolution wrought by science is not 
confined to a small academic circle. The diffusion 
of science in the present age is wide and rapid. 
The democracy is claiming equality in knowledge 
as well as in political rights. Many truths which 
were formerly the rare treasures of intellectual 
aristocrats are now the common possessions of our 
school children. In fact, science has become the 
great instrument of mental training, and there is 
given up to it an increasing portion of the time 
devoted to education. Even literature is often 
studied according to the methods of science, and 
the culture which in such cases it gives is little 
different from that given by chemical and physio- 
logical researches. It is not to be understood that 
those who advocate science as yielding the best 
education always mean that it is an end in itself ; 
they may say that the end is mental discipline, or 
even moral culture. The significant fact for the 
pupil remains that science has for so long a period 
occupied the attention, and that the mind has 
learned the scientific way of looking at the world. 

6. In view of the claims and influence of science, 
it is of the first importance to ask, what it is to 
know. The inquiry is not, indeed, of merely 
present interest. It is not one belonging to the 
exigences of a particular intellectual crisis ; it is 



INTRODUCTION J 

of importance whenever there are seekers after 
truth. But now the need for it is more pressing 
than ever, and it is a question for every one. 
We have to ask whether that which is now offered 
to the world as knowledge is entitled to be so 
regarded, and, if the present methods of know- 
ledge are wrong, what is to be substituted for 
them. 

7. The protest may at once be made that in 
the above account of knowledge and the problems 
which it raises the achievement of philosophy is 
neglected. Knowledge, it will be said, is not to 
be identified with science. Science is abstract ; 
the categories of science are finite ; philosophy 
finds fault with science as giving at best only 
half-truths. Philosophy, on the other hand, has 
the full-orbed vision ; it claims that it avoids ab- 
stractness, and that its categories are infinite. It, 
therefore, denies that there are elements in life 
which it has failed to recognize, and it asserts that 
it has found the method of absolute knowledge. 

The claims thus made by philosophy must re- 
ceive later careful consideration. At present a 
complete estimate of them cannot be given. It 
must, however, here be pointed out that science 
and philosophy are alike in this respect, — that 
both seek knowledge in conceptions or universals. 



8 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

8. For it is here that we come on the assump- 
tion made by all theories of knowledge alike. 
While much labour has been devoted to these 
epistemological problems, while Locke and Kant, 
Hegel and Spencer, have all grappled with them, 
the conclusions reached have all been vitiated by 
the assumption made as to the constitution of 
knowledge. It has been taken for granted, for 
the most part, that the method of science and 
philosophy is the right method in so far as uni- 
versal or laws are sought. There have been dis- 
putes as to the proper procedure in induction, but 
not as to the character of the knowledge which 
induction yields. That has been regarded as 
something fixed, like a fact, or event, which is 
something to be investigated, but which is not 
to be annulled by any process of investigation. 
Even the empiricist, as we shall see, does not dis- 
card universals ; he only gives another version of 
them ; like the transcendentalist, he tries to ana- 
lyze the content of science, but does not contend 
that that content should be different. 

9. But this view of knowledge must be sub- 
jected to criticism. It must be asked whether this 
mode of knowing is the only mode, and whether 
it gives knowledge, in the true sense, at all. 
When men were discussing the power inherent in 



INTRODUCTION 9 

matter, Berkeley asked the prior question, What 
is matter ? So it is necessary in discussions re- 
garding knowledge that there should be a criti- 
cism of the factors thought to constitute knowledge. 
10. The questions before us are not primarily 
psychological. Knowledge is a thought which is 
somehow related to an object, and the aim of the 
present work is to consider what that relation is, 
or what it may be made. Psychology, on the 
other hand, studies the processes of the mind with- 
out considering their cognitive value. It asks 
whence our thoughts come, and what elements 
their analysis yields, but does not inquire into their 
fitness to represent other things. The present in- 
quiry, therefore, belongs to the epistemological 
department of philosophy. At the same time, 
psychology is indispensable to the success of such 
an inquiry. For, if we would rightly estimate the 
value for knowledge of conceptions or other mental 
factors, we must determine what the materials are 
which have gone to their making, the images, emo- 
tions, abstractions, of which they are the resultant 
blend. The work at which Kant laboured was a 
criticism of conceptions, and Kant's results are 
marred because of the imperfections of his psy- 
chology : he does not know the history of the 
conceptions, and so fails to appreciate rightly their 



10 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

function. The cry has often been heard, " Back 
to Kant." And it is a summons to be heeded. 
But comparatively little result has followed from 
the renewed study of the great master, because the 
examination of his results has not been carried on 
in the light of a true psychology. It is not too 
much to believe that, when Kant is studied under 
the illumination of this new science, the result of 
the return to him will be in a true sense an ad- 
vance upon him. 

11. The work of Locke and Kant is not yet ac- 
complished. The theory of knowledge must benefit 
by the more thorough analysis of modern research. 
And the result of this investigation is to show 
that the method of science and philosophy must 
be discarded. Science has been called a "mush- 
room growth," and even philosophy is not old. 
And though it were much older, the present con- 
ception of knowledge has no inalienable right to 
the place it occupies. Its sway may be only an 
episode in the history of thought. I think that it 
can be traced to its origin in a certain definite 
philosophical theory, and that the theory can be 
proved to be a mistake. It is, therefore, one of 
the objects of the present work to show that what 
is now offered as science is not truth : that science, 
physical, mental, moral, philosophical, is not truth ; 



INTRODUCTION- II 

that no science singly can give it, and that all to- 
gether fail. It is then to be shown that for the 
attainment of truth a new method must . be de- 
veloped. 

12. It is necessary at the outset to guard against 
a misapprehension. It may be said at once that 
such a view as that indicated must be fantastical, 
and that to bring an indictment against science is 
to repeat the folly of ordering the ocean to retire. 
It is, however, to be observed that science is not 
said to be useless. It is profitable for many things. 
It would scarcely have reached the place it occu- 
pies had it not served some of the great ends of 
living. It is, too, indispensable in the search for 
knowledge. It is not, indeed, knowledge. Though 
it has usurped the place of knowledge, it is not 
the heir to that throne. Yet, though not the heir, 
it should be one of the chief ministers of know- 
ledge, and its work can be used for knowledge. 
Especially is it to be noted that there is no quar- 
rel with the spirit of science. The devotees of 
science have had truth as their ideal, though they 
have not shown discernment in their efforts to 
reach it. They are like that ancient religious 
people who needed that the God they worshipped 
should be declared unto them. The impulse to 
know, though approving itself one of the fruits 



12 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

of human evolution most worthy of admiration, 
needs to be guided by a criticism that is ever more 
careful and comprehensive. And since science has 
this ideal and this enthusiasm, he may be its most 
faithful friend who seems to be dealing it wounds. 
He is not necessarily an enemy of the democracy 
who does not look on the republican form of gov- 
ernment as the ultimate political constitution. He 
may have most of the spirit of science who re- 
fuses to regard its methods as above criticism. 

13. It is the plan of this investigation to give 
first a definition of knowledge. The methods will 
then be considered by which men have thought it 
possible to attain knowledge of the self on the one 
hand, and the not-self on the other. Those who 
have not begun to reflect believe that they get 
truth in the data of the senses. This view will 
be criticised, and at the same time an estimate 
will be made of the contribution which sensation 
offers to truth. The common view of philosophers 
and scientists, that truth is given in general con- 
cepts, or universals, or categories, will next be 
taken up. The special form of the doctrine given 
in empiricism will also be considered. It is a 
doctrine that is found wanting in all its forms. 
At the same time it will be pointed out that the 
concept has its uses in the mental economy. The 



INTRO D UCTION 1 3 

true method of knowledge will then be expounded. 
The method of knowing the not-self will be first 
investigated ; and it will be shown that this know- 
ledge is gained by sympathetic imitation. But 
as this method involves the use, to a greater or less 
extent, of the other methods, emphasis will be 
laid on what is called the "synthesis of the 
methods." After this discussion of the conditions 
under which knowledge of other things is possible, 
it will be a relatively short task to determine 
wherein self-knowledge consists. In conclusion, 
the bearing of this theory on the philosophical 
problem, and also on certain practical questions, 
will be indicated. 



CHAPTER I 

DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 

1. In order to determine the function of know- 
ledge, it is necessary to take a brief survey of the 
great philosophical theories. Such a survey is, in 
one sense, disappointing, for the question, What 
is knowledge? is one that has received too little 
attention from philosophers ; even in modern times, 
when epistemology has often been the exclusive 
topic of philosophy, a definition of the relation 
which subject and object sustain in knowledge has 
been too little attempted. Yet theories of the 
universe have certain views of knowledge as their 
presupposition, even when these are not adequately 
discussed, and the consideration of such will be the 
proper preparation of the way to a definition of 
knowledge. 

2. The theory was maintained by some of the 
early Greek philosophers that like is known by like. 
The doctrine may be best appreciated by reference 
to the system of Empedocles, who explained the 
sense in which he understood it. He taught that 

14 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 15 

there are four elements in the universe, — fire, air, 
earth, and water. There are besides two forces 
which act on these elements, — love and hatred. 
While hatred destroys their unity and scatters them, 
love or friendship joins them together. By this 
process of joining together, the cosmos is produced ; 
earth and stars and human beings are formed. The 
knowledge which the intelligence of man has of 
the world of things outside him is rendered possible 
by the fact that he is composed of the same ele- 
ments as those that are found in things ; and each 
of the elements in him recognizes the element out- 
side him to which it is akin. The air is known by 
the air in him ; the fire by the fire ; the earth by 
the earth ; and the water by the water. 

The theory as thus stated seems crude as a 
picture painted by a child. Yet it is to be appre- 
ciated properly only if its presuppositions are under- 
stood. It was the product of an age when the 
world was interpreted in terms of a simple animism. 
Fire and air were not dead things ; they were living, 
like human beings ; the principles that joined them 
together were not mechanical, they were love and 
hatred. These living elements blend in the human 
soul, and they reflect the life corresponding to them. 
The living, conscious fire and air in man are like 
the living, conscious fire and air in other things. 



16 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

The doctrine of Empedocles thus loses the crudity 
of its first appearance and becomes a suggestion 
toward a profoundly spiritual theory. 

After all that may be said for the theory, it 
must be admitted that it fails to offer a complete 
account of knowledge. The material and spiritual 
are so mixed that we cannot look for a clear state- 
ment of the relations subsisting between conscious 
elements and their objective counterpart. More- 
over, the self-knowledge of the elements, exhibited 
in the case of man, is not yet explained. Yet the 
statement that like is known by like formulates a 
view of knowledge that is of extreme importance, 
and one that was a natural product of the Greek 
mind. The unity of spirit and nature has often 
been referred to as characteristic of Greek ideas. 
The Greek did not think of nature as something 
alien from man and lower. It is also true that he 
did not think of the gods as inaccessible to man: 
they are human. Man is thus one among many 
objects of like quality. This attitude toward the 
world found its parallel in the assumption regard- 
ing knowledge. It was taken for granted that 
thought can measure reality, and that there is 
nothing to shut out the spirit of man from the 
objects about him. Philosophers, therefore, laboured 
to define the reality which seemed so certainly 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE \J 

within their mental reach. Their reflection on this 
function of knowledge was expressed in the maxim 
of Empedocles. 

3. The next important contribution toward the 
definition of knowledge is to be found in the ideal- 
istic system of Plato. For it is to him rather 
than to Socrates that we need here to turn. Soc- 
rates, though the author of the philosophic faith 
of Plato and Aristotle, has not developed his sys- 
tem sufficiently to raise the special problem of 
the relation which in cognition subject bears to 
object. 

Plato teaches that there is a world of ideas ex- 
isting independently of the mind. The idea is the 
universal, the common concept, or notion. It is 
that which abides while individual things change 
and pass away. Thus, there is a multiplicity of 
beautiful objects, but beauty in itself is other than 
they. They are beautiful because they share in it ; 
they are imperfect because they are only broken 
lights of it. It is eternal and perfect. Moreover, 
the idea is the real ; to it individual things owe 
such reality as they have. 

Knowledge is the contemplation of these ideas. 

The soul sees them. It looked upon them before 

it was imprisoned in the body, and even in this 

world it can so purify itself as to enjoy the vision 

o 



1 8 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

of them. The bliss of the future life will consist 
in the beholding of them. 

Thus Plato seems to regard knowledge as some- 
thing visual. 1 The object is something to which 
the eye of the soul is directed. This is the natu- 
ral, naive view of knowledge ; to look at a thing 
and to know it are the same. And so far, the 
Platonic contribution to epistemology seems of 
little value. 

Yet, though Plato so often speaks of knowledge 
in terms of sight, he has also given evidence that 
he has another conception of the relation between 
subject and object. Thus, he says the "true lover 
of knowledge will go on until he have attained 
the knowledge of the true nature of every essence 
by a kindred power in the soul, and by that 
power drawing near and mingling and becoming 
incorporate with very being, ... he will know 
and live and grow truly." 2 It is by a "kindred 
power in the soul" that the subject knows the 
object : Plato finds in knowledge the similarity 
of subject and object, if not a closer relation. His 
teaching is similar when he declares that the re- 
alities of the universe are rational ; and also that 
the good is the source alike of knowing and being. 

1 Cf. Windelband, GeschicJite der Philosophic, p. 92. 

2 Bepublic, 490 (Jowett's Translation). 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 19 

4. It was the task of Aristotle to modify and 
develop the doctrine of Plato. The form of Aris- 
totle takes the place of the idea of Plato, yet the 
form is not like the idea, something apart from 
things; it exists only in things. Further, the 
relation of the supreme form to the subordinate 
forms is stated. The supreme form is the ground 
or "principle" of the other forms; they are also 
moved by it : it moves them, for they are moved 
by love to it. This highest form is interpreted 
according to the purest idealism : God is self- 
consciousness, the thought of thought. It must 
be remembered, at the same time, that Aristotle 
does not elaborate these propositions into the con- 
sistent system of idealism which they so strik- 
ingly suggest. 

Aristotle's doctrine of knowledge is in harmony 
with these metaphysical principles. His defini- 
tion of truth, as the agreement of thought with 
reality, indicates its fundamental principle. In 
cognition he distinguishes between that which is 
by sense and that which is by reason. By the 
former we know the sense-qualities ; by the latter, 
the rational form. In both cases the knowledge 
consists in the presence in the mind of a form 
which corresponds to the form in things. " Sense- 
perception is that which is receptive of the forms 



20 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

of things sensible without their matter, just in the 
same way as wax receives the impress of the seal 
without the iron or gold of which it is com- 
posed." 1 It is to be remembered that sense- 
perception relates to the individual, not to the 
universal, and, therefore, cannot give us science. 
It is the reason that gives this supreme form of 
knowledge. Yet in the two kinds of knowledge 
there is the same relation between subject and 
object. " Thinking is like perception, and con- 
sists in being affected by the object of thought 
or in something else of this nature. Like sense 
then, thought or reason must be not entirely pas- 
sive, but receptive of the form — that is, it must 
be potentially like this form but not actually 
identical with it ; it will stand in fact toward 
its objects in the same relation as that in which 
the faculty of sense stands toward the objects of 
perception." 2 It seems natural to infer from 
such passages that Aristotle's rendering of the 
principle that like is known by like, is that the 
form in the mind is a copy of the form indepen- 
dent of the mind. 

Yet there are also passages in Aristotle's writ- 
ings in which it is stated that rational thought 

1 De Anima, II, 12 (Wallace's Translation). 

2 De Anima, III, 4. 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 21 

and its object are identical. He may be sup- 
posed to mean that the universal, which is one in 
the many individuals, is still the same when it 
shows itself in the knowing mind. There is, 
therefore, here a tendency to pass from the doc- 
trine that like is known by like ; for likeness 
gives place to identity. Aristotle can here be 
seen to approach that modern idealism which regards 
thought as at once subject and object. Yet he 
does not go the length of such idealism. 

5. There is yet another knowledge-theory be- 
longing to the Greek period of which it is impor- 
tant to take account. It is found in the 
mysticism of Plotinus. This thinker offered some 
serious modifications of the doctrine of Plato and 
Aristotle. It seemed to him that the absolute 
Being could not be described as though know- 
ledge were its essential activity. For in know- 
ledge there is a distinction of subject and object, 
and the absolute, being one, cannot have this dis- 
tinction applied to it. The absolute unity is the 
undefinable. Yet, as Plotinus proceeds to show, 
it gives rise to reason, which in its turn produces 
the ideas of things; and so there is a downward 
evolution till matter is finally reached. The 
task of the human soul is to reverse this process, 
and rise through its degrees till it reaches the 



22 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

absolute unity. In this ascent it arrives at the 
stage of reason which Plato and Aristotle regarded 
as the climax of human attainment. Here it enjoys 
the contemplation of the ideas ; and this is good ; 
but it is not the best. The soul passes upward 
to gain perfect unity with the Supreme Being. 
This condition is reached in ecstasy, in which 
the union with God is so complete that self- 
consciousness is obliterated, and no awareness of 
other existence disturbs the rapturous sense of 
possession by God. 

It is important to notice in regard to mysticism 
that it looks for another kind of unity with the 
absolute than that which the rationalists seem to 
reach. It may be that the condition of ecstasy 
has little claim to stand for the realization of such 
ideals, yet the search for some other method of 
reaching reality than that of logical categories 
demands careful attention. Another peculiarity of 
mysticism which concerns us more at present is 
that its ideal of knowledge involves the absorption 
of the individual in the absolute. It may be 
urged, indeed, that mysticism is not a theory of 
knowledge, since it is denied by Plotinus that 
the highest state can be described in terms of 
knowledge. But we must not be misled by words. 
If knowledge means the way in which the human 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 23 

spirit comes into contact with the absolute reality, 
it is not to be decided a 'priori that the ideal which 
it has before it is truly represented in the meaning 
usually associated with the term. It is necessary 
to keep in mind mysticism as a form of knowledge- 
theory. 

6. The Greek era passed, and the Middle Ages 
came with the dominion of the Christian Church, 
and the insistence upon the lesson that man's 
supreme task in life is the salvation of his soul. 
The lesson was learned ; the greatness of the soul 
was realized. At the same time, the nature that 
environed man was ignored. But this period also 
passed. Science revived, and nature was studied 
anew. She could no longer be ignored, and each 
new discovery of science served to exalt her, and 
display her greatness. But the lesson of the 
Middle Ages was not forgotten. Man came to 
the contemplation of nature with a deepened self- 
consciousness. Modern philosophy began, there- 
fore, with two seemingly distinct entities before it, 
— man and nature ; and no small part of its work 
has been devoted to the determination of their 
relations. The problem presented itself at first 
as that of the relation of mind and body. Des- 
cartes, the Occasionalists, Spinoza, and Leibnitz 
were taken up with questions of this kind. The 



24 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

discussion touched a deeper level when Locke 
asked, what our ideas are, and whether they can 
be applied to things. 

7. When such questions were asked, it seemed 
natural to say that our ideas reveal objects only 
as they appear, not as they are in themselves. 
There is no longer the original Greek unity of 
spirit and nature. Each thing is a substance 
which cannot disclose itself save in its effects on 
others ; and further reflection seems to show that 
this is true not only of external things, but of the 
Ego : it is known in its appearances. One of the 
most characteristic theories of modern times is 
agnosticism. 

8. Locke gives expression to agnostic views when 
he declares that the mind is limited to ideas, and 
that all its knowledge consists in the joining or 
separating of ideas according to their agreement 
or disagreement ; but he does not preserve his con- 
sistency, for he very soon proceeds to speak of a 
knowledge in which our ideas agree with reality. 

9. Hume's analysis of the contents of the mind 
shows that they are made up of impressions and 
ideas. The impressions are distinguished from the 
ideas by their greater strength and vividness ; thus, 
the imagination of a scene, if compared with the 
actual contemplation of one, is seen to be pale and 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 2$ 

obscure. It proves on further reflection that all 
the ideas are copies of impressions : in a sense 
they are all memories. They may be compounded 
in various ways and so yield the ideas of imagina- 
tion, but the materials are originally derived from 
impressions. The great question then arises, 
Whence do impressions come, and what know- 
ledge do they bring ? They arise from " unknown 
causes." They may come from objects, or from 
God, or from the mind itself. What a doctrine 
of knowledge can do is to trace the forms which 
these impressions and ideas assume. Hume sets 
himself to prove this in tracing the history of the 
"philosophical ideas of relation," such as space, 
time, causality. He does not find that these ideas 
add anything new to our mental content. They 
are simply particular ideas considered in a certain 
light. The idea of time is not something different 
from the succession of ideas. There is a succession 
of ideas in us, and, looking at that in such a way that 
the aspect of succession is prominent, we have the 
idea of time. Time as an abstract idea sundered 
from the succession of particular ideas or impres- 
sions does not exist. Thus the study of the ideas 
of relation confirms the view that there is nothing 
in the mind save impressions and copies of impres- 
sions. The case of causality has, so far as the 



26 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

account of the intellect is concerned, a somewhat 
exceptional treatment. Causality is resolved into 
constant conjunction in time ; but this does not 
seem fully to explain the necessity which exists 
in the causal bond, and Hume says that this neces- 
sity is a new impression which arises when the 
constant conjunction is exhibited. Hume thus 
admits a special mode of origin for this mental 
factor. But he does not assign such an origin to 
other relations, nor does he attribute to this origin 
any special cognitive value. The necessity in 
causality is merely a new impression. 

10. Kant offers a theory of knowledge which 
agrees, in important respects, with that of Hume. 
He also regards impressions as due to unknown 
causes. The thing in itself affects the sensibility, 
and thus produces the multiplicity of sensations. 
But these sensations do not reveal that thing in 
itself : they are only modes of the sensibility. 
Neither do they reveal the Ego in itself ; they 
present only its modes. The thing in itself re- 
mains absolutely unknown. 

Kant differed from Hume in his account of the 
"philosophical ideas of relation," or, to use his 
own expression, "categories." Quantity, quality, 
substance, cause, and the rest, are not merely par- 
ticular impressions, or ideas "viewed in a certain 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 27 

light." Neither are they new impressions. They 
are conceptions, distinct from sense-data, and owing 
their origin to the spontaneous activity of the 
mind. It might have been expected that Kant 
would regard these categories as representing the 
thing in itself, for while sensations are merely 
states of a conscious subject these mind-originated 
concepts might seem entitled to be thought of as 
objective. Yet Kant does not so view them. They 
are, as far as the thing in itself is concerned, merely 
subjective. They bring order and unity into the 
chaos of sensation; through them that sense-ma- 
terial is woven into the wonderful web which nature 
presents. Yet this web remains a mental product. 
Nature's laws are the creatures of the understand- 
ing. Thus categories fail as completely as sensa- 
tions to give us a knowledge of things in them- 
selves. 

It is true that there are in Kant hints toward 
a very different theory of knowledge. He speaks 
of the possibility of an intelligence that, unlike 
ours, is not " discursive," but intuitive, and so 
knows things in their truth. Moreover, while 
intellectually we cannot reach absolute reality, we 
come into contact with it through our moral facul- 
ties, and the great moral principles of the universe 
are made known to us. Some of these suggestions 



28 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

will be seen to be of great significance. Yet it 
remains true that the theory which Kant most 
explicitly formulated and most carefully elaborated 
is that which is agnostic in its principles. 

11. It is not necessary to consider other exposi- 
tions of agnosticism, for they contain little that 
is new. The doctrine seems, at first sight, to have 
assumed a much more developed form in the hands 
of Mr. Spencer. Yet what is most distinctive of 
his theory is his account of the evolution of ideas. 
His agnosticism does not differ from that of Hume : 
the manifestations of the unknowable are, he says, 
impressions and ideas. 

12. It remains to determine the definition of 
knowledge which agnosticism sanctions. For in 
saying that knowledge is impossible it implies, 
obviously, a theory of the nature of knowledge. 
And it is also apparent that the view of know- 
ledge is like the Greek view. The mental ele- 
ments must resemble the elements to be cognized. 
Thoughts must be equal to things. The early 
Greek view and the modern agnostic view agree 
in their presupposition as to the nature of know- 
ledge. 1 

13. There has, however, developed from Kant a 

1 Cf. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. I, Part II, § 2 ; 
Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (herausg. von Kehrbach), p. 222. 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 29 

very remarkable theory of knowledge, which, from 
its wide influence at the present time, demands 
somewhat careful examination. Kant's agnosticism 
has been described. But it is to be observed that, 
while he teaches that the categories are merely 
principles of unity among sensations, and there- 
fore unable to give us knowledge of things in them- 
selves, he yet describes the judgments which spring 
from categories as knowledge : it is a 'priori know- 
ledge, necessary and universal. This account of 
knowledge, as not consisting in relations between 
the mind and objects, but as being the develop- 
ment of the mind's spontaneous activity, seemed 
complete without any reference to an object or 
thing in itself. It developed into Absolute Ideal- 
ism. Thus, Hegel does not allow that truth refers 
to the agreement of cognition with reality, but 
contends that it denotes the adequate realization 
of the Idea, as we mean by a true man one who 
fully realizes manhood. A similar view is repre- 
sented by T. H. Green. " Knowledge," he says, 
"consists in the consciousness of relations, or re- 
lated facts." 1 Nor is there an objective world of 
which these relations found in consciousness are a 
copy. The eternal intelligence communicates to 
us "in inseparable correlation, understanding and 
1 Prolegomena to Ethics, Bk. I, § 57. 



30 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

the facts understood, experience and the experienced 
world." 1 Many other writers might be cited 
who regard the distinction between subject and 
object as belonging to a lower stage of the develop- 
ment of thought, and who describe knowledge as 
an activity of the mind unrelated to anything 
beyond itself. 

14. This theory is, in part, a reaction against 
agnosticism, and in its zeal for the validity of 
knowledge, it proclaims that knowledge of an ab- 
solute kind is possible because the facts to be 
known are all facts of consciousness. It thus 
seems to meet all the demands of knowledge. 
And it may be that it has a truth to suggest in 
regard to the individual human being's knowledge 
of his conscious states : we shall consider later 
whether each of these may be at once knowing 
and being. The validity of the theory might be 
conceded also, had we to deal simply with an ab- 
solute Reason whose being was his rational activ- 
ity. Yet even at this standpoint difficulties present 
themselves in the statements of idealists. For 
when it is said that the process of the universe is 
the knowledge or self-defining of itself by the ab- 
solute, it seems clear that there is not merely the 
unfolding of the Idea, but that this unfolding is 

1 Prolegomena, Bk. I, § 36. 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 31 

guided by the purpose of having a subject which 
is distinct from, if also identical with, its object. 

Apart from this, however, there is a further 
problem. It cannot be repeated too often or with 
too great emphasis that in the investigation into 
knowledge there is first to be considered the know- 
ledge of one individual by another. Hegel did not 
do justice to the fact of individuality, and trans- 
cendentalists generally have been his partners in this 
error. But the experiences of individual human 
beings are facts ; and part, at least, of the problem 
of knowledge is the question how one individual 
consciousness is to know the experience of another. 
My neighbour's actual experience as he reads the 
book, or enjoys the sunshine, — how am I to lay 
my consciousness alongside of his so that I can in 
any true sense know his ? It may be said that we 
can know him by universals, for knowledge comes 
only by such. The assumption is great, but it 
need not be here criticised. If my neighbour is 
made up of universals, yet they are so knit to- 
gether as to make him an individual with a 
unique experience, and when I wish to know him 
I wish to reproduce that particular plexus of uni- 
versals. There are still, therefore, subject and 
object which are to meet in the fellowship of 
knowledge. 



32 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

It may be said that when they attain this fel- 
lowship there is unity in the universal. The 
reasons for and against this opinion need not be 
stated at present. Suppose it to be true, it is to be 
observed that this unity is an ideal to be reached. 
There is a relation of subject and object, and the 
object determines the subject. There is not merely 
the spontaneous activity of an evolving Idea. 
There is the contrast of two individuals and the 
effort of one to become parallel to the other. 

One cause of the triumph of the transcenden- 
talist view, to so name it, is the success with 
which it has seemed to dispose of the material 
world. That world seems to be completely ex- 
plained when it is resolved into sense-data and 
intellectual relations. We do not seem to lose 
anything when matter is so regarded. Thus the 
act by which matter is created seems to be the act 
by which it is known : knowing and being are in 
every sense identical. The success of this kind 
of argument, however, is due to our complete ig- 
norance of matter. Matter is still an inscrutable 
mystery. Were our ignorance less complete, we 
might find that material things cannot, any more 
than human individuals or the lower animals, lose 
themselves in, or be resolved into, the mental states 
of an intelligence. In any case, the facts which 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 33 

must determine a theory of knowledge are those 
of which we actually know something ; and these 
facts are our own experiences, and the experiences 
of other human beings. The being of one man 
and the knowing of him by his neighbours are, in 
certain profound senses, not to be identified. We 
are thus brought face to face with a problem such 
as that which the Greeks recognized. 

15. It is appropriate at this point to take 
account of a theory of truth which is sometimes 
met with. It is said that the only true know- 
ledge that is to be attained by the mind is a 
system of consistent judgments. "We must seek 
the criterion of truth within and not without the 
world of consciousness. It can, then, be nothing 
else than the inner harmony and consistency of 
all thoughts and experiences." 1 Such a view 
naturally presents itself when the presuppositions 
of Locke and Kant are conceded. If knowledge 
consists in the combining or synthetizing of ideas, 
the consistency of a system of knowledge may well 
be the only possible test of its truth. And at all 
times such consistency must be admitted to have 
its value as a criterion. But when we are called 

1 Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, translated by Mary E. 
Lowndes, p. 219. Cf. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. I, 
Part III, § 5. 



34 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

upon to renounce all knowledge save that which 
is given in such a consistent system, the vital 
interest of knowledge is ignored. To refer to the 
crucial test, the man who wishes to know his 
neighbour does not aim merely at consistency. The 
goal of his effort is not that, but the reality as 
it lives before him. 

16. We have briefly surveyed the main theories 
of knowledge, and they can be seen to fall into 
two groups. The view of knowledge of which 
Empedocles was taken as the representative is ex- 
pressed in the formula, Like is known by like. 
This had the adhesion of Aristotle when he said 
that truth was the agreement of thought with 
reality. It seems also to be the presupposition of 
agnosticism. The other view of knowledge is 
that which makes it identical with its object : 
Aristotle in certain passages identifies the univer- 
sal in the mind with that which is manifested in 
things ; Plotinus seeks for the merging of self- 
consciousness in the absolute Being ; Hegel regards 
knowledge as the unfolding of the Idea. With 
this group of theories may perhaps be classed 
that which finds the test of truth in consistency. 
The truth of the first view is in its recognition of 
the distinction between subject and object; but in its 
formulation there is not any proper recognition of 



DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE 35 

the peculiarity of self-knowledge. The second view 
has truth in reference to self-knowledge ; it fails to 
recognize the problem of the knowledge which one 
individual has in the contemplation of another in- 
dividual, and thus is fatally incomplete as a theory 
of knowledge. 

17. This historical survey has prepared the way 
for a determination of the nature of knowledge. 
Since, in the effort to know, the mind seeks to 
think things as they are in themselves, and since 
the facts to be known by a human being are the 
knowing self and a world of other persons and 
things, knowledge may be denned as the presence 
in the mind immediately, or in copy, of that which 
constitutes objects. 

The full exposition and justification of this defi- 
nition will be given in the chapters which follow. 
It may be pointed out, however, that the definition 
is not meant to decide at the outset how the sub- 
jective state and the object known are ultimately 
related. Whether the subject and object while 
retaining their individuality reach in knowledge an 
inner identity, or by their individuality are excluded 
from such identity, is a question left at present 
unanswered. Again, it is not intended to decide 
the question as to the knowledge which the self 
has of itself in each moment of its existence. It 



36 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

remains to be considered whether it must become 
an object to itself as other things are objects to 
it; or is in some more intimate way knower of 
itself in every state of consciousness. What is 
affirmed in the definition is that the object, whether 
self or not-self, must be present to the knowing 
mind in copy or in some more intimate way. 

It is further to be remembered that the defi- 
nition presents the ideal of knowledge. It is not 
less the true ideal because men have failed to 
attain it, and in their efforts after it have used many 
false methods, and taken many an illusion for the 
prize of their search. 

It is here left undetermined how far this ideal 
is possible of attainment. It may be that the ag- 
nostic conclusion is in important respects the correct 
one. Even the argument of Berkeley, that God 
has not given His children a strong desire for any- 
thing that He has forever put beyond their reach, 
is one that must be used with caution. It will 
have to be decided how far it is possible to reach 
the absolute reality. But the ideal is the ideal of 
knowledge. It will justify itself as such as we 
proceed, and it will be the true test of the methods 
of knowledge. 



CHAPTER II 

SENSATION, FEELING, AND VOLITION AS COGNITIVE 
FACTORS 1 

1. If the question were asked, How do we get 
our knowledge of objects? it is likely that most 
people would answer without hesitation that we 
get it through the senses. The panorama of nature 
is spread before the eye ; her music comes to the 
soul through the ear. All that we know of her 
seems known by the senses : they are the " gateways 
of knowledge." Moreover, things are believed to 
exist in themselves just as the senses report them. 
The colours of earth, and cloud, and human face 
are thought to be just the same when no eye beholds 
them ; the symphony of nature is the same whether 
or not there are living creatures to listen to it. 
Sensation is thus taken to be the great method of 
knowledge. " It seems evident," says Hume, " that 
men are carried by a natural instinct or preposses- 
sion to repose faith in their senses." 

1 While feeling and volition are not usually recognized as instru- 
,ments of knowledge, the present discussion of sensation seems to 
afford a proper opportunity for attempting an estimate of their 
cognitive value. 

37 



38 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

2. " But," Hume adds, " this universal and pri- 
mary opinion is soon destroyed by the slightest 
philosophy." And, in truth, from the beginning 
of philosophy, sensation has for various reasons 
been disparaged as a method of knowledge. Even 
empiricists, who seem to restrict themselves to 
sensation, do not regard it as yielding knowledge 
in the strict sense of the word ; generally they are 
agnostics. It is only among those unaccustomed 
to reflection that sensation is taken for the method 
of knowledge. 

3. The reason for rejecting sensation is not that 
the senses are often the victims of illusions. The 
objections are to the deliverances of the senses when 
all so-called illusions have been corrected. 

Thus there is the contention of the transcenden- 
talists that the cognitive or objective element in the 
mind is other than sensation. To externalize such 
sense-qualities as sound and colour and to make 
them objects is to go beyond the warrant of mere 
sensation. A sensation is a purely subjective 
somewhat. A colour by itself is not the thought 
of an object. To make it an object there are 
called into operation the categories of space and 
substance. At the best, sensation serves as an 
occasion for the exercise of reason. Just as the 
word tree is not the representation of the actual 



SENSATION, FEELING, AND VOLITION 39 

tree, but may suffice to call into exercise the facul- 
ties which are necessary to the distinct figuring of 
the tree, so the sensation serves to call into exercise 
the rational faculty, and elicit not images but con- 
cepts or categories, in which alone knowledge is to 
be found. 

Nor is it the transcendentalist alone who finds 
sensation wanting. The researches of the physicist 
seem to establish similar conclusions. The physi- 
cist finds that the objective system of things is a 
system of forms of energy, possibly associated with 
a material substrate. This system bears no simi- 
larity to the series of sensations by which its 
existence is indicated to us. Vibrations in the 
ether which are the objective counterpart of colours 
are yet in no way like colours ; and vibrations in 
the air are not like sounds. The objective world 
is not coloured ; nor is it a vocal world. There is 
thus a breach between the intimations of the senses 
and the objective world revealed by science. 

A very similar objection presents itself to the 
view of physiological psychology. When there 
is studied not merely the movement in the world 
external to the body, but the process in the 
nervous system, the contrast of the physical and 
psychical processes is not less striking. The 
physiologist finds certain activities of a physical 



40 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

and chemical kind carried on in the cells and 
fibres which constitute the nervous system. In 
an ordinary sense-experience some agent in the 
physical world starts the activities of the so-called 
end-organs ; the action is propagated to the brain ; 
and a sensation results. But the sensation is not 
a knowledge of the brain-activity. The two bear 
no resemblance to each other. The student of 
the brain confesses that, however intimately he may 
come to know the brain, he does not expect to 
diminish the disparateness between the appear- 
ance which it presents and the sensations which 
are due to its activities. Thus the objects to which 
sensations might be referred, whether they are the 
immediately antecedent physical processes in the 
brain, or the more remote objects to which 
the nervous activities are ultimately to be traced, 
show themselves to be of another quality of being 
than these sensations. It seems just, therefore, 
to conclude that as reflection progresses the cogni- 
tive value of sensation diminishes in credit. 

4. These criticisms of sensation will be consid- 
ered more or less directly as we proceed ; and it 
will be seen that while they have certain obvious 
facts to rest on, the conclusions are of little value. 
They have been referred to here to account for 
the common disparagement of sensation. There is, 



SENSATION, FEELING, AND VOLITION 41 

however, a characteristic of sensation which is so 
far a justification of these criticisms, or, at least, 
specifies the sense in which sensation is not cogni- 
tive. Sensation is subjective ; it is a state of the 
subject ; there is no reason for thinking that it is 
a state of the object at the time when, and in the 
form in which, this object acts as stimulus. When 
a man looks on his neighbour's face, he has certain 
sensations of colour. He does not thereby know 
his neighbour, for there need be nothing in his 
neighbour's physical or mental constitution of which 
that sensation is the likeness. The colour is his 
feeling, not his neighbour's. It is, therefore, right 
to reject the naive uncritical view that things exist 
just as our senses report them. 1 The view is as 
false as the view would be that a word resembles 
the object for which it stands. 

5. But there is a sense in which the sensibility is a 
truly cognitive faculty. There is a sphere in which 
it alone can give knowledge, — the sphere of sensa- 
tion itself. Since like is known by like, sensation 
can be known only by sensation. 

1 Yet there is a tendency on the part of some writers to return 
to this uncritical view. Mach, e.g., says, "The world with my 
Ego appeared to me as one coherent mass of sensations." (Con- 
tributions to the Analysis of the Sensations, translated by 
C. M. Williams, p. 23, note.) 






42 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

First of all, it must be insisted, sensations are 
facts. They are such as truly as anything in the 
universe of thought and things. The sensation of 
green when I look at the grass is as much a fact 
as the force of gravitation. And if it is a fact, then 
it is legitimate to seek to know it. Again, the 
sensations are not exclusively, or even primarily, 
mere utilities in the preservation of life. The 
idea of evolution and of function as determined 
by its utility in the struggle for existence has led 
to the view of sensation as a means to an end 
beyond it. Sensation is thus regarded as a teleologi- 
cal instrument, and thus it is contemned. But 
originally it is not a means to an end. It is simply 
the mind's state, or activity. The rush of the 
winds, the flow of the water, the shining of the 
stars, these we describe simply as activities. They 
are not designed to redound to the good of wind, 
or sea, or star. Even so, sensations are not a set 
of signs invented by the mind for its convenience 
in discerning advantages or dangers. They- are its 
activities, or its states. Not that the forces present 
in evolution fail to affect the mental life. A period 
of sifting comes with the struggle for existence. 
The fittest survive ; the organisms which have 
certain characters survive. It is not meant that 
these organisms produced such characters by 



SENSATION, FEELING, AND VOLITION 43 

design. The characters are due to the operation 
of laws which are regarded as blind and mechani- 
cal. The stronger survives, just as the torrent 
sweeps away barriers which are less strong than 
itself. So those minds are "selected" by nature 
in this period of stress which happen to possess 
certain sensations and certain modes of relating 
sensations. Now it is one set of sensations that 
must be developed — say, those of smell ; now 
another — say, those of sight. The animal with 
the acuter faculty survives. In this manner sen- 
sations are teleological. In themselves, however, 
they are not teleological, any more than the clay 
is in itself teleological which is used to stop a 
hole. 

Nor is sensation merely a sign for the convenience 
of the intellect. It is not to be thought that it 
indicates something to us, and may then be for- 
gotten while that other thing is being studied. It 
is not merely an instrument to something beyond it ; 
it is a fact for knowledge. Knowledge has no instru- 
ments which are merely instruments. It must fulfil 
in the case of all its special function ; it must know 
them so far as they can be known. The sensation 
of green and other sensations must be known in 
themselves. 

If sensations are objects of knowledge, it is evi- 



44 Methods of knowledge 

dent that the likeness of idea and object which con- 
stitutes knowledge can be reached in their case, only 
if the knower has sensations. To know a sensation 
of green as a fact in his own or some other's con- 
sciousness, the knower must have the sensation of 
green. The blind man cannot, strictly speaking, 
know colours. He may have much that usually goes 
by the name of knowledge of them ; he may asso- 
ciate with the term many ideas like those which 
other men have, and he may understand the demon- 
strations of optical laws as well as others. But the 
sensations of red and green and yellow, which are 
experiences of other men, and facts in the universe, 
are forever unknown to him. Sensations in one 
man are known by corresponding sensations in an- 
other who is knower ; or in the same man in an 
act of memory. A fuller vindication of these state- 
ments will be given when the complete method of 
knowledge is expounded. 

6. The importance of the principle laid down is 
great in proportion to the importance to be attached 
to sensation. Sensation is important inasmuch as it 
is a fact of consciousness. Great interest is felt in 
the study of matter even when matter is regarded 
as dead. If it is dead, much more interest should 
be felt in this vital element of the mind. If the 
physical universe is merely mechanical, Hegel is 



SENSATION, FEELING, AND VOLITION 45 

justified when he says 1 that the meanest of man's 
fancies affords a better knowledge of the being of 
God than any object in nature ; that is, the most 
insignificant fact of consciousness has a more divine 
worth than anything in nature. Again, it must be 
admitted by every one, transcendentalist as well as 
empiricist, that sensation occupies a very large 
place in consciousness. Our conscious experience 
is to a great extent made up of sensations. They 
come in seemingly infinite numbers, some in the 
noonday of attention, others in its twilight. They 
change from moment to moment, one picture as it 
is created giving way to another scene. Add to 
these the imaginings, the dreams by day and night, 
the memories, all which give sensations again, 
though often faded and indistinct, and it can be 
seen how largely life is made up of sensations. 
Moreover, all must agree that sensation contributes 
largely to the interest of life ; were the sensations 
of taste and smell, sight and hearing, deducted from 
conscious experience, the residuum would be of the 
tamest character. 

It may be also that the senses will have in the 
future a still higher place assigned to them. Partly 
because of the intellectual theories which have pre- 
vailed, and partly because of the ascetic morality 

1 Encyclopadie, § 248. 



46 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

which is our heritage from the past, we look on 
them with indifference, or even suspicion. But 
they are the manna of our spirits, or, rather, they 
are the very life-pulses of our spirits. Nor does 
the fact that they are common justify our neglect 
of them. What is more common than the flowers 
by the wayside, or the stars in the sky? Yet to 
those who study them these familiar objects become 
worlds of increasing interest. And it is likely that 
the common sensations will prove to have a wealth 
of interest and beauty which at present is not sus- 
pected. Art has done much to honour them, but 
much more must be done to wean us from the 
abstractions which we now honour so highly, and 
bring us to the warmer and more vital experiences. 

Whatever may be thought as to the future recog- 
nition which sensation is destined to receive, there 
cannot be any hesitation in saying that it has a very 
important place in the experience of human intel- 
ligence. Hence the importance which it has as a 
cognitive factor. Like is known by like. Sensa- 
tion is known by sensation. This varied and chang- 
ing manifold must have as its counterpart in the 
mind of the knower an equally varied and changing 
manifold. 

7. It can also be seen that sensation is inti- 
mately connected with self-knowledge or self-con- 



SENSATION, FEELING, AND VOLITION 47 

sciousness. Whether it is said that the self has 
sensations as its states, or that it is manifested in 
sensations, or that it is made up, in whole or in 
part, of sensations, the vital connection of sensation 
and self-knowledge scarcely needs demonstration. 
The precise nature of this connection is a question 
which will be taken up later. 

8. The principles which have been found to 
hold in the case of sensation hold also in the case 
of feeling and will. These have usually been 
classed among the non-cognitive mental elements 
of the mind. It is true, they are admitted to 
have some relations to the process of knowledge. 
The sentiments of interest, curiosity, doubt, and 
so on, are described as intellectual. There are 
pleasures and pains of the mind. The will, too, 
is seen to be so closely associated with the intel- 
lectual faculties that belief is spoken of by some 
as a moral act. Yet feelings and volitions are not 
thought to be directly cognitive. A choice is not 
a knowledge of things ; a pain or a pleasure is 
not a disclosure of anything save the condition of 
the subject. 

But these mental elements are cognitive in the 
way in which sensation is cognitive. They are 
subjective even as sensation is, and thus the 
sphere of their cognitive application is made clear. 



48 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

Through them the mind knows the states of other 
subjects. Pain would be unintelligible to any 
one who had never felt pain. A volition 
would be unintelligible to any one who had not 
the power of willing. The subjective conditions, 
to be known, must be paralleled by similar sub- 
jective conditions in the knower. And their im- 
portance for cognition is proportionate to their 
importance in human life. It need not be added 
that they also, like sensation, must contribute to 
the knowledge of the self. 

9. The principle that feeling and volition are 
cognitive holds, whatever view be adopted as to 
their origin and their relation to sensation. Yet 
it will prove instructive to look at the connection 
of these three factors. For the study of this con- 
nection, while it may seem to be a digression from 
the main argument, suggests a point of view from 
which the sense of the reasonableness of that 
argument gains an added force. 

10. It can readily be seen that the feelings are 
closely related to the sensations. Pleasure and 
pain have often been regarded as aspects or attri- 
butes of sensations. Or if the hypothesis of 
separate nerve-endings for pain be corroborated, 
that feeling should be regarded as being in some 
of its forms a sentient experience coordinate 



SENSATION, FEELING, AND VOLITION 49 

with sensation. There is one group of feelings 
whose sensational character can scarcely be ques- 
tioned. The sensations which have this affective 
nature are those which come from the organs of 
breathing and digestion and other vital functions. 
They are not clearly defined or localized like the 
sensations of sight or hearing. While they are 
sensations, it is largely pleasure or pain which 
they indicate to us. Accordingly the persistent 
states of pleasure or pain which are called moods, 
are persistencies of these sensations. The larger 
feelings of well-being or ill-being which colour life 
as a whole are these elementary organic sensa- 
tions. Moreover, they join themselves to the 
more aesthetic and intellectual sentiments. The 
deeper thrill which we have in the contemplation 
of a work of art or in the solution of a problem 
means that there are associated with the more re- 
fined feeling these massive sensations. It may be 
added that it is probably when attention is turned 
to these, that there can be perceived the element 
of truth in Wundt's theory of feeling as the reac- 
tion of the apperception upon sensations. For these 
sensations are not only readily evoked by all kinds 
of influence ; they are precisely the sensations 
which, as we shall have occasion to see, go to 
make up to so great an extent the primary idea 



50 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

of the self. Pleasure or pain as the " Re- 
actionsweise der Apperception " means largely 
the pleasure or pain given in these sensations 
which form the core of the apperceptive con- 
sciousness. 

Doubtless this question of the relation between 
sensation and emotion will depend for its final so- 
lution on a study of mental growth. One of the 
most promising theories is that of Horwicz 1 and 
Stanley, 2 who hold that the primal psychical fact 
is the pleasure-pain experience. It must, indeed, 
in view of such a theory, be asked whether our 
present feeling of pleasure and pain is not differ- 
entiated from the primal consciousness. Yet the 
suggestion is important that this pleasure-pain ex- 
perience is the one most closely akin to the primi- 
tive consciousness ; and it may be that the more 
ideational phenomena should be regarded as devel- 
opments from this root ; sensation receiving an- 
other content while it retains in most cases more 
or less of the pleasure-pain character. 

The emotions do not call for detailed treatment 
in this investigation. They are blends of various 
mental elements, — sensations, ideas, impulses. So 
far as they are the " conscious reflection of instinc- 

1 Psychologische Analysen, Erster Theil, § 62. 

2 Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling, Chap. II. 



SENSATION, FEELING, AND VOLITION 51 

tive reactions," 1 it can be seen that they are made 
up of sensations or copies of sensations. 

11. The will has long been regarded as a distinct 
faculty, and it has seemed to occupy a position of 
peculiar dignity. It is taken to be that faculty 
by which man is master of his life, and is thus made 
the source of moral action. This sovereign faculty 
gifted to a finite being is a mystery, but it is the 
mystery of personality. This faculty seems ulti- 
mate and irreducible; some declare that will is the 
ultimate reality in the universe. 

Yet many attempts have been made to bring 
volitions into continuity with other conscious ex- 
periences. Many idealists have identified the will 
with reason. On the other hand, the empiricists 
have reduced the phenomena of will to a mat- 
ter of causal connection, or, more strictly, of 
sequence obtaining among the sensations, ideas, 
pleasures, and pains of conscious experience. Much 
interest attaches to the efforts of some recent 
psychologists to show that the finer analysis ap- 
plied in the present day exhibits the phenomena 
of the will as a series of sensations. According 
to them, the consciousness of a volition is the idea 
of an action accompanied by the feeling of effort. 
The idea of the action must be present, otherwise 

1 Marshall, Pain, Pleasure, and ^Esthetics, p. 65. 



52 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

the action cannot be willed, and this idea is the 
prefiguring of sensations like those the action will 
produce. The feeling of effort is also sensational; 
it is made up of sensations from brow, throat, and 
chest, the muscles of these parts being, during 
effort, in a state of tension. 

The full consideration of these views involves a 
protracted discussion with which we must dispense. 
We are, therefore, precluded from reaching any 
sure conclusion as to their truth ; and in any case, 
an attempt at a final statement would at present 
probably be premature. But the effort to find 
continuity between the will and other faculties 
must be commended, and is doubtless to be re- 
garded as in a general way a prophecy of its own 
success. 

12. Some light is thrown on the problem of the 
connection of the mental elements by the discov- 
eries and suggestions of physiological psychology. 
This science has to do with the problem because 
of the correlation of psychical and physical phe- 
nomena, but the science is so incomplete that its 
hypotheses must not suffer too much stress. Physi- 
ology finds in the nervous system cells and fibres, 
and the activity of these may be regarded as a 
typical activity repeated in numberless forms. 
The cell may be stimulated by a fibre coming from 



SENSATION, FEELING, AND VOLITION 53 

the periphery, or it may receive impulses from 
other cells within the brain. Amid possible indi- 
vidual variety there is yet general uniformity. 
The continuity in constitution and activity is still 
more clearly seen when it is remembered that all 
the cells are the offspring of a common parent, or 
stand in a still closer relation to each other. The 
conclusion to which this points is that, as there is 
one form of nervous activity and constitution, 
there is one form of conscious activity ; that this 
may be described as sentiency ; and that all the 
variety of consciousness is due to differences in the 
intensity and quality of that primal typical form. 

13. Again, the evolutionary treatment of psy- 
chology points to the same continuity. Evolution 
knows no breaks in its history. Nothing foreign 
is grafted into the growth which it describes. It 
is at least probable that the soul will prove no 
exception to this law. From its simplest germ to 
its highest fruitage, it is of one tissue. 

14. It is continuity that has been emphasized; 
the idea of continuity is very prominent in 
the doctrine of evolution. It must, indeed, be 
pointed out that continuity is not the whole truth. 
It does not explain the existence of anything. 
Change may be continuous, but in every change 
there is something new introduced. The new 



54 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

ideas, the new theories, the new purposes that 
come to the soul may be shown to be continuous 
with the past life, to have the same "elements," 
but it would be as correct to say that they are new 
creations. The principle is true, even in the ma- 
terial world. A dust-heap is not simply a collec- 
tion of the old identical particles which remain 
unchanged in spite of change of place. They are 
in a new relationship : it is as if a new world had 
been made. There might, therefore, be continuity 
in the soul's evolution, and yet, since new qualities 
and new faculties emerge without any breach of 
continuity, the mere fact of continuity is no war- 
rant for conclusions as to function. It is evident 
that all such conclusions must be qualified by the 
reflection that the experience of man and nature is 
always changing, and that each form of it is new 
and, in a sense, unique. 

But the fact of continuity is so far an evidence 
of homogeneity. Anything is not the cause of any- 
thing. Stones do not bear apples. The scenery 
of a landscape does not enter into the dreams of 
the man born blind. That which is new in the 
mind shows when it is examined that it is made of 
the material of the old. 

15. Let it be repeated, it is not essential to the 
present investigation to settle the question of conti- 



SENSATION, FEELING, AND VOLITION 55 

nuity. The doctrine, for instance, that like is known 
by like holds, however heterogeneous the mental 
elements may be. Yet unity and simplicity, and the 
presentation of evolutionary relations, are to be 
desired in epistemology as elsewhere. And there is 
a further value in these discussions. They serve to 
bring into clear view the fundamental fact that the 
mental factors are conscious and intelligible. The 
will, for instance, is not a blind something in man, 
like a hidden driving force. The will, so far as it 
is, or can be, spoken of intelligently, is a series, or 
a member of a series, of conscious phenomena. The 
statement that volition and emotion are cognitive 
thus becomes less paradoxical. They are parts of 
consciousness. And it is a great truth, which will 
become clearer as we proceed, that knowledge is one 
of the primal functions of every part of conscious 
experience, as assimilation is a constant function of 
living cells. Consciousness in all its forms reflects 
similar consciousnesses. Life is known by life. 
Moreover, all consciousness is self-knowledge. 

There is a still further interest in these discus- 
sions. They prepare for a consideration of the 
relation between the elements already spoken of 
and other mental constituents. There remains one 
important class of mental facts, which seem to 
many to belong to a distinct type, removed from 



56 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

all those that have been described. These are the 
forms, or categories, of reason. It will be neces- 
sary to study these with care, and it will be found 
that they have their origin in the processes of sen- 
sation and feeling. There will thus be confirmation 
given to the view that there is unity of type in 
all conscious experiences, and that they all, in an 
important sense, stand on the same cognitive plane. 



CHAPTER III 

THE CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE 

1. It was stated in the Introduction that the 
object aimed at by science and philosophy has been 
a system of universals or concepts. This state- 
ment must now be explained and verified. Its 
meaning, and also its correctness, will be most 
clearly perceived if we look at the history of the 
doctrine of concepts, especially its early history, 
and then at the form of the doctrine presented in 
logic. 

2. The first philosopher to give prominence to the 
concept was Socrates. Men had used concepts be- 
fore ; Socrates did not invent them. When Thales 
said that water was the principle of all things, he 
was using a general concept. But Socrates was 
the first to call attention to the concept as the 
great instrument of science. 

It is not to be supposed that Socrates differed 
from his predecessors in laying emphasis on the 
subjective character of thought. He did not say 
that thought was the supreme actuality, in con- 

57 



58 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

trast with the world of material things, nor did he 
say that the concept was a mental manufacture to 
be used in the cognition of objects. Such a con- 
trast of subject and object was somewhat strange to 
the men of that time, even in their scepticism ; for 
in their scepticism they believed that they were 
showing the nullity of things as well as of thoughts. 

But Socrates made an advance upon earlier phi- 
losophy in saying that the concepts of things are 
their explanation. He assumed their objectivity, 
and treated them as the ground or reality of things. 
He would not have asked after the cause of water, 
or the effects of water ; he would have tried to 
define water ; and he would have shown the general 
or universal nature of this concept by considering 
the many concrete cases in which it is illustrated. 

His use of this method was the beginning of a 
new era in the history of philosophy. He deter- 
mined, Windelband remarks, 1 for all the future 
the essential nature of science. 

It may be doubted whether Socrates was strong 
enough to mould the doctrines of philosophy ; but 
the work he began was taken up by Plato and 
Aristotle. 

3. The doctrine of Plato that the idea is the 
real, that it exists as an independent entity apart 

1 Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 75. 



CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE 59 

from individual things, and that knowledge con- 
sists in its contemplation, has been already 
referred to. It has also been indicated that the 
idea is the general concept : the idea of beauty 
is the one beauty in contrast with the many 
beautiful things; or, to use another of Plato's 
illustrations, the idea of bed is the one bed of 
which God is the maker, in contrast with the 
many beds produced by man's device. The con- 
cept is for Plato the presentation to the mind of 
the absolute, transcendent reality. 

It is the natural corollary to this doctrine that 
Plato should regard sensation as incapable of giv- 
ing us knowledge. As the concept is related to 
reality, so is sensation to this changing world of 
phenomena. Individual things in time and space 
are connected with the ideas, are, in some way, 
copies of them; but they also partake of nonen- 
tity. They belong to the stream of change, and 
their coming into existence is their passing into 
non-existence. This changing, vanishing show 
presents itself to the mind in sensation. Sensa- 
tion is, therefore, not the medium of our know- 
ledge of absolute reality. 

Plato has drawn the outlines of a system of 
ideas. The relations in which the ideas stand to 
each other are those of the subordination and 



60 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

coordination of concepts. Plato has, indeed, done 
little to fill in this outline. He speaks of being, 
justice, and a few other ideas ; and he gives the 
good the supreme place in this system; but a 
further completeness he does not present. Yet 
he has announced the great ideal of science as an 
organized system of concepts. 

4. Aristotle adopted the .view of Plato that 
concepts form the content of scientific knowledge. 
At the same time he has modified Plato's presen- 
tation of it. The concept is not separate from 
things, but in things, and hence Aristotle is led 
sometimes to insist that, as the individual only is 
real, knowledge can be only of the individual. 
It has seemed, indeed, to some of his critics that 
Aristotle is here contradicting what he says of 
truth as found only in universals. But the con- 
tradiction ceases to be felt when it is remembered 
that, while only individuals exist, the universal is 
the essence of the individual. Knowledge is 
therefore of the individual, yet is, at the same 
time, of the universal. That which is not dedu- 
cible from the universal, the varying effects, say, 
which an individual produces in other individuals, 
is accidental, and is not a matter of science. 

Aristotle also teaches that there is a system of 
such concepts. At the same time he does not 



CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE 6 1 

find absolute unity in the system. There is not 
one supreme concept under which all others can 
be ranged. There is not one science, but several. 

An important place in the development of know- 
ledge is assigned to sensation. All knowledge is 
dependent on experience, and experience is to be 
traced ultimately to the senses. Without sensation 
there are no images, and without images there is no 
thought: the soul thinks the "forms in images." 
Yet while sensation is thus important, it does not 
fulfil the function of the cognitive faculty. It 
only serves as a matter for the higher activity of 
the reason which thinks in concepts. Moreover, 
while our knowledge starts from experience, Aris- 
totle declares that the highest concepts are of a 
self-evident character, and that from such all 
other concepts must in an ideal system of know- 
ledge be derived. 

5. The great Greek masters determined the 
course which human thought was to take. Their 
work has never been undone. In spite of the 
Renaissance and Bacon they control the think- 
ing of to-day. Aristotle may still be described 
as the master of them that know ; the funda- 
mental conception of knowledge is his. The name 
of Kant, one of the most influential and represen- 
tative of modern thinkers, at once recalls the 



62 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

emphasis which he laid on concepts. The data of 
the senses, he says, give no knowledge of them- 
selves ; they must have concepts joined to them. 
The concept brings light to the sense world, for 
sensation without it is blind. It yields unity and 
objectivity and order. It may still be doubtful 
for Kant whether this product is absolute know- 
ledge, but, at least, it is that which constitutes 
science. Concepts or categories have a still higher 
place in the systems of Hegel and the other ideal- 
ists. They are not merely regarded as principles 
of synthesis : they constitute the being of the 
Absolute ; they are, in Hegel's words, God in His 
eternal essence. It is unnecessary to cite other 
illustrations of this view. The doctrine of the 
empiricists needs separate consideration; it will 
be seen, as has already been stated, that it does 
not differ essentially from the view described. 

6. Further illustration of this view is gained 
when the teaching of logic is considered. And 
the importance of this testimony is great when 
the relation of logic to science and philosophy 
is considered. There has been not a little perplex- 
ity as to the function of logic. It used to be a 
subject of debate whether logic should be regarded 
as a science, or as an art ; whether it gave the laws 
of thought, or was an instrument in mental train- 



CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE 63 

ing. It may seem to settle the matter to say that 
logic is the science of correct reasoning or think- 
ing, and the statement is so far right. Yet it is 
to be remembered that logic studies fallacies. 
Perhaps the happiest definition of logic is that 
given by Professor Sigwart at the beginning of 
his great work : " Logic is the ethics of thought." 
Yet this is not to be understood quite as Sigwart 
understands it, as an account of the methods of 
correct thinking, as if logic were a method of 
reaching something beyond itself. An ethic does 
not merely give precepts which may guide to some- 
thing other than themselves, but describes the ideal 
life itself. Logic does not merely give rules for 
reaching a beyond ; it describes the forms which 
thought, at present imperfect and fallacious, must 
assume when its work is perfected. 

The importance of the testimony of logic in the 
present inquiry can at once be seen. It is to logic 
that we ought to turn to be informed as to the 
ideals of science and philosophy, and we should 
thus know what forms a perfect knowledge is ex- 
pected to take. Unfortunately this testimony is 
far from being so clear as it should be. Logic has 
failed to understand clearly its peculiar function. 
In hearing what it has to say, we must remember 
that it wavers between the function of a normative 



64 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

science and that of a science which presents a cer- 
tain number of actual psychological processes. 

7. The first chapter of logic deals with the 
subject of terms. There are various forms of 
speech reflecting the various forms of thought, but 
logic restricts its attention to nouns, adjectives, 
and verbs. The other forms of speech are taken 
account of only if they are metamorphosed into 
the so-called categorematic forms. But this is not 
all ; a further sifting takes place. It is the noun 
which is selected, and from the many kinds of noun 
the common noun is taken. It is the class name, 
which does not, like the proper noun, indicate an 
individual, nor, like the abstract, specify a quality. 
It has for its function to indicate the one in the 
many. So it has denotation or extension, and con- 
notation or intension. 

It cannot be said that the ordinary logic justi- 
fies this selection of the common noun. Yet it 
does by this sifting process point to it as the final 
form of logical thinking. It thus makes the con- 
cept or the intension of the term the object of 
thought, this being, at the same time, the content 
of the things "denoted." 

Logic becomes more distinctly ethical in prescrib- 
ing the way in which the concept is to be treated. 
The work of definition must be carried out ; the 



CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE 65 

elements in the concept are to be distinguished 
and specified. Definition, however, to be satisfac- 
tory, must be preceded by division and classifica- 
tion. The concepts must be ranged in a certain 
order. They form an ascending scale of general- 
ity and stand in the relation of genus and species. 
The ideal of such a classification is indicated in the 
three scholastic rules for its direction. First, the 
number of the species is not to be diminished; 
that is, all the species contained in the universe 
are to be discovered. Secondly, the summum genus, 
or highest concept, is to be reached. The third 
rule is that the division shall not make a leap ; all 
the intermediate species and genera are to be 
given. The survey of this part of logic shows 
that there is presented as the ideal of knowledge a 
system of concepts. 

8. The account given of the judgment points, 
though by no means clearly, to the same conclu- 
sion. Light on this subject is not so much to be 
gained from definitions of the judgment, for these 
vary ; it is to be found rather in the treatment to 
which the judgment is subjected. Judgments are 
divided into four classes, — universal affirmative, 
universal negative, particular affirmative, and par- 
ticular negative. The judgments being thus classi- 
fied are also said to be distinguished by the 



66 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

distribution, or non-distribution, of subject and 
predicate. A term is distributed when it is taken 
in its whole extent ; thus the universal affirmative, 
all S is P, has the subject distributed, but the 
predicate is undistributed, as only a part of the 
things it denotes are indicated. This way of pre- 
senting the judgment indicates that we are dealing 
with classes. The class or number of individuals 
indicated by the subject is contained, to keep to 
the illustration of the universal affirmative, in the 
class indicated by the predicate. The relation is 
made one of quantity, and this reduction of the 
judgment seems a deviation from the conceptual 
view. At the same time, this demarcation of the 
class depends on the presupposition of the concept 
which the class name indicates, and indeed the 
concept has already in the doctrine of the term 
been taken for the content of the individuals indi- 
cated by the name. We seem obliged to conclude 
that, while the doctrine of the judgment refers only 
to individuals in certain quantitative relations, it 
implies a reference to the concept as the basis for 
determining such relations, and proves to be un- 
consciously a reminiscence of the superordination 
and subordination of the world of concepts. 

9. The treatment of the syllogism is similar to 
the treatment of the judgment. The syllogism is 






CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE 6? 

an instrument to help in determining the relations 
of classes. In Aristotle's hands it was meant to ex- 
hibit the connection of the individual or the species 
with the higher, and ultimately with the high- 
est, universal. But while, as used in the schools, 
it admits of this use, this is not shown to be its 
main function, and, even were it so employed, 
it would use those quantitative relations to which 
we have seen the judgment to be restricted. So 
that the syllogism, like the judgment, does not 
directly bear witness to the concept, though in it, 
as in the judgment, the concept is implied. 

10. In its treatment of the judgment and the syl- 
logism logic has degenerated into formalism : it has 
not been faithful to the doctrine of the concept ; 
and it has not fulfilled in any adequate way its 
ethical function of presenting the ideal to be at- 
tained by knowledge. When we turn to the doc- 
trine of induction we find a different mode of 
treatment. It is here that logic shows itself in 
most vital contact with the procedure of science ; 
and it is here also that logic returns to the doc- 
trine of the concept. 

Inductive logic shows how the relations of phe- 
nomena are to be stated. The connection is to be 
given, and the statement is to be made in universal 
form. What is true of one case is to be presented 



68 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

as the truth of all similar cases. In other words, 
the law of the phenomena is to be given, and the 
case or cases studied are regarded as exemplifica- 
tions of the law. It is thus that induction deter- 
mines the form of the ideal concept, for the law is 
the modern scientific form of the concept. 

Why, then, is the method of induction treated 
apart from the question of the formation of the 
concept ? It must be remembered that the con- 
cept which is described first by logic is the con- 
cept at the stage which is reached by unscientific 
thought. It is also the concept as it presented 
itself to Aristotle. The world is regarded by him 
as a world of individual things or substances. 
Qualities coexist in these substances : a man is wise 
and tall and dark. The universal concept, like- 
wise, is a presentation of qualities that coexist ; 
only, in the concept the coexistence is necessary. 
Nor does Aristotle transcend this view in his ac- 
count of induction. Induction is a syllogism in 
the third figure and presents two qualities as co- 
existing because found to inhere in a common sub- 
ject. Thus, to use his illustration, man, horse, 
and mule are gall-less ; they are also long-lived ; 
therefore, long-lived and gall-less are qualities that 
coexist. It is this primitive view of the world, 
as consisting of things, which is embodied in the 



CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE 69 

doctrine of Aristotle, and in the logic which is 
ultimately to be traced to him. 

Modern science, however, has ceased to lay ex- 
clusive emphasis on the idea of thing. With the 
revival of the atomic theory in the Renaissance 
period, another view of the world began to gain 
favour. Things were resolved into atoms, and the 
interactions of the atoms seemed to be the facts 
most worthy of attention. Even the atoms came, 
as reflection on them continued, to have a merely 
hypothetical existence. That which was traced 
everywhere was energy. The doctrine of energy 
is the centre of modern science. The world is not 
so much a world of things ; it is a world of 
processes. Hence the new view of induction. It 
is not to determine coexistence but sequence. It 
does not deal with qualities that are conjoined, 
but with processes that pass into each other ; it 
traces the transformations of energy. The methods 
of induction formulated by J. S. Mill, in their 
contrast with those of Aristotle, show the changed 
point of view. They are entirely methods for discov- 
ering causes. Even when there is a coexistence of 
phenomena presented, the statement of them in terms 
of coexistence is only provisional ; for the coexist- 
ence must be explained as due either to causal agency 
on the part of one of the phenomena, or to the fact 



70 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

that both of them are necessary results of a com- 
mon cause. This causal process is the most im- 
portant of the ideas associated with the great 
scientific term law. It can thus be seen that the 
law which science seeks to formulate is the modern 
development of the concept. It can also be seen 
that the ordinary logic text-book presents its 
somewhat chaotic appearance because the older 
doctrine of the concept and the modern treat- 
ment of it under the head of induction are not 
presented in their true relation. 

11. But while the doctrine of induction has 
been developed, logic seems on the other hand 
to have changed its view of the importance of 
the concept. It is the judgment which is often 
regarded by modern logicians as the universal 
form of rational activity. In such treatises on 
logic as those of Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet, 
the concept seems at first either to be ignored, or 
to be put in a very subordinate place. 1 Yet it is 
only in appearance that the concept is discarded. 
When the judgment is examined, it is found to 
contain a universal. When Mr. Bradley says 
that the judgment is the reference o£ an idea to 

1 Cf. Sigwart, Logik, Einleitung, § 1 ; Schuppe, Grundriss der 
Erkenntniss- Theorie u. Logik, § 66 ; Riehl, Der philosophische 
Kriticismus, Bd. II, Einleitung ; etc. 



CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF KNOWLEDGE Ji 

reality, the " idea " proves to be the universal. 
Mr. Bosanquet speaks of the judgment as an 
identity in difference, but again it is clear that 
the " identity " is the universal : the universal, it 
is taught, is not present except in the judgment, 
but there is no judging or thinking in which it 
is not found ; in thinking the one does not exist 
apart from the many, yet the many are consti- 
tuted by the one. 1 

12. It has thus been shown that from a very early 
period in the history of philosophy the concept has 
been taken for the ultimate form of knowledge, and 
that the later philosophy has been faithful to the 
tradition of the earlier. The testimony of logic has 
also been considered, because it is the function of 
logic to state the ideals of knowledge ; and, while 
the witness it bears is far from being unmistakable, 
it never entirely belies its Aristotelian origin ; and, 
when it seriously faces the questions of modern 
science, it points clearly to the concept or the univer- 
sal that is not merely extensive and quantitative, but 
intensive and qualitative. Finally, we have seen 
that, even where the judgment is said to be the con- 
crete act of thought, the concept or universal is still 
regarded as its truth, or as essential to its truth. 

1 In this connection v. Schuppe, Erkenntniss-Theorie u. Logik, 
§6. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 

1. In the present age when the idea of evolution 
has so largely leavened the minds of men, there are 
few questions studied with such eagerness as those 
that relate to origins. This kind of inquiry is pur- 
sued with special zeal in the case of living growths. 
It is felt that their structure and functions are 
understood only as it is known how they have been 
made. The structure of the horse's hoof and the 
swift running of that animal are truly intelligible 
when the story of the horse's evolution is told. The 
language of a people is known by the modern stu- 
dent when he can tell the stages of its growth from 
birth to maturity. Who understands the English 
constitution that does not know English history? 
We are here called upon to estimate the function of 
concepts, and we shall understand it best when we 
have not only looked at the record of the use of 
concepts in systems of science and philosophy, but 
have also studied what may be called their psycho- 
logical genesis. 

72 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 73 

The work is a large one, for it means little less 
than a history of the evolution of intellect. Only 
a brief summary of that history can be here at- 
tempted. It will be our aim to trace first the 
stages in the development of empirical concepts, 
and then to see how the principles reached in this 
investigation are to be applied to the rational con- 
cepts, or categories. 

2. It is important, first of all, to observe that 
the concept is not necessarily different from the 
particular concrete image. The particular image 
becomes a general concept by being used univer- 
sally. A name is a good illustration of this kind 
of concept. It is a mere particular sound, but it 
comes to be used of a class, and so becomes general 
or common. Or, let a man hear for the first time 
some sound, such as the hooting of an owl, the 
sound-image seems to be particular. But when it 
is said to him, all owls hoot in that way, the sound 
is recognized as a general or universal concept. It 
is not necessary that the sound-image should be 
changed in the mind in order to become a universal. 
It remains simply the original sensation or width of 
sensation. Any sense-quality or idea is implicitly a 
universal ; it may, as it were, float in the mind ready 
to attach itself to a variety of objects. As Hegel 
has remarked, " this," " here," " now," are universals. 



74 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

3. Again, there may be a combination of two or 
more qualities to form the concept. The hooting 
of the owl and the peculiar shape of the bird, when 
it is seen, may rise up together in the imagination 
whenever any owl is mentioned. Many general con- 
cepts are formed by thus " abstracting " from their 
context and combining certain qualities actually 
observed, and then making this abstract idea uni- 
versal. It may be added, that the complex concept 
may be framed, not by the conjoining of dis- 
tinct qualities, but by the analysis of that which 
presented itself at first as a unity. Let it also be 
observed that this abstract concept is still an image ; 
the qualities do not lose this character, though, 
when brought together, they may, in a greater or 
smaller degree, modify each other. 

4. It is also fitted to make the nature of the 
concept clearer, to observe that there may be framed 
the concept of an individual, say, Socrates. We 
may hesitate to call the concept general, because we 
restrict it in its application to one subject. Soc- 
rates has such a variety of spatial and temporal 
relations that the concept seems to have only one 
unique application ; and, moreover, there is asso- 
ciated with it the feeling of reality, which appar- 
ently precludes its being regarded as general. Yet, 
on the other hand, there might be, theoretically, 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 75 

many Socrateses ; it was the earnest belief of some 
of the ancients that the cycle of the world brought 
back at each turn exactly the same conditions, and 
that Socrates in all his relations was reproduced 
each time in the same way. Thus all that seems 
unique, including the feeling of reality, becomes 
universal. It is scarcely necessary to point out 
that, when we restrict our attention to a limited 
number of qualities, these readily form a general 
concept ; and we say of a man, he is a Socrates. 
Probably many of our class concepts wear the 
features of some individual. The term tree calls 
up the tree we are wont to see from the window ; 
dog is the household guardian. 

5. There is another form that appears in the 
development of the concept. There is the concept 
which does not resemble any particular image 
known to experience. The concept man may be 
unlike Socrates or Plato or any other ; the tree 
may not answer to the oak or maple or any other 
actual species. 

In the case of children, the first images may be 
supposed to be vague. The child calls all men 
Papa, probably because it does not notice the dif- 
ferences in the visual images they furnish. After- 
ward, with developing perceptive power, it notes 
the peculiarities of individuals. Yet the original 



?6 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

vague image is not lost ; it retains a relative inde- 
pendence as the concept man. 

Accompanying this process and tending to super- 
sede it is another, by which the observation of a 
multitude of individuals results in the formation 
of a concept. Many trees, for instance, have been 
seen — the oak, the ash, the maple, the sapling, and 
the tree of a hundred years. When a number of 
individuals are thus observed, each individual may 
contribute to the general concept, and the concept 
may thus be a resultant that is not to be identified 
with any of the individuals that have produced 
it. Mr. Galton has furnished an excellent illustra- 
tion of the forming of such concepts by the process 
of taking composite photographs. As, in the taking 
of the composite photograph, the various individual 
photographs are exposed for a certain time, so that 
the resultant image has in bold and strong outline 
those features which are most nearly alike in all, 
while the other features are vague and shadowy ; so, 
in the observation of the members of a class, the 
sensitive plate of the imagination receives the 
strongest impression from those parts in which they 
all agree, while the other parts show more or less 
nebulous. 1 The illustration helps us to understand 
how a large number of the concepts indicated by 

1 Cf. Spinoza, Ethica, Par. II, Propos. 40, schol. 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS J J 

the common noun are possible. The concept in such 
cases is not merely a quality as given immediately in 
sense-experience ; nor is it the complex idea of an in- 
dividual which has also been given in experience ; it 
is a quality, or group of qualities, differing from the 
original qualities, and present as something relatively 
new. Thus the term word may call up to us a dim 
image of a word in a line on a printed page, so dim 
that no letters are clearly discernible in it. The term 
tree may call up an image of a trunk with branches 
leaving it, the rest of the complete image being vague 
or absent. This fragmentary image is not necessarily 
the counterpart of any tree actually seen. Let it be 
carefully noted in this case also that the product is 
still an image; though shadowy and indeterminate, it 
does not differ essentially from more definite images. 
6. The concept being formed in these ways, there 
arises the important question of its relation to in- 
dividual things. It is regarded as the essence of 
the individuals. It is that which constitutes them 
members of the class or species. They are thought 
by means of it. This is seen in the ordinary judg- 
ments in which a common noun is used. To say 
that Socrates is a man means that the immediate 
mental presentation, Socrates, is interpreted as 
having for its constituent that which is indicated 
by the concept man. Socrates, as subject, does 



?8 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

not include the man of the predicate ; this would 
be in a sense true even were the judgment meant 
to be merely the unfolding of what is contained 
in the subject. When the judgment is not ex- 
plicative, it is clearly an interpretation of that 
which is presented in the subject ; that is, the 
concept given in the predicate interprets the sub- 
ject by representing its true essential being. 

Now, the concept, like the sensation, has in primi- 
tive thinking an objective character. It is a real 
thing. This is the stage at which are to be found 
Plato and Aristotle, and their ancient and modern 
followers. The concept gotten from particulars 
is treated as an objective reality. But a peculiar 
problem is herein involved. How is the concept, 
which is a unity, related to the many individuals 
to which it is applied? Socrates is a man, but 
Plato also is a man, and Aristotle is a man : how 
is the universal, man, related to these three indi- 
viduals? For our ordinary thinking the solution 
is found in a numerical multiplication of the essence. 
In three men there are three essences ; the essences, 
though exactly alike, are numerically distinct. Not 
that in our every-day thinking we recognize this 
process with any distinctness. But should an analy- 
sis of our mental content be made it would be found 
that this idea is present, though in a dim form. 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 79 

With the advance of reflection this view changed. 
As attention was turned to the general concept by 
the Greek thinkers, the doctrine of its reality and 
individuality was explicitly formulated. It was the 
natural outcome of this kind of reflection to con- 
clude that the concept is the one in the many. This 
doctrine of the one in the many has played such 
an important part in the higher development of 
the doctrine of concepts that it is important to 
have its precise significance realized. The universal 
is still kept distinct from the particular. The 
universal is, however vague, an individual image 
or idea. The particular is another individual 
image. Yet the particular is referred to the uni- 
versal for its ground or explanation, as when we 
say, Socrates is a man. It was thus natural that 
the particular should come to be thought of as 
that which the universal has made, or that into 
which the universal is changed. Since the indi- 
vidual is the metamorphosed universal, it might 
be supposed that it would for the mind supersede 
the universal. Yet the two are kept distinct. 
There is one important reason for their remaining 
distinct. The process traced out in the case of 
one particular is carried through for a multitude 
of particular cases. The universal is metamorphosed 
into the many. At the same time, as a concept or 



80 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

universal, it remains one. There thus emerges the 
doctrine of the one in the many, and yet distinct 
from them. It has changed into them, for they 
are the realities, yet it has still an independent 
reality, for when we would know them we must 
look on it, not merely as their potent producer in 
the past, but as their present essence. 

7. With the advance of science other changes 
take place which concern the content of the concept. 
These have been already referred to, and need only 
be mentioned. The general concept is found to 
have been in many cases formed hastily, and to be 
vague in character, and care must be taken to define 
precisely the qualities which truly enter into it. 
There is a further and still more profound change. 
The original concept made of a combination of 
sense-qualities is seemingly discarded. The tree is 
not a subject coloured and fragrant ; the tree is a 
plexus of forces, or, otherwise expressed, it is a 
system of laws. 

8. Along with these developments of the concept, 
and yet independently of them, there is proceeding 
a further refinement of thought, which, indeed, is 
the natural result of the process of abstraction. 
Thought, like other living activities, tends to be 
economical. In using a number of concepts it re- 
tains just so much of their content as is necessary 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 8 1 

to the proper conducting of its processes. For 
quickness, and for the saving of energy, it must 
thus limit itself. The word associated with the 
concept is often all that we have in mind. When 
such sentences as, Virtue is the cause of happiness, 
Logic is a useful study, are read to us, there is 
probably often nothing in consciousness beyond the 
words. Or at most there is some fragment of an 
image or feeling associated with them ; by the 
term virtue there may be roused the first pulses 
of a feeling of reverence ; with happiness may go 
a slight wave of pleasant feeling. In the reading of 
a paragraph it often happens that all that is in the 
mind is practically a series of words. Language is 
the algebra of thought, as Berkeley remarked ; 
words are counters or symbols which take the 
place of the original concepts. 

9. It can now be seen that the concept, in what- 
ever form we find it, is the creature of the imagination. 
The concept, whether it is a simple quality, or a 
group of qualities, or a composite photograph, is 
still an image; or, again, if it is represented by a 
mere fragment of an image, or by a symbol asso- 
ciated with it, such as a word or name, the frag- 
ment or symbol is still an image. It will be shown 
later that the idea of force is also a sensory image. 

10. We come now to the group of concepts com- 



82 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

monly known as categories. They have been thought 
to have a peculiar dignity and value in the cogni- 
tive realm. Hegel speaks of the categories as a 
Pantheon of god-like figures. They have played 
such an important part in the history of thought 
that they demand a separate, careful investigation. 

11. It has been a common doctrine that the fac- 
ulty which uses categories is not the imagination, 
but the reason. This doctrine has been much em- 
phasized in modern times by Hegel and his school. 
The category is said to be not Vorstellung but 
Begriff ; or, if in the evolution of thought it ap- 
pears at first as a Vorstellung, its destiny is to be 
transformed into a Begriff. 

The doctrine that thoughts are not images has 
certain facts to appeal to. The categories seem to 
have no kinship with the familiar images of the five 
senses. They mingle with these images ; they are 
" mediated " by means of images ; but they only 
stand out in greater distinctness, the more closely 
they are brought into comparison with images. 
When a man understands something, there seems 
to be nothing of the Vorstellung about that which 
is in a special sense his thought. 

But it is not to be inferred straightway that our 
categories do not arise from sensory experience. A 
category may not be like a shout, or the picture of 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 83 

a cow, or the smell of roast beef; but it is not 
thereby proved that it belongs to another than the 
sensory realm. The sensory factors become, in the 
process of abstraction, attenuated and shadowy. 
Besides, the category may originate, not in the 
"five" senses, but in obscure visceral or muscular 
feelings. A more careful psychological analysis 
shows that the distinction drawn by the transcen- 
dentalist between sense and reason must be annulled, 
and that the categories are to be regarded as products 
of sensory experiences. The category and the empir- 
ical concept belong to one type. 

12. These statements can be established only by 
a study of the particular categories. While Kant 
recognized twelve categories, Hegel has given ac- 
count of a much larger number, and Professor 
James says the feelings of relation are numberless. 
The examination of them might thus seem to be a 
great, or even an endless, labor. Yet, doubtless the 
categories may be reduced to a definite number of 
types ; and it may suffice here to consider some of 
those that are more common or important. 

13. We shall begin, as Kant did, with space, 
though, indeed, he did not rank space with the 
categories proper. It is important to notice, first 
of all, the presence of the space idea in all our 
mental life. The experiences with which it has 



84 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

been thought to be chiefly connected are the sensa- 
tions of sight, touch, and movement. Yet it comes 
through all the senses, 1 and all the mental experi- 
ences. It may be said that, of course, this is so, 
because, as Kant taught, space is the form of 
sense. Yet it is not merely the form of sense. 
It is one of the characteristics of all our mental 
activity that we put the contents of consciousness 
side by side. We cannot construct an abstract 
argument, or put the most intellectual conceptions 
before us in any other way. They cannot be con- 
ceived as existing in any other way. Not only 
must we think of two coloured surfaces as existing 
outside of each other ; when we think of time, or 
of substance and property, or of cause and effect, 
or of any other abstract category, we have still the 
spatial form. The points that hold the attention 
are arranged in space. 

For illustration, let time be considered. Time is 
not space, yet when we think of time we find that 
the idea is largely spatial. Even Kant speaks of 
time as a line, or as possessed of two dimensions ; 
and there is no valid reason for denying it the 
tri-dimensional character. The past years reach 
into the distance, like the objects of a landscape. 
Shakespeare speaks of the "dark backward and 

1 Cf . James, Psychology, Vol. II, p. 134. 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 85 

abysm of time," showing in what form time pre- 
sented itself to one for whom it was snch an over- 
powering reality. It is true that there is more 
than the spatial element in the idea of time; there 
is the appearance of the figures ranged in past 
time, as they stand ghostly and unreal : there is 
associated with the past the sense of loss; the 
future also has its peculiar unreality. These ele- 
ments are all fused in the idea of time ; yet none 
the less the distinction of moments in time is 
spatial. What is true of time is true of other 
intellectual conceptions : wherever there is the dis- 
tinction of elements, the multiplicity presents itself 
as a position of one thing beside another. The claim 
that thought is not spatial is probably due to the 
difficulty of giving its constituents a place in the 
visible or tangible area. 

This universality of space is not only a fact which 
it is interesting to notice : the consideration of it 
helps to an understanding of the significance of the 
space-concept. When there is distinction of men- 
tal contents, there is extensity. This distinction 
is facilitated by the variety which characterizes our 
sensory experiences. Yet if we should make the 
theoretical supposition of an entirely homogeneous 
width of sensation, we should even in such a case 
find that the distinction exists. 



86 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE \ 

It is an important question in the investigation 
of the genesis of the space-concept, whether the 
distinction of mental contents is primary and nec- 
essary in sentient experience. Hume believed that 
the minimum visibile has no magnitude ; and were 
this admitted, it might further be admitted that 
there may be orders of being for which such a 
form of perception is normal. But whether the 
human minimum visibile is of this non-spatial char- 
acter is more than doubtful. And the possi- 
bility of such a non-spatial perception in other 
intelligences is, to say the least, purely theoretical. 

Such speculations have no reference to the actual 
experience of man after birth. By the conditions 
of that experience there is not possible for it such 
a singleness of sensation. From birth man is 
exposed to a multitude of simultaneous impressions. 
It is, at the same time, difficult to realize the mean- 
ing of extensity or manifoldness in the first experi- 
ences when there are no developed ideas of up and 
down, right and left. It is also to be remembered 
that the first images are of a very blurred char- 
acter : the finer analysis of them is the work of 
the years to come. 

Let it be granted that human experience has 
from the beginning this character of extensity or 
manifoldness, it is to be noticed that we have not 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 8? 

yet reached the abstract idea of space or quantity. 
In much of the ordinary thinking, even of adults, 
there is present to the mind simply a manifold of 
sensations without any further space-idea. Hegel 
finds the qualitative manifold to be different from, 
and logically prior to, the concept of quantity. 
It is this qualitative manifold which is given in 
the beginning of human experience. Further, 
though there is this distinction of the constituents 
of the manifold, the distinction is not due to the 
presence in the mind of the categories of likeness 
and difference. We cannot attribute these cate- 
gories to the infant, or to the lower forms of ani- 
mal intelligence. There are present in experience 
two or more sensations of different qualities, but 
the mind, though having different feelings, does not 
react to them with the idea of difference. 

How is the idea of space derived from this qual- 
itative manifold? It arises because there are 
changes in the content of the sensuous area. To 
refer to the visual experiences, one variegated 
scene or manifold gives place to another. It is 
now the furniture of the room that is seen, now 
the landscape, now a human face. Of these various 
fillings of the visual field there is formed a kind 
of composite image, or abstract idea. ^ The partic- 
ular contents cancel each other, and disappear. 



88 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

There is not, indeed, an abolition of all quality, 
but the quality becomes homogeneous, and any 
particular quality is indifferent. There is thus 
left in the mind a variety that is no variety, but 
simply a multiplicity that is a repetition of the 
sense-quality. This featureless yet manifold, quality 
is quantity or space. 

In a fuller study of the origin of this concep- 
tion, great attention should be given to the ideas 
of movement, for these have probably much to 
do with the final form of the idea of space. The 
tactile sense-experiences should also be considered. 
In both cases there is a process analogous to that 
which we have traced in the visual experiences. 
There is a multiplicity of sensations, which, either 
actually or in representation, are given together. 
The resultant of a series of mental fillings of this 
kind is the pure manifoldness of space. 

The analysis of the idea of space confirms this 
account of its origin. Space is multiplicity of a 
perfectly homogeneous quality. It has this pecu- 
liar character inasmuch as it is the residuum of a 
variety of qualities. 

It can now be seen why space is the form of 
all experience, or the form of the world. It is 
derived or abstracted from universal experience. 
It is the shadow of the multiplicity in experience. 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 89 

It can also be seen how far Kant is right in deny- 
ing that space is of the nature of a concept. It 
does not appear as one general space embodied in 
many particular spaces, as the concept tree is 
embodied in many particular trees, but as one 
space that contains the many spaces. Neverthe- 
less, it is a concept, or resultant image. It is 
derived from a series of qualitative manifolds. 
There may be many such spaces which are not 
united into one space. It is the work of reflection 
to show that these are parts of one space. 

It is, therefore, necessary to regard the space- 
concept as developing like other empirical con- 
cepts. It is the resultant image of a multitude 
of perceptions in which a variety of sensory con- 
tent has been furnished. Whether or not the 
qualitative manifold is the necessary form of the 
original psychical state, it is the form of all 
post-natal experience of the human being. And 
the various manifolds give rise to the idea of 
space proper in the ordinary empirical fashion. 

14. After what has been already said of time, 
in the discussion of space, it is unnecessary to 
take much time to demonstrate that it is an 
empirical concept. It may, however, be pointed 
out that not only are our ideas ranged in space 
with feelings of reality or unreality associated 



90 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

with them; the comparison of a thing as real, 
with itself as distant and unreal, evokes a peculiar 
feeling, which is the distinctively new element in 
the time-feeling. 

15. The category of being or reality is one 
of our most elementary categories. It is also 
one of the most universal : it is thought to hold 
of the universe and all that it contains. It is 
one of the interesting suggestions of recent psy- 
chology 1 that the category of reality is derived 
from the sense of touch. A thing is real when 
we touch it. Other senses may deceive us, but 
we are assured of the reality of things when 
they appeal to the sense of pressure. It is the 
evidence of this sense that the doubting Thomas 
declares conclusive when he demands proof that 
the Lord is risen. It is noteworthy that Berke- 
ley, in speaking of the relation of sight and touch, 
always goes on the assumption that touch is the 
reality sense. The tangible qualities, along with 
the spatial form, are denominated the "primary" 
qualities of bodies. The common refutation of 
idealism has been an appeal to the sense of 
touch. 

It is true that the other sensations not only 

1 American Journal of Psychology, Vol. IV, p. 429 ; James' 
Psychology, Vol. II, p. 305. 



THE ORIGIN- OF CONCEPTS 91 

refer us to this class of sensations; they them- 
selves may be designated real, and the same epi- 
thet may be applied to all the other ideas of the 
mind. Yet even in such cases the reality-idea 
remains the touch-idea. There is always the 
sense of solidity or resistance when the category 
shapes itself into a definite thought. 

Touch has this preeminence among the senses 
for reasons of utility. A colour or a sound is not 
directly of vital moment, but that which touches 
the body is of immediate practical concern. 
Hence those sensations are important as they are 
interpreted in terms of touch. The category of 
being, though derived from this sense, is not 
any particular touch-feeling. A great variety of 
touches have been experienced, and this category is 
their resultant or composite image. It is thus one 
of the ideas of the understanding. It becomes, 
through use, to some extent unlike the original 
feelings from which it is derived ; it is as when 
a fragment of rock is broken from its original 
resting-place and worn into a smooth pebble, so 
that it is hard to tell its starting-point. But as 
the pebble tells the secret of its history to a 
closer observation, so this category is seen to be 
derived from certain definite sense-experiences. 

There may be need at this point to repeat that 



Q2 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

not only do conceptual images become attenuated; 
there may be in the mind nothing beyond their 
names. The category of reality and the other 
categories are often so represented. But we are 
not on this account justified in supposing that 
they are thoughts which have nothing sensory 
about them. 

There is one respect in which the category of 
being differs from that of space to which it is of 
importance to [call attention. Space is derived 
from universal experience ; hence, it is by nature 
absolutely universal in its application. Being or 
reality has an artificial universality : it is derived 
from a small part of experience, and then it is 
made universal by being attached to all experi- 
ence. 

16. The categories of being, including space 
and time, are, as Hegel has taught, primary and 
elementary, and are added to, or transcended, as 
the mind advances in the intellectual construction 
of the world. So long as the bare idea of reality 
is adhered to, there is not necessarily any distinc- 
tion of subject and object. The sensation of hard- 
ness is real in the sense that to it other sensations 
are referred ; but it is not the reality of distinct, 
self-enclosed, isolated individuality. Just as little 
is it thought of as merely subjective. It belongs 



THE ORIGIN 1 OF CONCEPTS 93 

to a stage of thought at which distinctions of sub- 
ject and object have not necessarily made their 
appearance. A new advance is made when the 
world shapes itself before the mind into a system 
of units, so that a man distinguishes himself from 
other individual things around him. The defining 
of the spatial limits of bodies, which comes with 
observation of their movements, involves the tran- 
sition to this view. It does not, however, concern 
us here to trace all the steps by which this break- 
ing up into units takes place ; it is the result of 
the process that is important. There is an associa- 
tion of the group of feelings which may be called 
the inner feelings of the body with the body's 
visible and tangible reality ; and the man who 
has accomplished this association in the case of 
his own body, associates with other bodies psychic 
experiences similar to his own. It is to this ejec- 
tion of the inner feelings that a number of cate- 
gories are to be traced. It is true that the 
categories of being illustrate this process of ex- 
ternalizing the feelings. Yet the process takes 
a new aspect when man begins to regard the world 
as consisting of feelings like those which he also 
thinks as peculiarly his own inner life. The cate- 
gories which spring from this source are those 
which Hegel has grouped under the head of es- 



94 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

sence : they are such as essence, similarity, sub- 
stance, and causality. 

17. The category of essence 1 reveals this new 
mode of thinking, though still in a somewhat 
obscure way. The essence of a thing means cer- 
tain qualities which make the thing, and are 
enumerated when we give a definition. As Locke 
says, it is the being of anything whereby it is 
what it is. Yet since the judgment as to what 
is essential varies, it may be said that the essence 
of a thing consists of those qualities on which the 
attention has been centred. This concentration 
upon them is due to various reasons : the qualities 
are attended to which are permanent, and so force 
themselves upon us, as when we think of the stem 
and branches of a tree as essential, while the leaves 
which come and go are non-essential ; or they may 
be qualities associated with some utility : the 
power to cut is essential to a knife, whereas the 
colour of the knife-handle is non-essential. The 
essence, it can be seen, is, so far, one with 
the general concept, but there is also something 
added to the concept. This new factor is the 
feeling of strain that we have when we hold on to 
anything. It is a feeling of, or connected with, 

1 The derivation of this category is to be taken as somewhat 
tentative. 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 95 

prolonged muscular strain. We project this feel- 
ing into the qualities which have permanence. 
This projection is similar to that by which we 
objectify sensations of all kinds : when certain 
qualities exhibit tenacity, we associate with them 
the feelings which we have when we show 
tenacity. 

Essence has thus an empirical origin ; yet the 
idea is a resultant of many particular images, and 
has thus become a category of the understanding. 

18. Another category which must be referred to 
here is similarity. Its consideration is the more 
important because, even by empiricists, it is re- 
garded as given in some form in the mind's first 
intuitions. There is truth in the view that it is 
given early in experience, if it is meant that one 
sensation is not another sensation. To have the 
sensations of red and green is not, however, to 
know that they are alike, or that they are differ- 
ent. The transcendentalist is justified in pointing 
out that a category is being joined to sense-experi- 
ence when we make such predications. How then 
does the category arise ? It has been contended 
that to see the similarity of objects is to see their 
partial identity. Yet this contention must appeal 
rather to the metaphysics of similarity than to its 
psychology. When we look at two objects, say. 



96 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

two windows, we perceive their likeness, but we 
cannot be said to perceive any identity in them. 
Each keeps to every detail its individuality. The 
likeness is a third idea, blending, indeed, with 
them, and forming a unity with them, yet coming 
from its own peculiar source. That the idea is 
not any constituent of the two objects present to 
the mind is further shown by the fact that it is 
practically the same idea when applied to windows, 
or apples, or faces. What then is its nature? It 
seems to consist in certain bodily or visceral feel- 
ings which are aroused when there are two or 
more objects which affect the mind in the same 
way. It is not, indeed, meant that this feeling is 
gained by a perception of the sameness, any more 
than the peculiar effect of a repetition of blows is 
due to a perception of the similarity of the blows. 
The sameness is not perceived as such at first. It 
is a new feeling, induced by a repetition of con- 
scious experiences, or a simultaneity of certain ex- 
periences. These are not in themselves recognized 
as like or unlike ; but they are followed by this 
feeling. The feeling is, after the usual fashion, 
objectified, and made a link between the two or 
more things with which it is associated, and then 
by virtue of it they are felt to be " like." It seems 
to consist, as we have said, in certain bodily sen- 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 97 

sations ; these are obscure, and difficult to analyze, 
as the internal bodily sensations usually are. It 
is gradually refined and sublimated, and at last 
the idea is, in many instances of its use, scarcely 
to be distinguished from the word. 

19. This ejection of internal bodily feelings, 
which we have found so obscurely intimated in 
the ideas of essence and similarity, is unmistak- 
able in the categories of substance and causality. 

The substance of a thing is the support or sub- 
stratum of its qualities. The qualities change 
their form ; they have modes or accidents, whereas 
the substance is the permanent one. Locke says 
that this substratum is "something, we know not 
what," and this agnostic view has been common. 
Yet it is soon evident that substance is not en- 
tirely unknown. The idea of it is the idea of 
something ; and it is of something contained in 
the object. Further light is thrown upon it when 
it is considered what stands to each man for his 
own substance ; it is found that the ideas of sub- 
stance and self coincide. 

What are the self -feelings ? Self -consciousness 
has often been regarded as that attribute of man in 
which he shows likest God. It should be noticed, 
however, that the self-consciousness which has so 
high a dignity is an ideal self-consciousness. It 



98 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

is thought of as belonging to the man who knows 
the self as identical with the source of all that is, 
and yet as infinitely superior to all that is merely 
natural. Self-consciousness is thus a large part of 
philosophy. It is doubtful whether the perfectly 
developed self would view itself quite as such 
theories suppose. In any case, the ordinary con- 
sciousness of self is of a different nature. When 
the individual first distinguishes himself from other 
things, it is the spatial distinctness of his body 
which is present to the mind. The self is the 
body ; self-consciousness is primarily what has been 
called " somatic consciousness." In this somatic 
consciousness the chief importance attaches to the 
feelings of the trunk. The muscular feelings of 
this part of the body ; closely associated with 
these, the extended, peripheral touch feelings ; fur- 
ther, the feelings derived from the organs of 
breathing, digestion, and circulation, — all these 
give filling to the idea of the self. Characteristic 
of these feelings is their relative constancy. They 
abide with us. Ideas come and go ; nothing is 
more changeable than the ideational life. Arms 
and legs are now in motion and now at rest. 
But many of the trunk feelings, if not without 
variableness, are much more permanent; and this 
constancy fits them to represent the self. They 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 99 

are further fitted for this function by their emo- 
tional quality. They give the greatest sense of 
well-being or ill-being ; they determine the moods 
of melancholy and happiness ; they add thrill and 
reverberation to other finer feelings of pleasure 
and pain. It should be added that, even in such 
strongly contrasted states as pleasure and pain, 
there is much that remains constant. The parts 
affected are the same ; they may even be similarly 
affected. This brings us back to what is in some 
respects the most important qualification of these 
feelings for yielding the idea of the self: they 
have a well-marked local character. Usually, in- 
deed, they are said to be vague, and badly local- 
ized ; and, in one sense, the statement is correct : 
an internal pain may be difficult to locate with 
definiteness. But these feelings are local, inas- 
much as they are recognized as belonging to the 
trunk. They are body-filling, and at the same 
time body-limited. The ideas of imagination have 
a much less definite location; they seem to be 
where the things thought of are, and they thus 
may be anywhere, save for the muscular sensations 
connected with them. The trunk feelings, on the 
other hand, are distinctly subjective. 

The feelings which make up the somatic con- 
sciousness are vague. The idea of the self is not 



100 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

these feelings in their immediate form and quality. 
It is the resultant of the feelings experienced at 
various times. It is a composite photograph of 
them. Further, the various feelings are combined 
in a massive continuum. They blend in an undif- 
ferentiated mass. This is the idea of the self which 
follows a man like his shadow. To this other 
features may be added. One of the most strongly 
marked is the faculty of volition. The predomi- 
nant interests of the individual, scientific, aesthetic, 
or religious, also go to complete the idea. 

But while each individual tends to gain a more 
specialized conception of his self, a contrary pro- 
cess takes place in the development of animism. 
The world, which is regarded as a world of living 
souls, begins to show to a closer inspection the 
diversities of classes and individuals. There are 
differences in form and size, and, as some do not 
speak or move, there is manifest diversity in feel- 
ings of activity, and in response to stimuli. There- 
fore only certain elements in the self can be rightly 
projected outwards. Those must be selected which 
are common to all the selves. If the intellectual 
has been recognized at all, it must be pronounced 
non-essential. The muscular feelings, so far as 
connected with volition, are probably an uncer- 
tain fringe around the idea of the self. There is 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS ioi 

left, as the common element in all individuals, 
the blend of vague, massive, body-filling sensa- 
tions. This residuum, this permanent identical core 
of individual things, is substance. It is the same 
substance for material as for living things. Even 
the later division of substances into extended and 
spiritual does not affect the generic concept. 

It is now possible to see the meaning of the 
support which substance renders to attributes. 
The phenomenal life, made up of quickly chang- 
ing sensations and ideas, seems to rest on this sub- 
strate of the abiding self. We can also see the 
explanation of the agnosticism which tends to ad- 
here to the conception. The feelings which enter 
into it are massive and vague, little comparable 
to the finely differentiated sensations of sight and 
hearing. It is the vagueness of these organic sen- 
sations that is the original justification of the 
common doctrine of a mysterious, unintelligible 
background of phenomena. 

20. Still clearer is the empirical or gin of the 
category of causality. This is one of our most 
common categories ; it is also one of the great 
concepts of science. Its origin has been often 
discussed. The study of it led Kant to his theory 
of the spontaneity of the understanding in the 
production of such concepts. Yet, in spite of Kant, 



102 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

it must be averred that the investigation of it has 
shown that its origin is to be sought in our com- 
mon sense-experience. 

Eeid, 1 when expounding the notion of active 
power, makes these sagacious remarks : " The 
conception of an efficient cause may very probably 
be derived from the experience we have had in 
very early life of our own power to produce cer- 
tain effects. ... If it be so that the conception 
of an efficient cause enters into the mind only from 
the early conviction we have that we are the 
efficients of our own voluntary actions (which I 
think is most probable), the notion of efficiency 
will be reduced to this, That it is a relation be- 
tween the cause and the effect similar to that 
which is between us and our voluntary actions. 
This is surely the most distinct notion, and, I think, 
the only notion we can form of real efficiency." 
In other words, we associate with our own bodily 
movements feelings of effort ; we then associate 
with the movements of external things similar 
feelings of effort : the thing which we call a cause 
is regarded as such because it makes, we think, 
an effort such as we make when we will to do 
anything. 

In view of such an analysis it cannot be said 
1 Essay on Active Power in General, Chap. V. 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 103 

that the category of causality is a product of the 
pure understanding. It is derived empirically 
from the phenomena of volitional activity. The 
truth of this is apparent if we accept the view 
that the feeling of effort is a complex of periph- 
eral sensations. And the case is not much 
altered, if the "feeling of innervation" be insisted 
on. If such a feeling exist, distinct from periph- 
eral sensations, is it not simply, as Hume would 
say, a "new impression"? Or, to speak in physio- 
logical terms, it betokens, like sensations, the 
metabolism going on in the brain cells. We may 
conclude, therefore, that it is a phenomenon, if it 
exists at all, not essentially different from those 
" feelings " we call sensations. 

21. This derivation of causality is all the more 
important, as it indicates at the same time the 
origin of the conceptions of energy and force, 
which have so large a place in modern science. 
Energy seems to be the modern substitute for 
causality ; when science traces the causes of things, 
it traces the transformations of energy. Yet it 
has the same essential content. The word energy 
suggests even more directly than cause the an- 
cestral source of both conceptions : it still recalls 
the feeling of effort and strain. Energy differs 
from causality chiefly in the doctrine which has 



104 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

been developed concerning it; while causality is 
intermittent, as our feelings of effort are, the energy 
of the world has, we are taught, a certain persis- 
tence and constancy. It is not necessary here to 
consider the distinction between energy and force. 

22. This category of causality has brought us 
in sight of other categories, which are derived 
even more directly than it from observation of 
the phenomena of the mind and will. 

23. One of the chief categories in this class is that 
of teleology. It is one that has received very great 
prominence in recent philosophy. It comes origi- 
nally from observation of human, and, to some extent, 
animal experience. Man thinks of an end and uses 
means to its realization : he wishes a harvest, and he 
ploughs his field, and sows the seed, and rises 
night and day. We have here simply a special 
form of representation of a causal series. The 
man's past experience has associated harvest with 
seed-time as effect with cause. Now when he 
thinks of the effect, he thinks of its cause, or of 
the chain of causes, and he thinks of them in 
their actual order. If the ideas of his own contri- 
butions to this series become, for any reason, vivid 
enough, they are translated into action ; for as we 
shall have occasion to see, it is the nature of ideas 
of action thus to translate themselves. 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 105 

There is no material difference between such 
cases and those in which an end is sought of a 
kind that has never been present to man's actual 
observation ; an inventor tries, for instance, to 
make a flying-machine. Even in such cases the 
separation from experience is not absolute. The 
new idea is due to the plastic power of the imagina- 
tion as it works on old material. 

It is from observation of such processes that the idea 
of teleology, or purpose, or final cause, is derived. 

The idea seems to have a special significance 
when an immanent teleology is spoken of. A tree 
develops, or humanity develops, or the universe 
develops : through the life of the individual, and 
through the ages a purpose runs ; but the purpose 
is not in some mind external to the process ; the 
end which is reached is said to be present ideally 
throughout the whole movement ; or, the teleology 
is immanent. The peculiarity of the idea when 
so rendered is obviously that the end or purpose 
is no longer dependent on a thinker, but is re- 
garded as independent, and as possessed of a causal 
efficiency of its own. We have thus the render- 
ing of the teleological concept which is so promi- 
nent in many systems of idealism from the time 
of Aristotle onward. Its empirical origin does not 
demand further demonstration. 



106 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

24. The meanings attaching to the word self 
have been referred to in the analysis of the cate- 
gory of substance. The concept reason is gained 
from empirical observation of that group of mental 
phenomena to which the name refers. The con- 
cept of will comes from the consciousness of effort, 
and also from the consciousness of choice, or 
decision, or what is called the fiat of the will. 
This fiat seems to indicate the sense of an overt 
action, as it is vividly contrasted with the incipient 
or ideational acting of a state of indecision. What- 
ever its meaning, this fiat lends a distinct colour 
to the idea of the will. Yet there is nothing in 
it to suggest that volition, though Hegel puts it 
in his list of categories, is a thought of other than 
empirical origin. 

25. Our concepts, categories, universals, all be- 
long to one type ; they grow in one way. They 
are all alike the offspring of experience. Some 
of the so-called categories seem to have a univer- 
sality which is inexplicable on this basis, but 
they get their universality just as the ordinary 
empirical concept gets its sphere. Any quality, 
as we have seen, is, or may be, a universal, and 
becomes such by being used universally. And it 
is in this way that the categories have gained 
what may be called their numerical universality. 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 107 

They are all derived from fragments of experience, 
with, perhaps, the exception of space, which repre- 
sents something common to all our human expe- 
rience. Then they are given dominion over a 
much wider sphere. Causality, for instance, is 
taken from a bit of experience even as the con- 
cept tree is. Tree is not applied except to the 
objects from which it is derived. Causality has a 
much wider range than the phenomena which are 
its source, because we think our own actions as 
mediated through the inward feeling of energy, 
and, further, because, being inveterately animistic 
in our interpretation of phenomena, we interpret 
all changes in terms of our own actions. The 
more constant and prominent ideas and feelings 
are transferred, so far as is possible, to all other 
objects ; and thus the categories which represent 
them gain their widely extended application. 

26. There is a possible criticism of this deriva- 
tion of the categories which should be considered. 
It may be said that the account given of them 
presents them when they have come to recognition 
as the result of reflection ; yet this is not their 
creation : they are implicit in the earlier experience, 
and determine its form ; and thus seem to emerge 
from that which really owes its shape to them. Thus, 
space was implicit in what has been called the quali- 



Io8 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

tative manifold, for it was by virtue of the presence 
of this form that it was a manifold. It is causality 
that determines the sequence of phenomena ; and 
its emergence in connection with the phenomena 
of volition merely indicates that these are the facts 
which bring it before the reflective consciousness. 
In answer to such criticisms it must be pointed 
out that to say that the categories are " implicitly " 
or "potentially" in the earlier consciousness, is to 
use expressions which are apt to cover a very 
doubtful metaphysical theory. When a phenome- 
non in a series is said to be implicitly or poten- 
tially in the earlier members of that series, all 
that the statement is entitled to mean is that the 
phenomenon belongs to the series, and occurs at 
a certain determinate place in it. It is further to 
be observed that it is necessary, if the presupposi- 
tions of such criticism be adopted, to hold that 
the categories, which, after all, are known to us 
as facts of consciousness, are at the early stages 
of experience at once absent from consciousness, 
and yet somehow present as potent factors in it. 
But even if it should be possible to harmonize 
these seeming contradictions, the fatal fact remains 
that the content of the categories is empirical or 
sensational. They presuppose experience ; they 
are not presupposed by it. The form of space is 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS 109 

made of nothing but sensations ; the categories of 
substance and cause contain nothing but sensory 
elements ; even the categories of teleology and 
reason are of the same material. The concepts 
have not, it may be repeated, the vividness of 
sensation ; they are fainter and more evanescent ; 
yet nevertheless they are sensory. The Begriff is 
a dried and faded Vorstellung. 

27. It is thus impossible to subscribe to the 
doctrine of Kant, that the categories are not de- 
rived from the sensibility, but are a priori in the 
mind, and are to be attributed to the spontaneity 
of the understanding. We have seen that this 
Melchisedek origin is not to be attributed to 
them. Kant's suggestion, that the sensibility and 
the understanding may have a common, though 
to us unknown, root, falls short of the truth which 
psychology is revealing to us. Rather must we 
say that the sensibility is the root, and the cate- 
gories are growths from that root. Yet Kant's 
doctrine of the spontaneity of the understanding 
is important in showing the nature of growth. 
When considering the continuity of the mental 
life, we saw that the explanation of anything 
is not given in the history of that thing ; even 
in the dust-heap formed by the wayside we have 
not merely a recombination of old particles ; we 



110 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

find a manifestation of being that is original and 
unique. And in the growth of mind, in the re- 
combination and modification of sensory elements, 
there is not merely the old. The resultant con- 
cept is other than the images from which it 
comes. There is, in truth, a spontaneity of the 
understanding. The life of the mind, like all 
other life, does not repeat itself, but ever assumes 
new forms. Yet let the bearing of this principle 
be recognized. It may be true that the cate- 
gories are new mental entities ; but so is every 
work of the imagination, every fancy of an idle 
hour. What Kant showed to be true for a few 
mental entities, is true for unnumbered others 
that are not of the order of the categories. The 
object of the above discussion has not been to 
call in question the fact of the newness of certain 
facts in the mental life ; it has rather been to 
show that this newness is not characteristic of 
these alone, but is similar to that which we find 
in the familiar processes of the fancy and imagi- 
nation, and also that it can be construed in entire 
consistency with the doctrine that the mental life 
is continuous from the simplest sensation-germ to 
the highest intellectual attainment. 

28. There remains to be considered the Kantian 
proof that the categories are a priori in the mind. 



THE ORIGIN OF CONCEPTS ill 

It is meant to show that they are necessary to 
experience. Thought, according to Kant, is syn- 
thesis or conjunction, and as the data of sense 
do not in themselves present a unity, the mind 
must supply it by its spontaneous activity. This 
unifying activity is manifested in the application 
of the categories to sense-data. 

This view of sensations as discrete units is one 
that is natural enough at all times, and had been 
specially developed in the writings of the British 
philosophers. So Kant regards our sense-intuitions 
as made up of a multitude of sensations. But this 
means that the idea of multiplicity gained from 
the sensory experience by the conceptual process 
is taken to describe that original experience from 
which it is differentiated. We shall see the falsity 
of this method in the next chapter. There is no 
real ground for Kant's view ; a sensory experience 
is not a multiplicity of discrete points. Moreover, 
synthesis, while it is a metaphor derived from the 
very familiar experiences of putting things together, 
is not therefore of absolute validity as an account 
of thought ; unity, as well as plurality, is, when 
the absolute nature of thought is considered, an 
irrelevant idea. 



CHAPTER V 

THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 

1. In the definition of knowledge which was 
given above, it was determined that for the attain- 
ment of truth thought must copy the object or 
hold to it a still closer relation. The kind of 
thought embodied in the concept has now been 
described : the manner of its growth has been ob- 
served ; the content of some of the most important 
concepts has been analyzed. It is now to be de- 
cided whether this form of thought meets the re- 
quirements of knowledge. What verdict must be 
pronounced on realism in its various forms, — now 
affirming that the categories constitute the eternal 
essence of the absolute being, and now proclaiming 
that the laws of nature represent the nature of 
things ? Is the concept the method of knowledge ? 
Or must it be denied that knowledge is its function ? 

2. The concept is either a quality separated from 
others by abstraction, or a group of qualities, or a 
composite image. Let the last case be considered 
first. This general image, though constructed out 

112 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 113 

of many images, is, nevertheless, one image, and, 
being an individual image among other images, it 
is unable to resemble them all. It is even as a 
general image specially unfitted to resemble them, 
for the peculiarities of the individuals cancel each 
other, and the general image thus fails to be a copy 
of any one of them. It is, as we said, a relatively 
new image, for there may not be absolute agreement 
of the individuals in any one feature. The con- 
cept man, for instance, is thought to hold of many 
individuals, though, when they are compared, there 
may be nothing in the experience of any one which 
is identical with the experience of another, and 
there may be nothing in any experience accurately 
corresponding to the concept. It may be said 
that all men agree in having such faculties as 
memory, conscience* will ; yet it can be readily 
seen that these are concepts which in their turn 
stand for experiences that in their concrete details 
fail to correspond with each other, and likewise 
fail to correspond with their concepts. The con- 
cept thus fails to be knowledge of a class. 

3. But there are concepts which claim to repre- 
sent a part of all the individuals of a class. There 
may be a quality, or nucleus of qualities, which is 
the same in all the individuals of a class, and this 
nucleus may be copied in the concept. But this 



114 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

vindication of the concept is also unsuccessful, for 
such a nucleus is, as a matter of fact, not to be 
found. It may seem, indeed, to present itself in 
such a case as that of objects fashioned alike by 
human design ; there may, for instance, be a num- 
ber of tables made of the same size and shape and 
painted the same colour. But when such cases are 
examined, it is found that the likeness subsists only 
in such an external character as spatial form. It 
is extremely unlikely that the wood of which one 
table is made copies in all the details of its fibres 
the wood of any other table ; it is probable that 
each molecule in the mass is unique. Besides, each 
table being external to the others is exposed to a 
special set of influences which do not affect the 
other. Theoretically, we may see no reason why 
individuals should not resemble each other, but 
probably, even in class-characters, they never reach 
perfect likeness. 

As regards the spatial form, it is to be observed 
that while it is true that space is homogeneous, 
and that each part in it seems like every other 
part, the space answering to this description is 
space in its conceptual presentation. We shall see 
reasons for believing that this concept has nothing 
objective to correspond to it, yet if it is regarded 
as objective, the peculiar differences that hold 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 115 

within it must not be overlooked. If it is to be 
taken seriously and is to be an object of cognition, 
its here must be known as here, and its there 
as there. The spatial similarity must not be em- 
phasized while the peculiar spatial difference is 
ignored. 

4. There is yet another way of stating the rela- 
tion of the general to the particular. The concept 
is the one in the many, it is said. This does not 
mean that there is a quota of qualities that are 
identical in a number of individuals. There is an 
identity, but it is an identity that clothes itself in 
diversity. The one spirit, for instance, is revealed 
in a kingdom of souls. Or, again, the one sonl 
puts on many forms in the evolution of the indi- 
vidual. 

In the analysis of this doctrine given in the pre- 
ceding chapter, it became clear that the universal, 
while creating or being changed into the individ- 
ual, is still regarded as a distinct entity. We 
have now to inquire whether this relationship is 
presented in anything that falls within our ob- 
servation. Do we know the one in the many ? 

It is clear that it is not possible to have such an 
idea exemplified in the external or spatial form of 
things. A spatial outline that changes into an- 
other, constituting that other, yet somehow hidden 



Il6 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

in it, is something which has never been seen and 
can never be seen. The one in the one — for that 
relation demands consideration before the relation 
of the one in the many — is not to be found in 
this sphere in the sense that the theory demands. 
The familiar relation of the part to the whole is 
the only representation that can be made at all 
resembling that called for. 

Let us turn to what may be called the inner 
being of things. Let our own conscious life be 
considered. For it is of importance here, and 
throughout this investigation into knowledge, to 
remember that the only inner being which we can 
properly be said to know is the life of consciousness. 
The inner being of material objects may be guessed 
at ; if it resembles our own we may gain some ac- 
quaintance with it, though only by inference from 
our own. What is directly and immediately pres- 
ent to us is our own conscious life, and, therefore, 
we must test theories of the inner constitution of 
things by reference to the conditions of our own ex- 
perience. When we examine that experience to 
see if the idea of the one in the many has therein 
its counterpart, we fail to find any such relation. 
We have a series of concrete experiences, but the 
universals which the theory supposes to be incor- 
porated in them do not exist for the consciousness 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 117 

of these experiences. We are conscious of the sen- 
sations of red and green, and we have distinct from 
these the general idea of colour-sensation; but we 
are not conscious of that general idea of colour-sen- 
sation as present in, and constituting, the sensa- 
tions of red and green. We are conscious of many 
wishes, and also of the general idea of wish, yet 
not of that general idea as incorporated in the par- 
ticular wishes. Any one, therefore, who sought to 
know these concrete conscious facts would err if 
he thought to copy the particulars by thinking of 
a universal somehow present in them. 

But, it may be contended, this criticism ignores 
the fact that the universal is, or has become, the 
many individuals, and is not to be found as a sepa- 
rate entity in them. This is, so far, a just objec- 
tion. We have treated the universal as in some 
sense distinct, for only on the supposition of its 
distinctness can the concept claim to be a copy, 
and so a cognition, of the reality. When the per- 
sistence of the universal is denied, and the unique- 
ness of the individuals is acknowledged, there is a 
clearer recognition of facts, but the claim of the 
concept to be cognitive has correspondingly lost 
in validity. The concept ceases to be the copy or 
counterpart of anything objective ; the one is not 
a copy of any of the many individuals. 



Il8 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

5. And even did there still remain grounds for 
believing that there is a universal in the many 
individuals, there could not be gained by know- 
ledge of it all the knowledge that is desired. 
Knowledge of the universal is not knowledge of 
the concrete. And the concrete is the reality; it 
comprises the world of our living experiences, our 
sensations and fancies, joys and sorrows, hopes and 
fears. This is the world of whose actuality we 
are assured. To know the universal, even if it is 
objective, is not to know these concrete facts. 
The knowledge of the one must still be outside 
the knowledge of the other. The heroism of men 
is not repeated in its actual forms in the general 
idea of it. The bitter-sweet of an act of self-sacri- 
fice is not reproduced in the general concept of 
self-denial. The concept is not the measure of 
reality. 

6. Nor may it be said that the concrete indi- 
vidual is not constituted by one universal, but is a 
meeting-place or plexus of many universals, and 
that an exhaustive knowledge of these would be 
true knowledge of the individual. Each universal 
would in turn betray its externality to the concrete 
facts. And, even were it admitted that the indi- 
vidual is a plexus of laws, the plexus is more than 
the universals taken abstractly. The elements of 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 119 

protoplasm when separated by the chemist are not 
protoplasm in the synthesis of life. That new ele- 
ment, or quality, that new life, which comes with 
the supposed synthesis of universals, must be made 
an object of cognition. To complete the list of 
them is not to give that life ; the continuous dis- 
covery of new laws is not contact with the true 
life of the object. To seek knowledge in concepts 
is to seek the living among the dead. 

7. There is still another way of representing 
the function of the universal. It may be looked 
upon as a principle of synthesis, as it was in 
Kant's system. It might further be supposed that 
the products of such a work of sjmthesis may 
themselves become objects of knowledge. In this 
case universal would copy universal. It may suf- 
fice here to point out that on this theory these 
universals, though cognitive of each other, are still 
left external to the phenomena they hold together. 
These phenomena may be synthetized by them ; 
they are not known by them. Again, we are 
obliged to seek alongside the knowledge given in 
universals a knowledge of another kind. For uni- 
versals can copy universals, but they cannot copy 
facts of another order. 

8. It might still be said that there is validity 
in this view of the one in the many ; only, it is a 



120 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

validity that is recognized by thought or reason, 
and not by imagination. This distinction of the 
Begriff from the Vorstellung has already been con- 
sidered, and it has been found that, whenever the 
Begriff is examined, it proves to be a Vorstellung 
in disguise. It is further to be noted here that, 
if the Begriff differs from the Vorstellung so much 
as is alleged, it is thereby unfitted in the case of 
certain facts for the cognitive function. The Vor- 
stellung is a fact and yet cannot be copied by the 
Begriff. 

9. For, in short, if knowledge is a subjective 
copy of an objective order, it cannot consist sim- 
ply of universals. Universals do make up part of 
the objective order ; they are, at least, facts in 
the human mind ; and they can be known or 
copied only by universals. But there is much else 
that cannot be thus cognized. The whole stream 
of sensations and emotions, which makes so large 
a part of the facts offered for cognition, must be 
copied by something other than the universal. The 
faculty by which we have sensory or emotional ex- 
perience is not that exercised by the mind when 
it frames concepts of that sensory and emotional 
experience. The two series of mental facts are 
disparate ; therefore, the one cannot afford a cog- 
nition of the other. 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 12 1 

10. This criticism of the concept will receive 
additional illustration as we proceed to inquire 
into the objective validity of the categories. It 
will, further, be found that the categories have 
not only the faults of the ordinary empirical con- 
cepts, but others which attach especially to them- 
selves. Their wider universality is, in the case 
of most of them, fatal to their truth. They are 
applied to phenomena other than those in which 
they originate, with the result that when thus 
applied they fail more completely to represent 
realities. 

11. Let space be first considered. It should 
be remarked at the outset that the criticism just 
passed on the categories does not apply to space ; 
for it is derived from universal experience, and 
has a peculiar title to be regarded as the form of 
all things. It is not thereby settled, however, 
whether the idea of space is a copy of anything 
objective. 

Space, we have seen, is a concept or idea derived 
from the manifold of sense ; or, rather, it is yielded 
by the meeting of many such manifolds. First of 
all, is the concept knowledge of these manifolds? 
It can be knowledge of them only by resembling 
them. But it is not like them. It does not even 
resemble a part common to them all. Space is not 



122 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

a part or element of the manifold. Quantity is 
not a part or element of quality. That it is an 
idea distinct from quality, is taught by Kant when 
he insists that space is distinct from sense-data, 
and is a form for them all. 

From this it follows that the truth of this mani- 
fold cannot be presented in terms of space. The 
place of the spatial relation in the method of truth- 
finding is not hereby determined. But the claim 
of space to absolute truth, when predicated of the 
qualitative manifold, is disallowed. The idea of 
pure space, while derived from this manifold, is 
external to it. The charge of externality, and con- 
sequent estrangement from truth, can be brought 
with still greater justice against such abstractions 
as number. The measurement of psychical states 
in respect of intensity offers no exception to this 
principle. Though the relation of one intensity to 
another may be given in quantitative terms, the 
description is external. The reality of the feelings, 
as they are felt, or as they actually exist, is not thus 
reproduced, nor is any part or element of them so 
reproduced. The feeling of greater intensity is 
not a multiple of less intense feelings ; and even 
were it granted that it is such a multiple or com- 
pound, the quantitative statement would not cease 
to be external. Again, were intensity resolved 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 123 

into extensity, 1 there must still be recognized the 
difference between the extensity of feelings as felt, 
and that presented in geometry. 

But there is another question that is more promi- 
nent in the inquiry concerning the reality of space. 
It is not asked merely whether space, being empiri- 
cally derived from experience, is like the experiences 
from which it comes. It is also asked whether the 
idea we have of pure space is the counterpart of 
an objective reality. 

It is to be observed that the concept of pure space 
can be like, and can therefore represent cognitively, 
only an object that is similar, that is, another con- 
cept of pure space. The concept which each man 
forms may be made an instrument of knowledge 
whereby other men's ideas of space are discerned. 
It may well be, as Kant remarks, that all finite in- 
telligences agree in this respect with man, and thus 
the cognitive use of the concept may have a wide 
range. 

Doubtless this view of the cognitive value of 
space seems to ignore the problem of its objectivity. 
Is there not, it is asked, a space independent of the 
mind to which the mental representation corre- 
sponds? It must be answered, that to affirm the 

1 Cf. Miinsterberg, Beitrage zur Experimentellen Psychologies 
Heft 3. 



124 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

existence of such space is to say that there is, as a 
counterpart to our idea of space, an idea of space 
independent of our thinking. We cannot suppose 
that the space in the mind is an idea, while the ob- 
jective space is something other than idea. If the 
space in the mind is a fact of consciousness, the 
objective space must likewise be a fact of conscious- 
ness ; otherwise the relation of knowledge cannot 
obtain between them. It may seem to remove this 
difficulty to attribute the objective idea of space 
to the Divine consciousness. Yet when it is re- 
membered that space is a product of fragmentary 
experience^, and represents the result of the can- 
celling of one qualitative variety by another, it 
can be seen that it has too many of the marks of 
finitude to be attributed to the absolute intelligence. 

We have thus found that the idea of space does 
not give us the truth of our conscious experiences ; 
it also fails to represent anything objective, save 
as it mirrors similar ideas in other finite minds. 

It has been stated already that number is exter- 
nal to our concrete sensory experiences. It may 
be added that, even if the objective nature of space 
be insisted on, it cannot be rightly represented by 
the sciences of arithmetic and geometry. These 
cannot, so to speak, reveal its heart. The feeling 
of these is not the feeling of space, and therefore 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPT 125 

it is not known by them. Likewise questions about 
the infinite divisibility of space do not arise in re- 
gard to the sensory manifold ; nor do they arise in 
regard to the general idea of space until the mind 
has substituted for the first form of that concept 
the idea of a system of discrete units. Moreover, 
infinite divisibility is an expression that has be- 
come merely symbolic, and does not represent any 
adequate cognitive appreciation of objective facts. 
This is true also of the expression infinite exten- 
sion. Into a further psychological analysis of the 
ideas of infinite divisibility and infinite extension 
it is not necessary, for the present inquiry, to enter. 

12. The category of time does not demand 
detailed criticism. So far as it is made up of the 
idea of space, the conclusions to be reached regard- 
ing it have been determined in the discussion of 
that concept. So far as reality and unreality are 
concerned, it may suffice to refer to the study of 
these which immediately follows. The feeling 
which arises upon their comparison, and is the 
new element in the idea of time, cannot, when 
stripped of its associates, be taken for the objective 
form or entity which time is thought to be. 

13. Being or reality was shown to have its 
origin in sensations of touch; and the first ques- 
tion regarding it should be : Does it give the truth 



126 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

of these sensations? The answer is to be found 
in the principle that general ideas are not the truth 
of the particular cases from which they are derived. 
Being is a composite image of touch-sensations, 
and cannot mirror the experience of the individual 
sensations. The category can copy, or cognize, only 
another idea that is, like itself, the resultant of cer- 
tain bodily feelings. 

There cleaves, however, to this category, as it is 
usually employed, the weakness of a spurious uni- 
versality. It is not restricted to sensations of 
touch, but is applied to everything in the universe. 
From the time of Porphyry, being has been recog- 
nized as the summum genus which could be predi- 
cated of all things. 

It is scarcely necessary to show that this uni- 
versal application of the category is unwarranted. 
Let conscious experience be first considered. The 
sensations of touch are only one group of sensa- 
tions ; those of sight and smell have nothing of 
the touch character, and when they are brought 
into relation to touch they are simply associated 
with it. If we would know the sensations of sight 
and smell, it is they themselves that must be laid 
hold of by the mind ; it is not directly to the pur- 
pose, from the cognitive point of view, to associate 
with them images derived from some other sense. 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 127 

Likewise our emotional experiences and our argu- 
mentations cannot be understood in their truth by 
means of this category. 

Of the things of nature we know little, and, there- 
fore, can dogmatize little as to what is predicable 
of them. It may be, therefore, that being can be 
attributed to them. Yet let it be repeated, this 
idea, if it is to be cognitive, must be like an idea. 
If it is maintained that external things have real- 
ity, it must be meant that there is associated with 
them, as part of their constitution, this composite 
image of touch-feelings. But it is at once evident 
that to say this is to indulge in crude and pre- 
carious hypotheses. The complacency with which 
we use the category must disappear when there is 
reflection on its origin and content. 

14. The idea of essence was traced to certain 
feelings of muscular strain. It is not necessary to 
repeat the criticism passed upon empirically derived 
concepts that they do not yield the truth of the ex- 
periences from which they have originally come. It 
is to be more carefully observed that this category 
does not give the truth of other mental experiences ; 
when we say that certain mental phenomena are 
essential to the soul, we are adding to the phe- 
nomena an extraneous idea. If they have not the 
same content as the idea of essence, that idea cannot 



128 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

be a copy or cognition of them. Again, the applica- 
tion of the idea to external objects means the ex- 
ternalization of certain subjective feelings ; and the 
justification of such a process as contributory to 
knowledge has never been attempted. 

15. The category of similarity also fails to yield 
the truth of the many things to which it is applied. 
It is not an element of the things, but is an inde- 
pendent idea, derived from internal sensations, and 
then applied to the relation of facts physical and 
mental. This relational character which it wears 
is proof that in respect to these facts it is not cog- 
nitive. It is not knowledge of the facts ; it is a 
bond between them. It would be cognitive, did 
there subsist as a link between the two objects the 
kind of organic feeling which forms the substance 
of this idea ; but there is no proof that it exists. 
It is not found between conscious states until it is 
supplied in the act of cognition, and the hypothesis 
of its existence as a bond between external objects 
is without the barest foundation of evidence. The 
question is, of course, not yet being decided, 
whether similarity, when employed as a symbol, is 
not exceedingly useful in the mental construction of 
the world ; the present inquiry concerns its abso- 
lute truthfulness. 

16. The category of substance, also, illustrates 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 129 

the failure of concepts to meet the requirements of 
cognition. It is, in the first instance, an interpre- 
tation of the self as made up of the somatic con- 
sciousness. But there is not to be found this 
persistent or identical element in the soul's ex- 
periences. In the somatic consciousness there is 
an approximation to such a monotone, but, even in 
it, variations show themselves. As little, or still 
less, does experience justify the view that this 
concept is so connected with the other phenomena 
of the soul's life that it may be offered as a true 
representation of them. Again, this category is 
applied to all existences, material as well as spirit- 
ual, and is thought to be the inner reality behind 
their appearance. But the precarious character of 
the hypothesis needs no demonstration ; the vague 
body-sensations cannot be proved to be the inner 
reality of material objects. We have no evidence 
that there is one material object which is to be thus 
interpreted ; we are still further from knowing that 
there are many such. 

This category has played an important part in 
the history of science and philosophy, and many 
attempts have been made to define it, and formu- 
late the deductions from it in precise scientific 
terms. It received its most elaborate treatment 
in philosophy in the system of Spinoza. It is 



130 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

impossible to offer here any complete criticism of 
that system, especially as Spinoza mixed up with 
the idea of substance other doctrines relatively in- 
dependent of it, such as that of genus and species. 
Yet it may be said that Spinoza made a quite 
uncritical use of the concept, and that, had he 
instituted a thorough psychological investigation 
of its origin, such as he suggests in the case of 
some concepts, 1 he would never have made it the 
basis of his system. 

The scientific doctrine of substance is restricted 
primarily to the physical world, and is presented 
in the formula that the substance of the world is 
permanent. At the same time, this doctrine is 
probably now expressed, so far as it is of scientific 
interest, in the principle of the conservation of 
energy : the permanence of substance is for science 
a permanence of mass, and thus a manifestation of 
energy. 

17. We are thus brought to the categories of 
causality and energy. Let it be remembered that 
causality is one of our most widely applied con- 
cepts. It is thought to hold of the agency of 
God, of the voluntary actions of men, and of the 
changes in material objects; moreover, it is one 
form of connection which is ordinarily thought to 

1 Ethica, Par. II, Propos. 40, schol. 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 13 1 

obtain in all these cases. The validity of these 
pretensions must be estimated. It has been seen 
that causality is derived from our feelings of 
effort. Now the theory which makes causality a 
metaphysical reality is not only claiming that these 
feelings are to be found in mental changes ; it is 
ejecting them into the external universe. It would 
lend little support to this theory to say that the feel- 
ing of effort is the feeling of innervation. Even 
that feeling, if it exist, cannot a 'priori claim any 
more metaphysical dignity than a sensation of smell 
or taste. 

It finds no real evidence for its claims in the 
facts of conscious experience. This seems at first 
sight a paradoxical statement, for causality is a 
mental phenomenon, and it is a matter of experi- 
ence that it does conjoin other mental phenomena; 
thus, a man wishes to walk, has the feeling of 
energy, and then experiences the sensations con- 
nected with actual walking. It may seem that 
in such a case the wish is the cause of the sen- 
sations of walking. But the feeling of effort 
which conjoins the two and seems a clear mani- 
festation of causal connection is simply another 
feeling, or set of feelings, interposed between 
them. No member of the series is creative: the 
series is a succession of conscious states; the feel- 



132 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

ing of causality, however closely it joins with the 
other ideas, is yet external to them and relatively 
independent of them, and does not represent their 
constitution. The concept is therefore not cog- 
nitive of the two states ; it relates to something 
foreign to them. Further, it is only in cases of 
voluntary action that the feeling of effort comes 
into consciousness. In other cases in which a 
causal connection is asserted, the concept does not 
appear in the experience, but only in the intellect 
of him who reflects on the experience. The hear- 
ing of his friend's death is, we say, the cause of 
the man's grief. But the man who grieves has 
not present in his consciousness the complex of 
ideas indicated by the category. It is present 
only to the reflection that would explain or inter- 
pret his experience. By far the larger number of 
our experiences are neither preceded nor followed 
by anything resembling the category of causality, 
nor does the analysis of them show a trace of its 
presence. So true is this, that psychology no 
longer seeks the causal bond in the mental series, 
but in the physiological series which is regarded 
as its basis : the stream of consciousness is a suc- 
cession; it is not construed as a causal chain. 

The application of the category to the physical 
series of events means, we have seen, the ejection 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 133 

of a special set of feeling. Again, as in the 
previous cases of such hypotheses, we must con- 
fess our ignorance of external things, and our in- 
ability to say what concepts are applicable to 
them. But we must, also, again point to the 
peculiarly crude character of such theorizing. If 
we are in this animistic way to ascribe feelings 
of effort similar to our own, to all things in the 
universe, we should offer some justification for 
the procedure. 

18. The category of energy is, as we have seen, 
closely akin to that of causality. Like causality, 
it has the important place it occupies in thought 
simply because of our inveterate association of 
change with effort. The theory of energy is ex- 
pressed in the principles of the conservation and 
transformation of energy, and an estimate of the 
cognitive value of the category may thus be re- 
solved into an estimate of these principles. 

Let the principle of the transformation of energy 
be first looked at. It is said that the energy while 
remaining the same appears in various forms ; here 
it is light, there it is heat, while in another place 
it is electricity; or it may adopt these various 
forms in succession. There is first to be noticed 
here the old Aristotelian idea of the one in the 
many; the energy appears in a variety of particu- 



134 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

lar forms. But not only does the theory present 
this untenable view ; it joins to it another doctrine 
not less hard. It teaches that one form of energy 
passes, or is transformed, into another. Of this, 
however, science offers no proof. It presents a 
series of phenomena, and shows that one gives 
place to another ; but this is all that it shows. 
And the analogy of conscious experience warrants 
no such statement of transformations. It offers 
a succession of conscious states each of which is 
qualitatively distinct ; one is not changed into 
another ; at least the act of transformation is not 
given in consciousness. This doctrine regarding 
energy thus proves to be untrue of anything that 
comes within the sphere of experience. 

In place of "transformations of energy," the 
more cautious expression "correlation of forces" 1 
has been used. The expression indicates the view 
that, while it is right to say that one force pro- 
duces another, it is yet not legitimate to say that 
one is transmuted into another. This recognition 
of difference in the forces is valuable, but the prin- 
ciple is not carried far enough. Each force is still a 
general concept, and the attempt to unify the modes 
of one force is exposed to objections as much as the 
attempt to reduce all the forms of energy to unity 

1 Sir W. K. Grove, The Correlation of the Physical Forces. 






THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 135 

The law of the conservation of energy states 
that the energy, while undergoing change, re- 
mains the same in amount. This law fails to 
meet the requirements of cognition, because it 
reverts to the idea of quantity to explain what 
is qualitative. Let it be remembered that the 
idea of energy is derived from feelings of effort, 
and that thus the physical world is being inter- 
preted after the analogy of our conscious exist- 
ence. So far as the physical universe has for its 
being feelings of effort or feelings of any kind, 
these must be supposed to change from moment 
to moment, as a man's would change, were he 
hauled, now one way, now another. To say that 
the quantity of his sensations remained the same, 
would be to apply, as we have already seen, 
categories external to the facts that are to be 
stated. In absolute cognition, ideas of quantity 
can be applied only to ideas of quantity. 

It may still seem impossible to think energy to 
be annihilated, or created, and it may, therefore, 
be concluded that it is never lost from space. 
But the seeming impossibility of thinking energy 
away is due to the fact that the idea of being is 
associated with it, and, so long as we hold to the 
idea of being, we cannot at the same time intro- 
duce the idea of its non-being. To refer again 



136 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

to our conscious experience, we find that each 
moment it is new, and then vanishes, never to 
return. So the experiences of nature, the past 
manifestations of energy, have vanished. And it 
could not be asserted that our experiences or those 
of the physical world are still preserved somewhere. 
The fact of change presents to reflection difficulties 
enough, but it is not likely to be explained by the 
hypostatizing of space, the supposition that this 
space is permanent, and the further supposition 
that our experiences are moved around in it. 

It need not be said that no attempt is being 
made to call in question the value for science of 
the principles of the conservation and transforma- 
tion of energy. These may be taken, as we shall 
have occasion to note, to refer simply to relations 
of succession and coexistence among phenomena. 
It is not necessary that science should regard en- 
ergy as a metaphysical entity. 

19. It is not out of place here to refer to the 
attempts made by Schopenhauer, and other meta- 
physicians since his time, 1 to install the will in 
the place of the absolute. These attempts are 
natural products of the thought of the modern 
world. Causality is the category made prominent 
in modern science, and it has developed into the 

1 Wundt, Paulsen, Denssen, may be mentioned. 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 137 

idea of energy, as the explanation of the physi- 
cal world. It was also natural that it should 
give rise to the theory that the will is the basal 
faculty, and that the universe, physical as well 
as spiritual, is a manifestation of will. Causality, 
energy, force, are ideas derived from our feelings 
of effort, and it is from the same source that the 
elements of the idea of will are largely, if not 
entirely, derived. The doctrine that the physical 
vjorld is will and the doctrine that it is energy are 
scarcely to be distinguished. In view of what has 
been said regarding causality and energy, a de- 
tailed criticism of the theory may be dispensed 
with. 

20. The category of teleology is a general idea 
derived from the contemplation of a variety of 
actions directed to ends. It has the weakness of 
other general concepts and cannot afford true cog- 
nition of any one such action. There is still greater 
departure from truth when it is thought that there 
is some peculiar efficiency in the idea of an action 
which in a teleological process precedes the action 
itself. This idea is, like others, part of the stream 
of consciousness, and has no special productivity. 
To speak in terms of causality, it is the effect of 
the ideas that precede it, and the cause of those 
that follow it. 



138 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

When an immanent teleology is proclaimed, there 
is a theory offered which the facts of experience do 
nothing to illustrate. An idea which exists only 
" ideally," according to the demand of such theories, 
is manifestly something of which we have no direct 
experience, for all our experiences are concrete and 
actual, and cannot in this sense be ideal. And it 
is difficult to see by what right such a conception, 
which cannot sustain its claims in the sphere to 
which, by the terms of it, it specially belongs, is to 
be applied, for cognitive purposes, to other exist- 
ences, such as plants or animals, or even to the 
universe as a whole. 

This category has had great prominence in modern 
philosophy. It has been used to interpret the abso- 
lute, not only in the design argument, but also in 
such philosophical systems as those of Lotze and 
Von Hartmann. So recent a writer as Professor 
Royce 1 says that while some of the categories are 
descriptive of the appearance of things in space and 
time and fail to reach their inner being, that inner 
life is " appreciated " in teleological ideas. We are 
now, however, in a position to see how far this cate- 
gory is from giving an appreciation of that life, if 
by appreciation is meant a knowledge of its actual 
experiences. 

1 Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 426. 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 139 

In The Riddles of the Sphinx, it is pointed out 
that concepts, inasmuch as they are timeless, cannot 
present the truth of this changing universe ; x yet 
it is thought that the universe may be interpreted 
by the teleological concept. 2 It need scarcely be 
pointed out that teleology is as static as any other 
category, and is as little able to mirror the chang- 
ing scene of things. The concept of a stream is not 
itself a stream. 

21. Finally, the category of reason must be con- 
sidered. It is gained by observation of the work of 
the mind in cognition and ratiocination. The value 
of the category as a means to cognition has been 
considered by many to be very high. Such idealists 
as Hegel have made it the ultimate truth and ex- 
planation of all things. But doubts of its cog- 
nitive validity readily arise. The fact that it is 
derived from observation of those very abstractions 
which have proved to be so phantasmal, is enough 
to awaken suspicion regarding it. It does not 
represent even the rational process. It does not 
resemble the immediate sensory or emotional ex- 
periences. It is not to be assumed that it is like 
anything in the experience of natures lower than 
the human. When these lower natures have to 
be explained by it there is called to its assistance 

1 pp. 81 f. 2 pp. 180, 199, etc. 



140 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

the idea of evolution; in the lower nature reason 
is said to be in process of evolution ; and then to 
explain this evolution recourse is had to the idea 
of an immanent teleology. But the use of the 
category is thus rendered yet more unsatisfactory. 

22. It is the more necessary to call attention 
to the criticism of this category ; for it is generally 
its claims in a somewhat different form which we 
meet, when it is said that the self is a clear illustra- 
tion of unity in diversity. The self is said to be 
in its various experiences. The reason for saying 
this seems to be that when we in the act of reflection 
frame the idea of the self, as being in the experi- 
ences, what we really have for the idea of the self 
is an individual idea ; and when, on the other hand, 
we turn to the experiences, we fail to find in them 
the self as represented in our idea; and then the 
self is said to be not apart from our experiences, 
but given only in them. All this only serves to 
show that the idea, not being like all the various 
experiences, is not cognitive of them. It can be 
cognitive only of an idea like itself. 

23. The categories have thus been proved to 
be wanting when tried by the ideal of knowledge 
with which we started. They have the defect 
of the empirical concept and cannot represent the 
individual facts which have produced them. And, 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 141 

in so far as they are applied to a wider range of 
facts, they are rendered yet more false. The con- 
cept as an individual thought may correspond to 
an individual objective fact. But to say that 
there is such a fact in the world beyond our con- 
sciousness is to make a theory for which no evi- 
dence can be discovered. The most that it is 
legitimate to say is that a category, as a mental 
fact, can be used in the cognition of just such a 
category. 

Concepts, as we said, have been held in honour 
by many of the great philosophers, but their 
claim to this honour cannot be established. They 
were raised to the high eminence they occupy by 
Socrates and his disciples; but the investigation 
of their origin and their constitution proves their 
inadequacy to the function assigned them. Their 
sway is only an episode in the development of 
knowledge. The faith in universals and laws 
of nature must be put aside with many another of 
man's primitive beliefs. 

24. Even were the category supposed to have 
another origin than that indicated above, it would 
not necessarily follow that it gives knowledge. 
Even were it given a priori, independently of sen- 
sibility, it would not of necessity give truth. We 
should still be obliged to ask concerning it, Does 



142 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

it resemble this sensation or that idea to which 
it is applied? The disparateness would be glar- 
ing, whatever the origin of the category. Kant 
may be appealed to as teaching that categories 
due to the spontaneity of the understanding do 
not necessarily have any correspondence with 
things in themselves. At the same time, the 
search for the empirical source of the categories 
has served to make clearer the meaning of this 
lack of correspondence. It brings to light the real 
content of the category and enables us to estimate 
more justly its value as a copy of other objects. 

25. The above criticism has been directed to 
the claim of concepts and categories to represent 
supposed objective realities. Other lines of criti- 
cism might have been followed. Mr. Bradley, in 
his work, Appearance and Reality, has criticised 
the categories in respect of their content, and, as 
the result of his work, has shown the contradic- 
tions which each contains within itself : " unity in 
diversity " is an instance of such contradictory 
conceptions. The importance of criticism of this 
kind is great. Yet whatever contradiction may 
be ultimately involved in some of our concepts, it 
has not been the special aim of this work to point 
it out ; the aim has been to determine what sense 
the categories and other concepts do actually pos- 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 143 

sess for the mind, and then to decide whether 
they are correspondent with, or cognitive of, the 
actual facts present to us. 

26. It is not unimportant to consider the bear- 
ing of the conclusions that have been reached on 
doctrines that have been widely prevalent regard- 
ing the necessities of thought. Our thinking is 
said to be dominated by the so-called primary 
laws of thought, — the laws of identity, non-con- 
tradiction, and excluded middle. These may 
indeed be, and have often been, interpreted as 
maxims that guide our subjective thinking; thus, 
the law of identity is said to teach that we 
should keep to one signification for a concept 
through all our treatment of it. Yet it is evi- 
dent that the maxims are not merely subjective ; 
if thought agrees with things, the enunciation of 
such laws implies that they are laws of things, 
and thus they regain that ontological significance 
which they had for Aristotle. 

When they are used in this objective way, they 
may be described as the laws of the category of 
being or reality. They belong to one distinct 
category, and tell the procedure of thought when 
it is using that category. But thought has other 
categories, and each category has its own laws. 
The "primary laws" of thought are not the only 



144 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

laws of thought ; thought has many laws. Space 
is a conception which is not of the same quality 
as being, and it presents relations and laws of its 
own. The laws of geometry are laws of thought, as 
much as the law of non-contradiction. Other con- 
ceptions, such as substance and causality, present 
other laws. The laws apply only as the category 
applies ; its limits are theirs. 

But, it may be objected, these laws are necessary. 
It may be admitted that in a sense they are neces- 
sary. If we use the category, we must use it in 
a certain way. If we think that a thing is, we 
cannot at the same time think that it is not. Even 
so, the two sides of a triangle must be thought to 
be together greater than the third side ; they can- 
not be thought to be less. Yet where such cate- 
gories are irrelevant, the laws have no cogency. 
Moreover, the idea of necessity must be criticised. 
"Whenever it is used, it will be found upon investi- 
gation that the idea of causality or force is its true 
significance. When we speak of the necessities of 
thought, we are associating with the current of ideas 
this somewhat crude category. When from such 
so-called necessities the extraneous idea of force 
is eliminated, all that can be said is that one idea 
always accompanies or follows another. If this is 
true in regard to deductions from concepts or ideas, 



THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF CONCEPTS 145 

it is yet more manifestly true in regard to those 
judgments in which different ideas are combined. 
The causal judgment, for instance, is said to bo 
necessary. It is necessary in the above sense if 
the judgment run, every effect has a cause. It 
may also be necessary if it take the form, every 
change has a cause ; for there may be present the 
idea of something to be changed, and thus of 
something which binds the two appearances to- 
gether ; or there may, unawares, be carried into the 
very idea of change the idea of force. But if it 
is said that every phenomenon must have a cause, 
there is not only no necessity in the judgment ; we 
have found reason for deciding that, in many cases, 
at least, it has no claim to truth. 

27. It is not to be inferred from what has been 
said that concepts have no function at all in the 
mental life. First of all, they are of great utility. 
Long before Socrates reflected on them they had 
proved their value in the economy of life. In 
the ordinary concept certain qualities are conjoined, 
and one of them occurring to the mind calls up 
the others with it. The sight of one fruit sug- 
gest edibility and pleasure; the sight of another 
suggests poison. The utilitarian value of the con- 
cept is enhanced by its character of universality; 
for, though the fruit now seen is not in all respects 



146 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

like the fruits seen on previous occasions, it yet 
awakens the general idea, and edibility is inferred. 
This ignoring of individual peculiarities may be 
attended by disastrous consequences, but this only 
leads to a revision of the concept. The method of 
thinking in general ideas has the great advantage 
of using past experience for present guidance. Con- 
duct ceases to deal with a series of disconnected 
facts; it brings life under general rules. The 
variety of the world is reduced for practical purposes 
to simplicity. 

Again, the concept is of value in the search for 
knowledge. For the concept tells what qualities 
are found together, and in the form of law it pre- 
sents the coexistences of phenomena. This is 
not knowledge, but it is an indispensable instru- 
ment of knowledge. It is better, however, to post- 
pone the further study of the way in which the 
concept ministers to knowledge, till we have deter- 
mined more completely wherein knowledge consists. 



CHAPTER VI 

EMPIRICISM 

. 1. When we studied sensation, we found that 
it constitutes to a very large extent, to say the 
least, the materials and also the instruments of 
knowledge. The investigation of concepts has 
not only discredited their claim to be in any 
special sense cognitive ; it has shown that they 
are made of the materials yielded by sense- 
experience. It is important now to estimate that 
theory of knowledge which has professed to keep 
closer to sense-experience, and to find in it the 
source of all that goes by the name of cognition. 

2. For empiricism combats the transcendental 
theory that reason is an independent source of 
cognition. The theory that there are a priori 
principles of thought, it opposes with the doctrine 
that these principles so far as they have any 
existence are products of sense-experience under 
the laws of association. Nihil est in intellectu quod 
non prius fuerit in sensu. 

The theory in its modern form attempts to give a 
147 






148 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

natural history of the mind. It begins with the 
simplest constituents of consciousness, and traces 
their combinations. Its point of view resembles 
that of the atomic theory : as the atoms are the 
ultimate constituents of the physical world, 
sensations are the ultimate constituents of the 
mental world ; and as atoms are conjoined into 
systems and make the physical universe, so sen- 
sations are joined or associated together to make 
the system of consciousness. The revived atomic 
theory seemed to furnish to the modern world 
the model of scientific explanation, and it was 
natural that its method should be applied in the 
study of the mind. Locke was, therefore, working 
in the spirit of the science of his time when he 
traced the development of the mind from simple 
ideas. Hume expressly announces that his 
Treatise is "an attempt to introduce the experi- 
mental method of reasoning into moral subjects," 
and his procedure shows that he has in mind, not 
only the experimental method, but also the pre- 
suppositions of the science in vogue. In more 
recent times the theory of empiricism has under- 
gone certain modifications. One influence which 
has profoundly affected it is that exerted by modern 
biology. This science finds each member in the 
complex organism developed for its utility ; 



EMPIRICISM 149 

and thus there is a new light thrown on the 
history of living growths. In this light the 
history of the mind has been eagerly re-read, and 
the aim of the empiricist is now to show that each 
faculty is useful, or, in the evolutionary sense, 
teleological. While this interpretation of the 
facts is not inconsistent with the atomic theory 
of mind, any more than the doctrine of evolution 
is inconsistent with the atomic theory of matter, 
recent psychology tends to some degree to bring 
the atomic theory of mind into discredit ; for it 
does not regard complex ideas as combinations 
of atomic states of consciousness ; and it finds 
that the principle of association, which Hume 
declared to be the law of gravitation in the sphere 
of ideas, does not fully account for the coming 
and going of ideas in the mind. Yet, notwith- 
standing such modifications of its earlier doctrine, 
empiricism has never been turned aside from the 
purpose to trace the natural history of mind as a 
continuous growth from the simplest germs of 
sense-experience. 

3. Yet, while the historical method is so fruit- 
ful in epistemology, and while it was employed 
by the empiricists long before evolution was the 
watchword of all the schools, it must be charged 
against empiricism that it has failed to deal 



! 



150 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

rightly with the epistemological problem. Fo 
this failure the historical method is itself partly- 
responsible. When attention is centred on th 
work of tracing the evolution of the mind, the 
question, how mental states are related as cognitions 
to things independent of the mind, is more likely 
to be neglected. Empiricism has tried to reach 
an analysis of the human mind rather than 
theory of knowledge. There is a further reaso 
for the neglect of epistemology by the empiricist 
The mind has been treated as a separate individual 
thing with its own private, subjective states ; and 
since these states are thus subjective, they have no 
cognitive reference to any object. This is the point 
of view taken by Hume when he says that im- 
pressions arise from unknown causes ; we can only 
watch these impressions as they range themselves 
into a system without hoping to find anything 
cognitive in them. J. S. Mill teaches that we 
have to do simply with sensations and their 
order ; matter is the possibility of sensation. Mr. 
Spencer 1 has also endeavoured to show that while 
all other modes of consciousness are derivable 
from experiences of force, these experiences are 
the subjective correlative of an unknowable power. 
It seems necessary to the empiricist to give up the 

1 First Principles, §§ 18, 50. 



EMPIRICISM 151 

hope of finding any consonance between our ideas 
and possible things, and, therefore, he neglects the 
further problems of epistemology. 

4. Agnosticism will be considered later. It 
must, however, be said here that it is no necessary 
accompaniment of empiricism, though they have 
been so often allied. A gnostic theory might be 
reared on empirical foundations. It is, therefore, 
incumbent on us to inquire whether the work of 
empiricism has resulted in an indication of the 
way in which knowledge is to be attained. 

5. It is not necessary to enumerate again the 
advantages of the historical method to which 
empiricism has been so faithful, or the miscon- 
ceptions which are apt to attend upon its employ- 
ment. Nor is it necessary to do more than call 
attention to the great service done by empiricism 
in the emphasis it has laid upon sensation. The 
philosophers of the transcendental schools, ancient 
and modern, have poured contempt upon sensation 
and exalted reason. In this disparagement of sensa- 
tion they have blinded themselves to facts. It is the 
merit of the empiricists to have been faithful to this 
order of facts, and to have recognized its importance 
in the constitution of mind, and thus to have pre- 
pared the way for a theory of knowledge in more com- 
plete accord with the actual conditions of experience. 



152 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

6. The question as to the meaning and function 
of universale in the theories of the empiricists is one 
of importance, and one which cannot be answered 
by any sweeping statements. There has not been 
agreement in the school as to the presence of gen- 
eral concepts in the mind. Locke, who may be 
regarded as the founder of the modern empirical 
school, accepted abstract ideas as mental facts, 
and proceeded to inquire into their nature and 
origin. In his account of them he has in view 
now one and now another kind of abstraction. 
He says that the mind makes the "particular ideas 
derived from particular objects to become gen- 
eral," by separating them from " all other ex- 
istences, and the circumstances of real existences, 
as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas." 1 
But, while Locke gives this account of abstrac- 
tion, there is a well-known passage in which he 
speaks of an abstraction of another order. " Does 
it not require," he asks, "some pains and skill 
to form the general idea of a triangle ; . . . for it 
must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither 
equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and 
none of these at once ? In effect, it is something 
imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some 
parts of several different and inconsistent ideas 
1 Essay, Bk. II, Chap. XI, § 9. 



EMPIRICISM 153 

are put together." 1 Locke seems here to be de- 
scribing, though in an awkward enough way, 
those ideas which are the resultants of many- 
particular perceptions. It is to be added that 
Locke likewise recognizes the categories, such as 
space, time, substance, cause. Probably the clearest 
evidence of this is found in his treatment of sub- 
stance. The mind is, he explains, furnished with 
a great number of simple ideas, conveyed in by 
the senses, or by reflection on its own operations ; 
it sees, moreover, that certain numbers of these go 
constantly together, and not imagining how these 
simple ideas can subsist by themselves, it sup- 
poses some substratum ; this substratum is called 
substance. At the same time, substance, while 
an individual mental entity, is said not to be a 
"clear or distinct idea." Locke does not pursue 
his analysis of the conception further. 

Berkeley writes sometimes as an empiricist, 
and sometimes as a transcendentalist. In his 
Principles of Human Knowledge, he says that he 
can abstract in the sense of separating one part 
of an image from another by the exercise of his 
imagination, or he can consider the qualities or re- 
lations of things without attending to other quali- 
ties which are in real existence inseparable from 
1 Essay, Bk. IV, Chap. VII, § 9. 



154 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

them, as when a man considers a figure merely as 
triangular without attending to the particular 
qualities of the angles or relations of the sides. 
But a general idea of a triangle like that which 
Locke demanded is to him quite unintelligible. 

But Berkeley also finds that the mind has "no- 
tions " of things which cannot be presented as 
sense-images. Again, he speaks of the soul as a 
substance ; and, in doing so, he clearly wishes to 
distinguish substance from the mere association of 
conscious states. In Siris, he shows his sympathy 
with the Platonic doctrine of ideas. So that, while 
sometimes he seems to promise a development of 
the empirical method of Locke, at other times he 
proves to be moving in a very different direction. 

Hume carried out the empirical method of criti- 
cism in a more consistent and thoroughgoing fash- 
ion. Berkeley's doctrine, that general ideas are 
nothing but particular ones which recall upon 
occasion other individuals, is, Hume says, " one of 
the greatest and most valuable discoveries that 
has been made of late years in the republic of 
letters." Abstract ideas are, therefore, particular 
ideas which are " general in their representation " ; 
they are particular ideas which happen to have 
many associates. Hume applies his principles to 
the categories, and finds that they do not exist 



EMPIRICISM 155 

save as particular ideas, or particular ideas viewed 
in a certain aspect. Yet it is necessary again to 
call attention to the fact that when he has to ex- 
plain causality he does not resolve the whole idea 
into succession, but accounts for the causal nexus 
or the feeling of necessity as a new impression. 

Hume thus gave clear and adequate expression 
to the atomic theory of consciousness. After 
Hume, empiricists developed the same theory, giv- 
ing it a still more mechanical form. No category 
appears, though but as a new impression. There 
are in the mind only impressions of sense, and 
ideas which are copies of these impressions. It is 
a natural corollary to this theory, and illustrates 
it, to say that the imagination has no creative 
power, but can only give a new form or a new 
order to the materials provided by sense. It can 
thus be seen that, in the matter of concepts, the 
empiricists have not explained them, but have ex- 
plained them away. 

It is interesting to observe that in more recent 
empiricism there is a tendency to recognize fully 
the existence of concepts as distinct from particular 
sensations. Huxley, 1 though an adherent of the 
empirical school, censured Hume for his denial 
of the existence of relations. Whether or not the 

1 Hume, p. 69. 









156 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

criticism of Hume is entirely justified, the signifi- 
cance of Huxley's position is great. In this con- 
nection may be quoted the testimony of Professor 
James as a representative of that modern psy- 
chology which has so largely assumed in the em- 
piricists' spirit the task of tracing the genesis of 
the mental faculties. He denies that there is a 
distinct faculty, to answer to the name reason, 
which creates categories ; yet he maintains that 
categories exist as feelings : they are feelings 
of relation. "As surely," he says, "as relations 
exist in rerum natura, so surely do feelings exist 
to which these relations are known." 

This increasing agreement of empiricists and 
transcendentalists is a hopeful sign of the times, 
inasmuch as it shows that apparently irreconcilable 
differences of opinion yield to the harmonizing 
influence of more careful investigation. But great 
caution must be shown in accepting the general 
statement of Professor James that the " feelings of 
relation " are cognitive. We have seen that while 
categories are cognitive of categories, their cogni- 
tive function extends no further. 

7. It has been important to consider the dis- 
position shown by empiricists to reject concepts 
and categories as independent mental facts; for the 
hope is natural that, though they may have been 



EMPIRICISM 157 

untrue to psychological facts in this denial of the 
existence of concepts, they will prove to be the more 
sure to grasp the true method of knowledge. But 
when we turn to the legacy of method left by this 
older empiricism, we find that it is disappointing. 
We find only the method of universals in disguise. 

8. The empirical doctrine of the method of 
knowledge is expressed in the theory of the asso- 
ciation of ideas. 

To understand aright the value of this theory 
of knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish clearly 
between the fact of association and the recognition 
of the association. A man may find himself think- 
ing of some social gathering at which he was 
present, and may wonder why his thoughts hap- 
pened to take that particular direction. After a 
time he may discover that it was some odour that 
greeted his nostrils which furnished the associative 
link. In such a case, there was association before 
and apart from any recognition of association. The 
principle of association appears as the great princi- 
ple in the sequence of our conscious states ; yet the 
associative links may be hidden from the unreflect- 
ing consciousness. But the series of ideas whose 
connection is not made intelligible for conscious- 
ness, is not, according to empiricism, knowledge. 
Knowledge appears when the mind recognizes the 



158 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

association or consciously joins the two ideas to- 
gether. The odour is one of a number of images 
with which it is apprehended as " coexisting " ; or, 
it is perceived to be " like " other odours ; or, it is 
connected with a flower as its "cause." Associa- 
tion has thus ceased to be a mere fact ; it denotes 
a perceived relation. 

This is not less clear when we turn to the scien- 
tific ideal presented by the associationalist, which 
is the statement of the facts of the world in terms 
of coexistence and sequence. J. S. Mill, whose 
Logic may be regarded as giving the logic of asso- 
ciationalism, finds that such a presentation is the 
aim of induction. He assigns an independent place 
in science to the laws which express coexistence 
among phenomena. At the same time, he devotes 
his chief attention to the formulation of the methods 
for the discovery of causes, for the notion of cause 
is the "root of the whole theory of induction"; and 
since, on his analysis, cause resolves itself into se- 
quence, the great object of inductive science is the 
statement of the phenomena of the universe in terms 
of invariable sequence. It is obvious from this that 
science is not satisfied with the simple fact that 
ideas occur ; its ideal, even as expressed by asso- 
ciationalists, is to present the ideas in certain 
perceived relations. 



EMPIRICISM 159 

9. It is evident that, in proportion as attention 
is given to these relations, there is a return to the 
old doctrine of concepts or categories. Coexist- 
ence is simply another name for the category of 
space. Succession is the time-relation. Nor is it 
to be supposed that the empiricist has escaped the 
necessity of using the categories in his presentation 
of his propositions. Along with the ideas that are 
associated and distinct from them is the idea of 
their relation. Ideas might follow ideas without 
any thought of their succession ; that thought is 
not given immediately in them ; and when they 
are thought to form a succession, this new idea has 
joined itself to them. In the same way coexistence 
may be shown to be a new idea. The relation of 
similarity, if it is added to the principles of asso- 
ciation, is likewise a case in which a new idea is 
joined to the related ideas. Hume, indeed, says 
that the relation of resemblance is discoverable at 
first sight, and falls more properly " under the prov- 
ince of intuition than demonstration. When any 
objects resemble each other, the resemblance will at 
first strike the eye, or rather the mind." But two 
objects which we learn to pronounce similar may be 
present to the mind long before the likeness is rec- 
ognized. In such cases, when a resemblance which 
has long been overlooked is appreciated after pro- 



l6o METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 






tracted contemplation, the newness of the idea of 
similarity is readily perceived. 

Thus the empiricist is really maintaining the doc- 
trine of categories which he believed he had over- 
thrown. For him, as for the transcendentalist, the 
cognitive ideas are universals. 

10. Yet, as used by the empiricist, they prove to 
have no cognitive function. So far, indeed, as their 
existence has been denied, no such function could 
be sought for them. Were it recognized, they could 
be cognitive only in relation to what is independent 
of the ideas they associate, or in relation to these 
ideas themselves. The possibility of knowledge on 
either of these suppositions has been already con- 
sidered. In the former case we should have to 
affirm that the peculiar psychological product which 
these principles of association represent has its exact 
counterpart in the objective world, on which view 
knowledge of the particulars associated is still want- 
ing ; in the latter case, we are asked to take, as cog- 
nitive of the ideas, an idea that is external and 
strange to them. 

11. It may, however, be urged that in this inter- 
pretation of empiricism the emphasis falls in the 
wrong place, and that, whether or not these uni- 
versals are actual ideas in the mind, the stress is 
to be laid on the particular concrete ideas which 






EMPIRICISM l6l 

are associated together ; the universal is a mere 
sign of the connection. This way of expounding 
empiricism is legitimate, and we have, therefore, to 
inquire whether the method thus left is the method 
of truth. Does the conjoining of ideas give us the 
truth of the ideas? 

It is the characteristic of association that it is 
utterly restless. If knowledge of one thing is sought, 
there is straightway reference to something else. If 
a is to be known, b is called up ; if now the pur- 
pose is to know 6, c is called up. If this tree is 
to be known, other trees, like and unlike, are 
brought to mind ; or the ideas of soil and sun- 
shine and other things usually designated causes of 
the tree's existence. When I wish to know my 
neighbour's happiness, association refers me to the 
good news he has heard ; if now I think to under- 
stand his hearing of this news, I am referred to the 
kind heart of his friend. When the mind is thus 
transferred from one point to another, its desire for 
knowledge is mocked. Knowledge of the soil and 
sunshine and all the forces which have "entered 
into " the tree is not knowledge of the tree itself. 
Knowledge of his friend's kind heart is not know- 
ledge of the man's hearing of good news, and know- 
ledge of this latter fact is not knowledge of -the 
happiness which followed it. It can thus be seen 



1 62 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

how complete is the failure of the common attempt 
to know things by reference to their causes. The 
cause is different from the effect. A metaphysical 
assertion of their identity is foreign to a consistent 
empiricism, but, even should it be made, it should 
not be allowed to blind us to their manifest differ- 
ences. One cannot, therefore, be substituted for the 
other, nor can an idea which is a copy of one be a 
copy of the other. If causality is the root of the 
whole theory of induction, it must be concluded 
that induction is not the method of absolute truth. 
12. It can now be seen that the associationalist 
fails, in certain respects even more than those 
who sought the one in the many, to gain abso- 
lute knowledge. For those who explained the 
particular by reference to a universal embodied in 
it were more faithful to the nature of thought as 
interpretation; they seemed to be passing to the 
deeper significance of the thing itself. The em- 
piricist always conducts from the thing to be known 
to something other than it ; even when he presents 
a universal, in the sense of a particular idea that 
has many associates, this idea is never offered as 
the inner truth of its associates, but as an idea that 
has an external connection with them. Empiri- 
cism has endeavoured to hold to the view that 
thought is synthetic in its function. 



EMPIRICISM 163 

13. It need not be said that it does not alter 
the nature of this method to make research mi- 
croscopic. The minuteness of the parts that are 
associated with others as their concomitants or 
antecedents does not mitigate the gravity of the 
associationalist fallacy. 

14. It is not meant that association is without 
value in the mental life, and can be dispensed with. 
It is association, in some sense, that guides the 
movements of the mind; it is, therefore, involved 
in all perception of things that is not given immedi- 
ately in the data of the senses. The empiricist has, 
therefore, done great service in laying emphasis 
upon association, and in seeking to reduce its pro- 
cesses to simplicity. Yet, while association is thus 
indispensable to cognition, the reference from one 
thing to another which it provides is not to be con- 
fused with that relation of the mind to the things 
which constitutes truth. 

15. It is appropriate at this point to consider an 
assertion that is sometimes made by scientific men. 
It is claimed that the chief end of science is to 
find facts. On this view, science does not, after 
all, make the discovery of laws its chief function ; 
laws have their great importance only because they 
are convenient in the grouping of facts, or because 
they lead the way to new facts. Science seeks 



1 64 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 






laws for the sake of facts, not facts for the sake 
of laws. 

In dealing with this assertion, it is necessary to 
determine what is meant by facts. It is possible 
that the reference is to facts of sensation. On 
this supposition, the law has value as it indicates 
what sensations are to be associated; the law of 
gravitation, for instance, indicates to us that, 
should two clusters of colours and touch-sensations 
be presented to the mind, their future mode of 
presentation in a possible conscious experience can 
be determined. Science would thus take for its 
basis the philosophy of Berkeley ; or it would say 
that, while there may be an unknown order of 
facts behind our sense-experience, sensations are 
all that we have to do with. It is clear that we 
have here just one of the varieties of empiricism 
already considered. It is that form of the doc- 
trine of association in which the emphasis is put 
on the ideas rather than on the principle of their 
association. It may again be pointed out that 
there is still association, or the reference from one 
thing to another. The scientific man does not 
hold to the particular sensation in itself, but con- 
siders it in its relation to others. It may be added 
that the fact, that science is, in an increasing de- 
gree, mathematical, is an evidence that sense-data 



EMPIRICISM 165 

are considered in their relations. Thus the claim 
that science deals with facts becomes, when sensa- 
tions are taken as the facts, discredited. Each 
fact when it presents itself proves under scientific 
methods elusive, and gives place to something 
else. 

But it is probable that the scientist means some- 
thing different when he speaks of facts as distin- 
guished from laws. His protest is against the 
general statement of laws in abstraction from in- 
dividual things. He wishes to see how the laws 
are manifested in particular cases. The concrete 
fact is a bundle of laws, and the aim of knowledge 
is to analyze this combination, determine what 
laws are represented in it, and see how they 
modify each other's action. It is obvious that in 
this case science is still laying the stress upon 
laws. The only question that needs to be asked 
is, In what sense is the term law used? If it is 
not used in the empirical sense of an association 
of sense-experiences, it must be used to designate 
the forces back of sense-experience. The law is 
the general concept of the force, and the concrete 
fact is explained by a number of concepts. It is 
not necessary to repeat the criticisms already 
passed upon such views as this. It has become 
clear that while science is to be commended for its 



1 66 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 






effort to keep close to the concrete, while its 
stinct for facts is a true instinct, it has not yet 
shown itself able to transcend the traditional con- 
ception of knowledge. The concrete is reality, 
and the true method of knowledge must enable 
us to reach the concrete ; it must not conduct us 
back to the universals which have already proved 
so disappointing. 



CHAPTER VII 

KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 

1. That in a man's knowledge of other persons 
and things there should be reproduced in the 
mind, by copy or otherwise, that which consti- 
tutes objects, is the theory with which we set out. 
The methods of knowledge which have been passed 
in review have shown themselves unable to meet 
the requirements of such an ideal as the theory 
holds up. It is not to be inferred that the demand 
for knowledge of this kind is illegitimate. It is 
now to be shown that there is among our familiar 
experiences a method of relating the mind to the 
objective reality which can satisfy the demands of 
the cognitive ideal. In the cases in which con- 
scious experience is the object to be known, there 
may be in the mind of the knower a conscious 
experience like it. We can know our fellow-men 
through sympathy ; we can by this faculty re- 
produce that which constitutes their conscious 
existence. 

167 



1 68 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

Let it be observed that it is the knowledge of 
other persons and things with which we are at 
present concerned. There are also certain phases 
of self-knowledge which are now to be accounted 
for ; as, for instance, the knowledge by the Ego of 
its past states. But the question how the Ego 
knows itself in each moment of its conscious experi- 
ence needs separate consideration ; for such know- 
ledge sympathy is not an indispensable requisite. 

2. Imitation is a faculty found in a number of 
the lower animals. Let the leader of a flock of 
sheep leap at a certain place, the leap will be 
repeated by the whole procession. Parrots show a 
remarkable aptitude for imitating sounds, whistling, 
laughing, crying, and even uttering articulate words. 
Dogs have been thought to learn modes of hunting 
by imitation. Monkeys are known to be specially 
clever imitators. An animal may even have its 
instincts modified by imitation. Stories are told 
of dogs which were brought up by cats and learned 
the habits of their foster-parents ; one dog which 
had been suckled by a cat showed fear of rain and 
wet places, and used to watch a mouse-hole for 
hours together. 1 

Yet while these cases of imitation are not without 
significance in the present inquiry, it is man that 

1 Vide Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals, Chap. XIV. 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 169 

is, as Aristotle observed, tlie most imitative of 
animals. The faculty is manifested in children 
at a very early age. In their second year, or 
even earlier, they show a very marked disposition 
to copy the actions of those about them. The 
child laughs when others around it are laughing, 
and it cries when they are weeping. Its attempts 
to speak are imitations of the sounds it hears, and 
if articulate words are often too hard for it, it 
renders more successfully the sounds of animals, 
as the lowing of the cow or the barking of the 
dog. It assumes the attitudes of any one it is 
watching; it goes through the form of smoking; 
or when some one laces and cleans his shoes in 
its presence, it tries to execute similar motions. 

Nor does imitation cease with the period of 
earliest childhood. The "six-years darling" often 
shows remarkable dramatic power, acting over 
again what he has seen of business, or of wed- 
dings and funerals. 

" Filling from time to time his * humorous stage ' 
With all the persons, down to palsied Age, 
That Life brings with her in her equipage ; 

As if his whole vocation 

Were endless imitation." 

As life advances there is much to interfere with 
the free exercise of the faculty. Yet even in more 



170 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

mature age there are many examples of spontaneous 
imitation of movements and gestures. With older 
persons, as with children, laughter and tears are 
contagious. A cough in church is answered by a 
volley of coughs. It is a malicious trick to yawn 
in company : a corresponding spasm seizes the 
neighbouring jaws. And there are many who cannot 
help catching the tricks of speech and manner of 
those with whom they associate, especially if these 
are superiors who must be observed closely. 

These simpler forms of external imitation may 
suffice not only to show how familiar are the mani- 
festations of this faculty, but also to give us the 
clew to the interpretation of the general principle 
of imitation, and thus to render intelligible those 
sympathies which are not necessarily shown in 
visible movements, yet are of such profound sig- 
nificance in the search for the method of know- 
ledge. 

3. It is obvious, first of all, that in the imitation 
there is an association of ideas or mental processes. 
The child sees an action and then makes an effort 
to reproduce it by using certain muscles ; the visual 
image and the muscular feeling are two entirely 
distinct mental states, which are conjoined. To 
take another instance, the hearing of a word leads 
to the speaking of it by an association of the two 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 171 

heterogeneous mental states, — a sensation of hearing 
and a muscular feeling. 

4. It is also evident in many cases that, before 
the imitation, this association has been established. 
Imitation depends more or less directly upon habit. 
The child who moves his hand on seeing another 
person's hand move is not necessarily associating 
the visual image with the movement image for the 
first time. His past experience may have established 
the association, so that the new stimulus only calls 
up associates which have been linked before with 
similar stimuli. We cough when others cough, 
because with the sound of our own coughing there 
has been associated the feeling of irritation in 
throat or chest ; then when we hear another cough- 
ing the image of that irritation is revived, the 
associated effort to get relief from it is also repro- 
duced, and thus the actual coughing process is 
started. 

5. Yet it is of great moment to observe that the 
associations are often modified by the imagination. 
The imagination is the creative plastic power which, 
when the materials furnished by experience are pre- 
sented to it, causes new shapes to arise from them. 
The child copies a movement which is new to it ; 
for instance, it sees its father brushing his shoes, 
and then, for the first time in its life, goes through 



172 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

the motions of brushing its own. It is true, the 
materials of this new image were derived from ex- 
perience ; the child had used its hands in various 
ways, and knew also what it meant to reach to 
its feet and touch them. Yet the combination of 
muscular movements which was imaged before 
being executed was new. It was as in other cases 
of the productive imagination : the materials de- 
rived from experience were modified and recast. 
Imitation, therefore, does not depend merely on 
habit. It uses habit, and, again, discards it, as 
service is best rendered to its own peculiar end. 
The habitual action is not merely habitual, but 
is allowed its course as a means to an end. The 
aim of imitation being to copy the object, all that 
goes to constitute it has its presence determined by 
that which constitutes the object. Memory and 
imagination are used, as need be, that the copy 
may be true. 

6. The fact that imitation is determined by the 
object, or gives a copy of the object, brings into 
view its essential function. Imitation is a mode 
of perception or cognition. It can be seen that it 
is not the perception of immediate sensation, for 
with the sensation ideas are associated. Imitation 
is that form of perception in which the mind 
interprets what is given in sensation. Its per- 









KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 173 

ceptive character is not altered by the fact that the 
imagination is called into play. Perception needs 
not only the memory, but the creative imagination. 
For perception is interpretation ; and the memories 
of the past do not in themselves suffice for a ren- 
dering of the new facts of experience. 

7. The presence of external movement in the 
cases of imitation that have been considered seems, 
at first sight, to adapt itself awkwardly to such a 
view. What is the significance of these move- 
ments, which are popularly taken for the important 
part of imitation? 

It has become one of the accepted truths of 
psychology and physiology that the vivid thought 
of an action is, in a measure, the performance of 
the action. The idea of the action has become so 
firmly associated with the doing of it that it 
excites the beginnings, at least, of the muscular 
movements. The image of a word is the incipient 
speaking of it ; as Professor Bain J expresses it, 
the idea of speech is a " suppressed articulation " ; 
or, again, " thinking is restrained speaking." So 
much is this the case that some persons when 
they think intently become hoarse. 

It naturally follows that when the image is 
more vivid, or when the inhibition on overt action 

1 /Senses and Intellect, 3d ed. ? pp. 339, 340. 



174 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

is withdrawn, the action passes beyond the incipient 
stage, and becomes the gross movement. Thinking 
readily becomes talking to himself in the case of 
the man who lives much alone, and so is more 
free from family and society criticism. The clearest 
illustration of the nature of ideo -motor action is 
to be found in those actions which a man performs 
in spite of himself. A man is sometimes more 
ready to throw himself over a precipice by reason 
of the fear that he will do so : the fear gives 
the idea of the action such vividness that he tends 
to cast himself over. 1 The conclusion to be drawn 
from the observation of such cases is the principle 
already indicated, that the greater the attention 
given to the image of a movement, the more cer- 
tain is the realization of that movement. 

When the child thinks of a movement, it thinks 
of it in this vivid way; the motor image absorbs 
the attention, and so leads to the execution of the 
movement. The thinking of the adult is, for the 
most part, not of this kind. He is economical in 
the use of his energies, and does not allow them 
to be spent in useless muscular exertion; and, 
therefore, the tendency of his ideas to act them- 
selves out is inhibited. Besides, there is economy 
in the sphere of thought itself. The mind calls 

1 Bain, Senses and Intellect, 3d ed., p. 343. 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 175 

up the details of its images only so far as the 
necessities of its procedure require. A faint 
fragment of an image is often all that is needed. 
It is true of much of our thinking that, the more 
it is turned to any subject, the more abstract and 
symbolic does it become. But .the child is not 
economical in its thinking. At first, at least, it 
does not think in symbols. In its case thought 
is not a suppressed articulation. When it thinks 
clearly of an action, it thinks or lives it out. 
Hence the wonderful dramatic exhibitions of 
the "six years' darling." When he thinks of 
the wedding or funeral, he acts it out ; when he 
thinks of the dialogue of business, love, or strife, 
he conducts it. 

Bearing this in mind, we have to consider the 
child's perception of an action which is performed 
in its presence. Let it be remembered that the 
child has formed the habit of associating with 
the visual images which the movements of its 
own body produce, the motor images excited by 
the movements ; or it has associated with the 
sound of its voice the feelings of articulation. 
Thus the visual image of another's movements 
awakens familiar motor images in the child's 
mind ; the sound of another's voice awakens 
the motor images of articulation. Through this 



176 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

association the child comes to perceive the action, 
or have an idea of it like the idea of the actor. 

The place of the external movement can now 
be understood. When the motor image occupies 
attention, the physiological consequence thereof is 
the movement o.f the body's members. But it is 
not essential to the imitative process, which might 
be complete were the movement checked. It is 
the conscious motor image that is of consequence. 

The motor image thus stands on the same plane 
with other images that fill consciousness and con- 
stitute perceptions. It is thus going too far to 
say that the little child acts as if his whole voca- 
tion were endless imitation, for motor images 
form only a part of the things that interest him. 
Colours, touches, and other sensations fascinate 
his curiosity, and absorb, each in turn, his con- 
sciousness. Movements have a special power to 
attract his attention, yet they do not necessarily 
lead to imitation, — the joyful leaps of the dog 
may produce from him shrieks of terror ; and, be- 
sides, there are many movements which baffle his 
imitative efforts, or can, at best, be represented only 
in a fragmentary way : the actions which are copied 
are chiefly those of human beings, and, to a less 
extent, those of the lower animals. So far as he 
is interested in the motor images, and is able to 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 177 

represent them, his vocation is imitation of the 
external kind. 1 

8. Exception may be taken to this account of 
imitation, by which it is represented as being of the 
nature of perception. Imitation seems to prove, 
rather, to be an exhibition of will, for a voluntary 
action is one in which the idea of the action pre- 
cedes the action. But it should rather be observed 
that, on this analysis, voluntary action is resolved 
into perception. If there is anything distinctive of 
the will, it is to be found in a fiat-uttering power 
that is distinct from the play of motor images. The 
motor image in itself is as passive as any of the 
images which the mind possesses. It is, as much as 
any image, the instrument of perception. 

9. Reference has been made especially to the 
child's experience for illustrations of imitation, for 
such experience represents the process more faith- 
fully. In the adult the same process may be ob- 
served, but usually the adult has less external 
imitation. Moreover, when he does take to mim- 
icry, he is economical in his imitating, as in the other 
activities of his nervous system, and the process is 
abridged. A fragment of an image may be signal 
enough, without any further presentation of the 

1 For a similar theory of imitation or sympathy, v. Bain, Mental 
Science, Bk. II, Chap. I, 13, and Bk. Ill, Chap. XI, 5. 



I?8 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

action in consciousness, to start the muscular move- 
ment. Such economy diminishes the perceptive 
truth of the imitation. 

10. The results which have been reached may now 
be stated. The child or man who imitates an- 
other's muscular movement reproduces that move- 
ment. But the original movement was preceded by 
a conscious state, and the movement which is a copy 
is also preceded by a conscious state like the first 
conscious state. This imitation of conscious states 
is the significant fact. It is entitled to be called a 
perception, inasmuch as the associated imitative ideas 
interpret a sensory impression. 

11. We are now brought to a study of imitations 
in which the muscular movement is not present, or 
is not such as to attract attention. The conscious 
states known as motor images are not intrinsically 
different from other conscious states ; they are simi- 
lar to, or part of, our sensations, feelings of pleasure 
and pain, and abstract ideas. The conclusion is, 
therefore, to be drawn, that other conscious states 
can be copied, and that there is real imitation, 
though there may be no visible outward movement. 

Let a child or a man see a wound in his hand, and 
at the same time feel the pain of it, wound-vision 
and pain-feeling are associated in his mind. Let 
him next see a wound in his neighbour's hand, the 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 179 

pain-feeling is revived. He thus imitates his neigh- 
bour's pain-feeling. Or, let him associate the act of 
eating an apple with the taste of the fruit, he may, 
when he sees his neighbour eating an apple, discover 
in his mind the taste-sensation. Thus in respect of 
this sense he copies his neighbour's experience. Or, 
to take another case, illustrative of much in life, let 
him associate an image or idea with the sound of a 
certain word which he has uttered, he will, when he 
hears this sound uttered by another, associate that 
image or idea with it ; and, since that sound was 
thus an associate of the same mental content in the 
case of both speaker and listener, the reproduction 
of that content in the mind of the listener is to be 
called an imitation. Thus the word horse is, when 
spoken, the sign of a certain image in the speaker's 
mind ; it calls up an imitative image in the lis- 
tener's mind. More complex illustrations might be 
added, but it is unnecessary to adduce them to prove 
that the whole of life — its emotions, its sensations, 
its intellections, its volitions — lends itself to imita- 
tion, so that apart from external movements the 
experiences of each individual may be mirrored in 
the consciousness of others. 

It has not been the intention here to state that 
these states of mind have never any physiological 
consequences. There are manifold effects produced 



180 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

by those conscious states which to ordinary observa- 
tion seem passive. There may even be produced in 
the body of the observer a condition like that which 
he is contemplating in another. One of the most 
remarkable of such cases is that of Louise Lateau, 
who meditated on the sufferings of Christ till the 
blood oozed from hands and brow ; there is here 
presented the phenomenon of a pain-idea, associated 
with the image of a certain part of the body, produc- 
ing in that part the most powerful effects. Other 
cases of a similar kind might be cited. It is not nec- 
essary here to inquire further into the physiological 
significance of such cases. They not only show that 
images used in imitation may produce striking 
bodily effects ; they also throw light on the truthful- 
ness of the imitation. But such violent effects are 
not to be looked for in all imitations. In a large 
part of experience the stream of ideas is not at- 
tended by any gross movement ; and the imitation 
must be like the original in its quiet flow. In any 
case, it is to be remembered that what we are ulti- 
mately concerned with is the conscious experience: 
it is the imitation of idea by idea that is important. 
12. The kind of knowledge thus yielded may 
be appropriately designated sympathetic imitation. 
The term imitation alone is fitted to express ade- 
quately its nature ; but it is most frequently used to 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 181 

denote the external movement, and often suggests 
that nothing more than this is copied, for the 
mimic would usually regard it as interfering with 
his special purpose of making sport, should he 
allow the imitation of ideas to occupy him. The 
faculty that imitates conscious states is best de- 
noted by the term sympathy. Sympathy means, 
literally, being affected with : we sympathize with 
another when we make his inner experience our own. 
There are, indeed, objections to this term. It has 
been used chiefly, though by no means exclusively, 
to indicate fellow-feeling with pain; and its pre- 
vailing associations are emotional, or, it might 
even be contended, sentimental. But the value 
of the expression consists in this, that it has 
reference to conscious states rather than external 
movements, and that it indicates, even if in a 
restricted sphere, the mode of relation between 
conscious persons which is precisely that relation 
which constitutes knowledge. 1 The sphere of this 
relation must be widened to meet the full require- 
ment of knowledge. I can sympathize with my 
neighbour in all his conscious life. Not only may 

1 Yet it should be pointed out that the term sympathy is also 
used to cover the more general instinctive distress which is felt in 
the presence of certain forms of suffering and which may have little 
imitation in it. Cf. Baldwin, Mental Development, Social and 
Ethical Interpretations, p. 220. 



1 82 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 






I feel his pain when he suffers : when he sees a 
red colour, I may call up the image of red in 
my imagination; when he is conducting an argu- 
ment, I can copy in my mind the train of imagery 
and abstract ideas which is proceeding in his. 
This is sympathy in the larger sense. Yet prob- 
ably the term sympathy does not promptly sug- 
gest this meaning, and the misleading associations 
of both the terms, imitation and sympathy, can 
be avoided by the use of the expression already 
given : the method of truth is sympathetic imita- 
tion. 

13. The value of this method will be more fully 
appreciated, if we contrast the knowledge which it 
yields with the knowledge that is offered by science 
and philosophy. If a sensation of red is in ques- 
tion, science has much to say of the structure of 
the eye, and optic nerve, and cerebral cortex ; of 
the character of the ether- waves which produce the 
sensation ; of the place of red in the spectrum ; 
of the phenomena of colour-contrast; and of other 
such things. If the philosopher wishes to present 
the truth regarding this sensation, he may proceed, 
as an empiricist, to show that all we are concerned 
with is the phenomenal series, and that red holds 
a clearly ascertained place in that series; or he 
may, as an idealist, trace the development of the 









KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 183 

Idea in all the phases of consciousness, finding the 
sensation to be one moment in this development. 
But the scientist and philosopher fail to know the 
sensation of red by these methods. They are 
explaining it by referring it to something else, — 
another phenomenon, or a law, or the absolute Idea. 
They do not get the sensation in itself. If we 
consider the fact that the faculty by which the 
sensation is given is not the faculty by which 
such cognition is attained, the disparateness of the 
knowledge and its object is still more apparent. 
By the method of sympathetic imitation we seek 
to know the sensation by having the same sensa- 
tion. Were other concrete experiences called up, 
they would with not less clearness prove to be 
knowable by sympathy, and not by the methods of 
science. The chasm between the scientific formulas 
of psychology and concrete human experience is 
as wide as that between algebraic symbols and the 
realities they represent. But by sympathy the 
observer knows the actual mental processes, for he 
lives them through in his own experience. He 
does not use his rational faculty as equally cogni- 
tive of all forms of experience : he knows the experi- 
ence of each of the other faculties by a corresponding 
faculty in himself. For, if like is known by like, 
if in the mind of the knower that which consti- 



1 84 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

tutes the object must be reproduced, it follows that 
for knowledge of an emotion it is necessary to 
experience that emotion ; for knowledge of a 
man's act of will it is necessary to "put ourselves 
in his place " ; for knowledge of an abstract idea 
or reasoning process it is necessary to think an 
idea or a process in all respects corresponding to 
the original. Not that other modes of thinking 
are unnecessary. We shall find that the mind 
must use them in order to exercise sympathy 
aright. But in cognition they are to be used as 
subserving the faculty of sympathy : the essence 
of knowledge is sympathetic imitation. 

14. To sum up : Knowledge must consist in 
sympathetic imitation, if it is a reproduction of 
that which constitutes objects ; and that such a 
relation to objects is not a fantastic dream, but a 
genuine possibility, is suggested by our common 
experiences. 

15. In view of the importance of this faculty, it 
is desirable to determine its relation to the other 
faculties of the psychical life. It has been the cus- 
tom to construe life on the principle of utility. All 
the members of the living body, and all the actions 
it performs, are thought to serve, directly or in- 
directly, some useful purpose. Is imitation a 
utilitarian function ? It is claimed by Professor 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 185 

Baldwin 1 that it is such : imitation is a " circular " 
or stimulus-repeating reaction, and the stimulus, 
so often as it is reproduced, repeats the reaction; 
the stimuli which are thus maintained are said to be 
"vital." 

16. In considering the present question, it is 
necessary to remember, first of all, that under utili- 
tarian actions are comprised two species very differ- 
ent in character. There are actions that are useful, 
in the sense of pleasure -giving, and these actions are 
repeated that the pleasure may be renewed. The 
child that has picked up some grains of sugar, and 
tasted them, will repeat the action to get once more 
the sweet taste. Many habits are covered by the 
formula, that the living organism seeks to renew 
the pleasure it has experienced. 

There are other actions which are useful to the 
organism, which cannot be so described. Many of 
those which are the response to painful stimuli are 
not fitted to secure vital stimulations after the man- 
ner of the actions already spoken of. They may 
frequently be useful, but it is as when a man's faint- 
ing on the battlefield saves him from being shot. 
The animal that shams death is by so doing saved 
from its persecutors, but the action is not done with 

1 Mental Development,- Methods and Processes, pp. 216, 487, 
et passim. 



1 86 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

the purpose of securing some good; the animal is 
probably paralyzed by fright. The contraction of 
the organism when it is suffering pain may have the 
result that it exposes less surface to its enemies, but 
it does not contract thus with the purpose of saving 
its life. The contraction means loss of energy, and 
is due to the action of forces which the organism is 
unable to resist. And the various manifestations 
of pain, the depression of the vital functions, trem- 
bling, and weakness, are primarily pathological, and 
when finished bring forth death. These pathologi- 
cal processes may, to repeat, be useful; but they 
are not designed for use, any more than a man's 
heart disease is designed in order that he may be 
exempted from military service. 

Moreover, it is probable that many reactions are 
simply pathological, and do not secure, either di- 
rectly or indirectly, any good to the organism. And 
such actions pass into habits. 

Again, there are the actions which have been 
designated " random." These are thought to be pro- 
duced by an overflow of energy from the brain 
which is not directed by the will, but takes its way 
to the most convenient muscles. The infant's wav- 
ing of hands and feet may be taken as an instance 
of them. To these may be joined the actions which 
are due to habits once useful, but now useless, or 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 187 

even hurtful. 1 The truth is that the activities of 
organic beings are not at any stage necessarily utili- 
tarian. Those actions are useful in which the en- 
ergy expended secures, directly or indirectly, its 
own renewal. And it can readily be seen how great 
the advantage is of this regeneration of energy. 
In the struggle for existence those organisms are 
successful which do not waste any of their energy. 
The elimination of the non-utilitarian and the non- 
economical has been complete in proportion to the 
fierceness of the struggle. Yet this regeneration of 
energy is not the only activity of the organism. If 
we should describe the utilitarianism of the organ- 
ism as its centripetal tendency, we must also recog- 
nize the presence in it of a centrifugal tendency. 

17. The bearing of all this upon the question of 
imitation may now be made clear. Actions are not 
all utilitarian or pleasure-giving ; even habitual 
actions are not always of this kind. It follows that 
associations are not all of the utilitarian kind. It 
seems clear that at all stages in the development of 
mind the formation of associations must have been 
determined by the play of contingencies that were 
not subject to the teleological principle. Associa- 
tion cannot be construed on utilitarian principles. 
Imitation, therefore, since it uses all kinds of associ- 

1 Cf . Darwin, Expression of the Emotions, p. 39. 



1 88 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

ation, cannot be put among functions that are 
intrinsically utilitarian. 

If we recall the characteristics of imitation in 
greater detail, we see that this conclusion is estab- 
lished. It is of great importance to observe that 
whereas, if pleasure is sought, all the actions of 
others are disregarded, and new adaptations are 
welcomed, if thereby the pleasure is made more sure, 
in imitation the supreme effort is to reproduce that 
which is objective. So much is this the case, that 
painful actions are copied : the imitator weeps at 
the sight of another's tears. Again, there are imita- 
tions which do not result in useful reactions : the 
inner sympathies have physiological consequences, 
but they do not in all cases produce beneficial 
effects ; still less do they produce overt utilitarian 
actions. 

It may still be urged that imitation is originally 
of this utilitarian character, but that it becomes a 
habit in itself, and thus it is that imitations may 
take place which are attended by pain. It is to be 
observed, however, that there is herein a recogni- 
tion of what we have called the centrifugal ten- 
dency in organisms, or the non-teleological element 
in them. It is also acknowledged that imitation has 
changed its character. It is no longer imitation 
simply for the sake of pleasure-renewal : it is 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 189 

imitation for the sake of the imitation. It is, 
therefore, to be studied in view of this new func- 
tion. It may be historically true that the hand 
had originally the function of a fore-foot as well 
as that of a prehensile organ, but it is now to be 
studied as a developed hand. The historical gene- 
sis is of great importance, yet the newness of the 
function is of no less significance. If the pleas- 
ure-seeking interest was the source of imitation, 
it has dropped out, and imitation now subserves 
another interest. 

Let it be added here, that this principle, that 
the function of imitation is not determined by its 
original causes, is to be applied to other forms of 
the utilitarian derivation of this faculty. Mr. 
Herbert Spencer traces it to the conditions in 
which gregarious animals live. When animals live 
in flocks, they have a large number of common 
experiences. The danger which threatens them is 
a common danger, and they all flee at once. On 
the other hand, the food that attracts one attracts 
all simultaneously. Accordingly, the sheep that 
has fled with the flock before the wolf is ready, 
as often as it sees the others run, to run with 
them, even though the object inspiring their terror 
is hid. Thus sympathy is thought to arise. It 
may, indeed, be that some forms of sympathy 



1 90 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

have arisen in this way, for it may have been pro- 
duced in very varying conditions. When produced, 
however, it has its own special characteristics and 
laws. 

18. The argument for the utility of imitation 
may put on another form, and thereby come into 
line with the ordinary hedonistic account of con- 
duct. It may be said that if imitation becomes a 
habit, this habit in its turn is practised for the 
sake of pleasure, and thus pleasure proves to be 
still the end of action of this kind. But it can 
be seen that in spontaneous imitation, which is 
due to the free association of ideas, there is no 
question of pleasure involved. And in the more 
complete exercise of sympathy the imitator so iden- 
tifies himself with the happiness or the sorrows of 
another that the pleasure of the self passes out 
of sight. At the most, it could be said that a 
man launches himself in this course of sympathy 
because of pleasure which he will experience at 
the end of it. But, in such a case, the pleasure 
is something external to the sympathy, as the 
pleasure of the man who fattens a sheep that he 
may dine upon it is external to the physiological 
processes of the living animal. Moreover, it is 
to be remembered that in the case of sympathy 
the pleasure is of the kind that a man feels in 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC /MZTATfOAT 191 

view of the interests of others, and may continue 
to feel even when these involve his own effacement. 
19. We thus are brought back to the view that 
imitation is a form of perception, and is thus not 
more directly connected with pleasure and utility 
than perception is. Various influences may have 
stimulated its development, but it is probable that 
in any case it would have developed with the 
growth of the perceptive power. The vessel may 
be driven down the river by steam, but the cur- 
rent would have carried it down in any case. 
This faculty coexists with large intelligence, and 
hence shows itself so fully in monkeys, and still 
more in men. In them there is a special develop- 
ment of the nervous system ; the fund of brain- 
energy is great. Usually this energy is not all 
required for the useful reflexes of a life of habit. 
It is thus left for exercise that is not utilitarian. 
There is, accordingly, not mere observation of the 
obvious qualities of objects, and inference as to 
their injurious or beneficial character, and the 
adoption of the course of action most suitable for 
self-preservation ; there is curiosity, examination, 
and investigation, for the delight of these exer- 
cises themselves. Perception of this nature is 
thus due to the abundance of energy. To the 
same abundance of energy imitation is to be 



192 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

traced : great perceptive energy must inevitably 
give rise to imitation, or the complete thinking 
out, of what is observed. Imitation may thus be 
regarded as a form of play. 

20. In truth, the rise of the imitative faculty 
marks a new departure in the psychical develop- 
ment of the world. It is one of the character- 
istics of living organisms to seek pleasure and 
avoid pain, to use their environment solely for 
purposes of self-preservation. And when the in- 
tellect is humble, and the struggle for existence 
is fierce, action of this kind tends to be the 
exclusive occupation. In such conditions, actions 
observed lead to actions in no way resembling 
them. The wolf, seeing the lamb at play, is 
moved to do its murderous work. The roar of 
the lion causes the antelope to tremble. Or we 
may find illustrations in our own experience : 
where the flower opens its beauty, we put forth 
our hands to it; where the serpent is seen glid- 
ing, we shun the spot ; when a certain signal is 
waved, we steer our course in a new direction. 
In all these cases, the action does not resemble 
the action observed : the movement of the serpent 
is not copied by the start of terror ; the act of 
steering is not like the act of signalling. It is 
true that in the primal life of organic beings an 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 193 

action is copied when it brings pleasure, or when 
it is judged from the observation of others to bring 
pleasure. But in such cases it is a particular pleas- 
ure that is the end of the action, and the imitation 
is discarded at once if the pleasure is not gained, or 
if a short cut to it is discovered. A new depart- 
ure is taken when imitation becomes an end in 
itself, or the experience of the object is contem- 
plated for its own sake. The song does not 
betray the singer to his enemy; it is echoed by 
the song. The wound when it is seen does not 
tempt to an assault on a bleeding and weakened 
victim : the pain of the wound is felt by the 
observer as his own. It is the era of that tru- 
est and profoundest contemplation which we call 
sympathy. 

21. We are now prepared to understand that the 
human intellect, in the exercise of its cognitive 
faculty, has always made use of imitation. Animism 
is a great essay toward knowledge, in the proper 
sense of the word. There is in it not merely reac- 
tion to stimuli ; the abstract view of the individual's 
welfare is transcended. There is apprehension of 
the inner nature of things, and that apprehension is 
gained by imitation or sympathy. For the mental 
process of the animist is of the kind we have found 
in imitation. With the form of his body he associ- 



194 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

ates certain conscious experiences, and with other 
forms, such as those of tree, stream, ocean, cloud, 
he associates similar experiences. He makes the 
assumption, indeed, that his experiences may be 
regarded as objective, yet this is the assumption of 
all imitation, and of all perception. And if the 
primitive animist, with his polytheism and mythol- 
ogy, has crude results to show, it is yet true that 
he has adopted the methods of the cognitive life. 
Nor does man leave animism behind when he passes 
to the sphere of philosophy. The concepts of science 
and philosophy are animistic attempts at imitation 
of the reality. It is important to observe that, while 
the method of concepts differs from that of sym- 
pathetic imitation in so striking a manner, it yet 
springs ultimately, as it is commonly employed, 
from the same root. Knowledge is a copying of 
the reality. When Heraclitus said that all things 
are "becoming," when Parmenides affirmed that 
only being is, they were proceeding upon the prin- 
ciple of imitation; they made these subjective con- 
cepts the interpretation of the things which met 
their senses. Likewise, when science speaks of law, 
or of energy, it is by the same imitative method 
interpreting facts ; it is ejecting into things what is 
subjective. Imitation is not left behind with the 
childhood of the individual, or the childhood of the 



KNOWLEDGE BY SYMPATHETIC IMITATION 195 

race. There is a sense in which all objective cogni- 
tion is imitation. And, therefore, the question is 
not, whether or not we will be imitative, but 
whether or not we will cultivate the right kind 
of imitation. We can interpret things only in the 
imitative way. But the charge against science and 
philosophy has been that they have not been faithful 
to the principles of a successful imitation. Individ- 
ual concrete facts cannot be properly imitated by 
universals, and least of all by universals whose 
origin is not at all in these particular facts. The 
experiences of the conceptual faculty may imitate 
the experiences of the conceptual faculty: they can- 
not imitate the experiences of the other faculties. 
It is necessary to return to the study of childhood 
that it may be understood at what point science and 
philosophy have gone astray, and how the right way 
is to be regained. We have seen that in childhood 
the faculty which knows is similar to the faculty to be 
cognized; and except we become, in imitativeness 
and sympathy, as little children, we cannot enter the 
kingdom of truth. 



CHAPTER VIII 

SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 

1. While science has departed from the true 
principles of imitation, it can be shown that this 
faculty has been cultivated by art and morality. 
It is important, not only to prove the fact that they 
use it, but also to consider their use of it, in order to 
get the light which they throw on its nature; and, 
further, to determine how far in their employment 
of it cognition is attained. 

2. Art is one of the chief forms of the mental life 
of man. Notwithstanding the extension of science, 
it still remains true that the majority of those who 
participate in the intellectual life find their enjoy- 
ment in poetry and other forms of art rather than 
in science. The histories and biographies which are 
most popular have more affinity for art than for sci- 
ence. Moreover, many of the choicest spirits that 
the world has known are those which have been 
consecrated to art. 

The interest in art has been, to a certain extent, 
intermittent. When the struggle for existence is at 

196 






SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 197 

its sternest, there is little development of art ; but, 
when the storms abate their fierceness, the flowers 
of art begin to bloom. The times which allow the 
cultivation of science are usually the times which 
allow devotion to art. And thus art grows beside 
science, supplying, especially in its poetical form, 
that which science lacks. 

3. Art deals with the concrete. Science deals 
with the abstract, having for its ideal a system of 
concepts or laws ; art has its attention fixed on the 
individual. Science gives a general definition of 
tree, or man ; art paints an individual tree, or por- 
trays a living character. Science gives a treatise on 
political economy; art sees the " city dawn amid 
the clouds." It may be admitted, indeed, that the 
highest art is universal ; but it is so in the sense of 
presenting to us that which is of universal interest ; 
and it is precisely art of this high type which pre- 
sents to us every scene and every character in indi- 
vidual shapes. The art which tried to represent 
abstract qualities, as in the dramas in which each 
character stood for a virtue or a vice, is justly con- 
demned as inferior to that which holds up the mirror 
to living men and women. Yet even the drama in 
which the actors are abstractions does not become 
a treatise in psychology or ethics : the abstractions 
must act and speak as individual human beings. 



198 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

Even in allegories, in which the abstractness of the 
thought is only disguised by a thin veil, the quali- 
ties that appear are in the form of concrete realities : 
courage is a warrior with sword and helm; justice 
is a maiden holding a balance. For the true artist, 
if he allegorizes, does so because, when he con- 
templates the categories of science, he cannot leave 
them cold and- dead : human eyes seem to look out 
on him ; human hands take hold of him. Art ceases 
to be art when it loses the concrete in the abstract. 
4. The important question now arises, How does 
art deal with the concrete ? It is to be regarded as 
having a twofold function, for it deals, on the one 
hand, with the world of sense-impressions, and, on the 
other, with that inner realm which, so far as the 
individual contemplates the lives of others, is known 
only by association and inference. When sense- 
impressions or their copies in the imagination are 
taken, not as signs which the intellect uses, but as 
they are in themselves, they begin, under this foster- 
ing of attention, to let their interest and their pleas- 
ure-pain aspect emerge into prominence ; and thus 
art has the function of ministering to the sensuous 
nature. The experiences of others are reached in 
their concrete reality only by being copied ; hence 
art has its sympathetic function. This dualism in 
the aesthetic life is closely related to the dualism of 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IAT ART 1 99 

self-regarding and other-regarding impulses in the 
ethical life. 

5. The art that is directly sensuous may be 
briefly considered here, because of the need of dis- 
tinguishing its function from that of sympathetic 
art. This consideration of it will also prepare for 
that reference to it which will be necessary when 
the nature of self-knowledge is investigated. 

6. It might seem natural to say that the function 
of sensuous art is to minister pleasure. And, doubt- 
less, this is part of its function. For all the senses 
have a pleasure-pain aspect. They are not merely 
the gateways of knowledge : they are the goblets 
from which we quaff the wine of pleasure. And the 
filling of every sense with joy is one of the great 
ends of living ; and it is one of the functions of art 
to draw forth this joy and bear it to men. Yet to 
say merely that sensuous art tries to minister pleas- 
ure is to give too narrow a view of its work. It 
is not merely the pleasure of the sensation that is 
of interest to consciousness : the peculiar quality of 
the sensation itself has its interest. The redness 
of this rose gives pleasure ; but it is not merely the 
pleasure, it is also the redness, that is of aesthetic 
interest. Pain tends to inhibit interest ; yet the 
interest is not dependent merely on the pleasure. 
It is to be remembered, therefore, when the sensu- 



200 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

ous pleasure of art is spoken of, that the pleasure is 
not the only aesthetic element. 

7. The art that is sensuous is probably, in the 
order of nature, the first. The earliest form of 
aesthetic appreciation is simply interest or delight 
in some sense-experience. The long story of sexual 
selection is thought to illustrate this kind of appre- 
ciation, as it is found even in the lower animals. 
When the beautiful male finds favour in the eyes of 
the female, her pleasure in mane or crest is aesthetic. 
The primitive human being has this aesthetic enjoy- 
ment of what is sensuous. The child evinces it also 
by its attraction to what is brightly coloured. 

Further, if man has interests of this sensuous 
kind, it is natural that he should try to perpetuate 
them, and reproduce them, and find new modes of 
them. Interest, unless it is painful, is a motive 
to its own renewal. In this fact is to be found 
the explanation of a large part of artistic activity. 

8. The selection of colours and combinations of 
colours illustrates these principles. Certain com- 
binations are painful to the eye ; others attract 
and please. It is one of the purposes of the 
painter to present the colours in that relation, and 
in that proportion, which yield the most agreeable 
result. 

Again, there are sounds, and combinations of 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 201 

sounds, and successions of sounds, which are pleas- 
ing and attractive, while others are painful. The 
purely sensuous element is an important element in 
music. 

The muscular sense, also, has its interests, its 
pleasures, and pains ; and it is probable that these 
experiences constitute not a little of the beauty 
or ugliness which we attribute to objects. There 
are lines of beauty which have that character be- 
cause of the agreeable exercise of the muscles as 
the eye sweeps along them. Part of the beauty 
of buildings, or of human faces, resides in this 
sense. 

It might be shown that the sensations of the 
other senses have their aesthetic value. The sen- 
sations of touch have this aesthetic quality; nor 
is there any good reason why such a quality should 
be denied to the sensations of smell and taste. It 
is to be added, the aesthetic feeling of one sense 
may blend with that of another ; it is found, also, 
that with the pleasures and pains of the special 
senses there blend the massive feelings derived 
from the internal organs of the body. 

9. But the direct ministry to the sensuous nature 
is not the sole function of art. Art is perceptive 
in a profounder sense. It deals with the concrete ; 
but, as we have already seen, the concrete is not 



202 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

merely that which is technically called phenome- 
non ; it is also the inner life of the being that is ob- 
served. Art, to be realistic, must present that inner 
reality also. But this reality is independent, and 
cannot be known directly. The artist knows di- 
rectly only his sense-affections, and knows only in 
an indirect way that which these sense-affections 
suggest. The perception, therefore, is indirect; 
and when it is such as to grasp the actual life, it 
is of the kind we have designated sympathetic. 

10. There is a natural transition from the im- 
mediately sensuous function of art to the sympa- 
thetic function. The attractive object, because of 
its attractive qualities, becomes the centre of inter- 
est, and is then contemplated till its objective exist- 
ence is appreciated. It is as in the marriage of 
two souls which, attracted by charms and delights, 
pass by virtue of these delights to the profoundest 
sympathy with, and understanding of, each other. 
The interest leads to this penetrating observation. 
The pleasure felt leads to kindness. And the two 
feelings so blend together that in many a case it 
is difficult to divide the conscious state and render 
to each that which belongs to it. 

11. It is not meant that this objective character 
is never attributed to that which is sensuously per- 
ceived, as well as to that which is reached by sym- 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 203 

pathy. The relation of the artist to colours and 
sounds is not always that of one seeking subjective 
gratification ; he does not feel the self-reference of 
one who is using means to please himself. The 
colour, or the sound, appears to him as a real 
object ; he loves it and admires it as if it was 
his friend ; and the pleasure he finds in it is like 
his who takes pleasure in unselfish kindness to his 
friend. Beauty has been called objectified feel- 
ing or emotion : 1 it is true that in some cases, 
at least, beauty is a subjective affection objectified. 
Moreover, the term imitation is used to describe 
the art which produces sensuous beauty : the artist 
is said to imitate or copy the colour of the rose, or 
the sunset. Yet though the artist, like the unreflect- 
ing man, objectifies his sense-impressions, it remains 
true that they are his immediate sense-affections, 
and they do not enable him to reach the independent 
object as the man reaches it who uses the method 
of sympathy. Moreover, the imitation, when a 
psychological analysis of it is presented, proves to 
be something other than a correspondence of subject 
and object. The man who sees an object, and then 
proceeds to put it on the canvas, has first an image 
of it, and then an image of it as reproduced, this 
second image becoming a motor idea, and resulting 
1 Santayana, The Sense of Beauty, § 10. 



204 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

in the actual reproduction. It is only in this sense 
that there is imitation. 

12. We proceed, therefore, to a study of those 
works of art in which sympathetic imitation finds 
clearer exemplification. It is interesting to look at 
the artistic treatment of inorganic nature. The art- 
ist personifies nature. The painter who paints the 
hoary rock beaten by the waves puts human feeling 
into it, — constant suffering, yet undaunted courage. 
The artist supposes this to be there, as he supposes 
the presence of feeling when he sees the figure of 
a man, and enters into the realization of it by 
sympathy. 

13. In architecture, inorganic nature is moulded 
to man's thoughts and feelings. Schopenhauer 1 has 
given an interesting theory of the meaning of 
beauty in architecture. He says that it is the func- 
tion of this art to present the laws or forces of 
matter ; and that the building is beautiful which 
exhibits clearly the idea of burden and support. 
The natural tendency of the materials composing 
the building is to fall to earth in a mass, but part of 
them is lifted and held aloft. In illustration of this 
theory we have his contention that the Greek is the 
most beautiful of all styles of architecture, because 
the horizontal beam resting on the pillar brings out 

1 Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Band I, § 43. 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 205 

most vividly the idea of burden and support. Com- 
pared with a Greek building, a Gothic is barbarous, 
for the idea of burden has vanished in the arch. 
Exception might readily be taken to these deduc- 
tions from the theory : it may seem that they are, 
even on Schopenhauer's principles, unjustifiable, and 
that the round or pointed arch represents, though in 
a different way, yet more finely than the beam and 
pillar, the idea of burden and support. Such criti- 
cisms, however, should not hide from us the value 
of the general principle laid down. 

If we go on to inquire by what exercise of the 
mind this idea is gained, we can see that it is 
reached through animistic sympathy. This is not, 
indeed, Schopenhauer's account of it. He says that 
in art we are contemplating ideas, not abstractly, as 
we contemplate them in science, but as they are 
given in concrete things : while, for instance, science 
considers the laws of fluidity, art sees them em- 
bodied in a fountain. The statement is valuable, as 
calling attention to the interest in the concrete 
which is characteristic of art. Yet art has no special 
regard for abstract ideas. The reality is not for it 
an embodiment or knot of them. They are for it, 
as art, only incidents in life's epos, like other con- 
scious experiences. It is by another way than that 
of abstract ideas that the builder becomes artistic. 



206 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

The primitive man, when he came to be in a position 
to attend to such things, began to notice the press- 
ure on the rock-pillars of his cave, or on the posts 
of his house. The post or the rock-shaft became for 
him a living thing ; and he seemed to feel the effort 
made by it to sustain the burden. He admired its 
strength, and as he built further he took care that 
the pillars should, like athletes, have their strength 
tried, but yet that the weight should not be, or 
appear to be, oppressive. He became an artistic 
architect because he personified, and knew this per- 
sonified object by sympathy with its individual 
feelings. 

14. In the artistic representation of living or- 
ganisms the same sympathetic treatment can be 
observed. It is probably present, though in an 
obscure way, in the delineation of physical beauty. 
Probably in the beauty of, say, a human face there 
is more than the sensuous pleasure we experience. 
Schopenhauer believes that the touchstone of the 
beauty of human features is the utility of each for 
the well-being of the whole. The brow, he says, 
must be well developed, for that is the seat of intelli- 
gence ; the mouth must not be large, else it re- 
sembles the muzzle of a brute ; the beauty of the 
man is not the beauty of the woman, for the life- 
work of the two is different. If this view is 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION W ART 207 

correct, it is likely that the painter and sculptor will 
be found to have an appreciation of these features 
differing in character from that of the physiologist. 
It is, indeed, the tendency of men of artistic temper- 
ament to look on each feature as having an individu- 
ality, and even a personality, of its own, and to 
enter sympathetically into the feelings supposed to 
belong to this objective entity. 

But there is a presentation of the outward form 
of living creatures which much more clearly re- 
veals the presence of sympathy. Emerson quotes 
somewhere the remark of the painter who said that, 
to paint a tree, you must for the time be a tree ; you 
must, so to speak, enter into the tree's life, and 
share its hopes and fears. The painter and the 
sculptor can likewise represent a tiger or a lamb in 
such a way as to make known to us the fierceness of 
the one, or the timidity and meekness of the other. 
But such artists furnish yet fuller insight into the 
human soul : their art reaches one of its highest 
attainments in the representation of the human face. 
The artist has to reveal the soul behind the face that 
is depicted. The revelation is, indeed, only for the 
seeing eye ; but it is there in those " touches which 
are known to souls." And the appeal is made to 
the spectator's sympathy as when the living face of 
the individual himself is present. 



208 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 






15. There are, however, arts which appeal yet 
more unmistakably to the sympathies. It would 
be easy to offer plausible objections to what has 
been said of the presence of sympathy in the arts 
already considered. It might be urged that the 
painter and the sculptor are not making use of the 
sympathetic faculty, but are rendering as accurately 
as possible the appearance of the object as it affects 
the senses ; and to say that sympathy is essential to 
the appreciation of architecture might seem to bor- 
der on the fantastic. But there are forms of art in 
the presence of which such objections cannot be sus- 
tained. It is doubtful whether they can be adhered 
to in view of certain kinds of music ; it is not 
readily conceivable how they are to be reconciled 
with certain forms of poetry. 

16. Music, as we have seen, has charms which 
are immediately sensuous. But it has a further 
meaning : it expresses the emotions. All the feel- 
ings of the soul find their natural expression in 
vocal sounds. The joyful or sorrowful stirrings of 
the spirit are reflected, especially in the case of 
primitive man, in inarticulate sounds. Even when 
that which is offensive in such sounds is eliminated, 
their power of suggesting certain experiences is not 
diminished, but may even be increased. By virtue 
of this empirical yet firmly established association 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 209 

of sound with emotion, music is able to evoke sym- 
pathy with the experiences of the musician. The 
original form of music is that given by the man who 
chants his own joys and sorrows, or those of others. 
In the use of instruments, and in the rendering of 
music apart from all its natural context, there may 
be much to perplex the power of interpretation. 
Yet the sympathy, if rendered vague and uncertain, is 
still present. It may be claimed, indeed, that music 
has now gained a new function ; in the case of some, 
the appreciation of music seems to become a purely 
intellectual perception. Yet such perception is like 
that of the students of illuminated texts who, ab- 
sorbed in the contemplation of the letters, entirely 
lose the ideas which the letters are meant to convey. 
However this may be, it is true that some music is 
the utterance of the emotions, and is able to elicit 
sympathy with them. 

17. Poetry, like music, makes use of sounds ; but 
the sounds which poetry uses are articulate words 
that are wedded to definite meanings from which, ex- 
cept in peculiar conditions, they cannot be divorced. 
It is true that poetry, like other arts, has an sesthetic 
element that is immediately sensuous : its appeal to 
the ear resembles, in certain respects, the sensuous 
appeal of music. Yet the words of which poetry 
makes use convey ideas : they cannot lose their 



210 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 






supreme function of acting as symbols of definite 
conscious experiences. 

In the lyric, the poet is expressing his subjective 
feelings. His joys and sorrows, his loves and hates, 
are the theme of his song. Moreover, the expression 
of them is direct. The poet is not studying them in 
a scientific way ; they are not objective to him ; he 
is not writing his autobiography. He is absorbed 
in the living of them, and his song is the experience 
rinding a voice. If he speaks of other things or per- 
sons, it is as they are related to this subjective mood : 
the grass, the birds, the stars, are not interesting for 
their own sakes, but as they affect the singer. 

" The dark, dreary winter and wild driving snaw, 
Alane can delight me." 

" Break, break, break, 
On thy cold gray stones, O sea ! 
And I would that my tongue could utter 
The thoughts that arise in me." 

The lyric often, indeed, approximates to the epic, 
but in so far as it remains lyrical it retains this sub- 
jective character. Thus, the religious hymn seems 
to be largely taken up with the divine attributes ; 
but it is not a theological treatise, inasmuch as it 
merely reflects the course of ideas and emotions 
in the writer's mind. 

It may seem that the lyric excludes the exercise 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 211 

of sympathy by reason of its subjectivity; and this 
is the case so far as the lyrist is concerned. The 
sympathy which is elicited by the lyric is like that 
elicited by the music which expresses the musician's 
experience. The lyric reveals the poet's soul in its 
concrete emotions and fancies, and thus evokes the 
sympathy of others. To understand the lyric is to 
perceive the concrete life of the poet, and to feel it 
as he is living it. 

There is a special function of the lyric which 
should be referred to, for it is often used without 
the awakening of any sympathy with the writer. 
It may be adopted by the nation, or the church, and 
each member of these communities makes it his own 
without giving, it may be, a moment's attention to 
the author. But this is because the author aimed 
at expressing the feeling of the community : he sang 
the song of the community ; and, therefore, the 
community adopts the song as its own. The sym- 
pathy referred to could come only from one outside 
the community, or one who for the time should 
adopt the attitude of an outsider. 

While, therefore, the sympathy which the lyric ex- 
cites is not that of the poet, it is important to note its 
power to evoke sympathy ; he for whom it is some- 
thing objective understands it only by sympathy. 1 

1 Music and the lyric illustrate Tolstoy's definition of art ( What 



212 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

The poet becomes the interpreter of that which 
is objective to him when he passes from the lyric 
to the epic. In the epic the poet is interested in 
the life of another human being. The hero is 
made to live in the poet's imagination ; he speaks 
in his own voice ; when he acts, the peculiar emo- 
tions associated with his action are vividly realized. 
The poet may adopt less poetical modes of ex- 
pression, and speak of abstractions like justice or 
courage, but all this may be subordinate to the 
representation of a living personality in its con- 
crete actuality. 

It does not disprove this statement regarding the 
epic to say that few epics have been so purely 
objective, and that even a poet like Milton pro- 
jects his subjectivity over his characters. It only 
shows the limits of the poet's sympathy ; the 
characters with which he can sympathize are 
those like his own. None the less is it true that 
he has made these characters objective. And the 
fact that they are so like himself is in itself an 
evidence that his relation to them is that of 
sympathy. 

The novel is, in many respects, like the epic, 
which it has to a large extent superseded. Some 

is art? translated by Aylmer Maude, p. 50). But that definition 
does not cover all forms of legitimate artistic activity. 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 21 3 

of the more sensuous factors in poetry are omitted ; 
and yet, while this prejudices the artistic com- 
pleteness of the novel, the loss is counterbalanced 
by the greater freedom which is gained. It is, 
other things being equal, a more lifelike picture 
that is attained. 

In the epic and the novel the characters do not 
always speak for themselves. There are passages 
in which the writer is describing them. Such 
descriptions are more or less external. They do 
not make the appeal which the actual words of 
the character represented make ; for the associa- 
tion of inner experience with such words is of 
the most direct kind known to the mind. More- 
over, in the epic or novel there may be a tendency 
to adopt some of the methods characteristic of 
science : to make much of abstractions, and to 
expound causal relations. Not that it is always a 
disadvantage to mingle the more scientific with the 
more artistic. Except for the greatest writers, it 
may be a surer way of attaining the end desired. 
Yet it does not indicate the completest absorp- 
tion in the object. 

That completer absorption, that more perfect 
vision, that fuller sympathy, are given in the 
drama. The drama is the synthesis of the epic 
and the lyric : like the epic it is interested in the 



214 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

objective ; it has a lyrical element, inasmuch as 
each of the characters represented is self -revealing. 
The dramatist shows skill in selecting those pas- 
sages of the inner life which are best fitted to 
yield this revelation in a clear form. He may, 
indeed, help us to understand that life better by 
indicating its effects on other lives ; yet the pri- 
mary method is that of self-revelation. It need 
not be said that the account of this inner life is 
not of the scientific kind; the life is so disclosed 
that we feel it as if we were living it. 

It is worthy of being recalled that the drama 
is meant to be acted and spoken. Perhaps all 
poetry is taken too abstractly, and too much apart 
from its original intention, when it is read silently. 
It demands the human voice for its instrument. 
The drama makes its appeal not only through 
spoken words, but also through various bodily 
movements. There is thus additional help toward 
that insight into the inner life which the drama is 
meant to yield. 

18. The two principles of artistic insight and 
artistic production which concern us here may 
now be restated. First, art deals with the con- 
crete, not with the abstract or universal. Again, 
since the concrete is not merely sensation in its 
immediacy, but the inner life of independent beings, 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 21 5 

we have found that art, to fulfil its function, must 
make large use of sympathy. It has been seen 
that for poetry especially sympathy is indispensable. 
19. It is important for a clearer understanding 
of these principles that we should recall the two 
main forms of aesthetic theory. There is, first of 
all, the theory that the object of art is to please. 
We have seen that this doctrine is, so far, true : 
there may be many works of art whose object is 
to give pleasure. This is true of much sensuous 
art, though it cannot be conceded that it is true 
of it all. But there are many artistic activities 
which the theory entirely fails to cover. It does 
not take account of the objective interests of art. 
Even so, to refer to the parallel ethical contro- 
versy, the utilitarian theory, that actions are per- 
formed for pleasure, holds true of certain actions, 
but it is not true of all; for instance, the impor- 
tant group of actions known as ideo-motor cannot 
be explained by it. And there are many artistic 
interests and artistic products whose impulse is not 
pleasure. It might be thought that the existence 
of pleasure is at least a negative condition, since 
nothing will be sought after which gives pain ; yet, 
though the inhibitory power of pain is great, it is 
doubtful if even thus much of the theory can be 
defended as universally true. From what pleasure 



2l6 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

arises the interest in a tragedy? In the tragedy- 
men are seen to become the prey of disaster. And 
the disaster is not necessarily the manifestation of 
retributive justice : it may be such in some cases, 
but Schopenhauer is right in scornfully rejecting 
the view that the suffering in all cases is retribu- 
tive. It may be urged by the optimist that the 
suffering is to lead to happiness somehow ; but 
those who cannot put confidence in such consola- 
tions may yet find interest in the tragedy. They 
are interested as they are interested in the suffer- 
ings of their own children ; not less, but more, 
when they can discern no prospect of alleviation 
or happy termination. 

In connection with the hedonistic account of art, 
reference may be made to the theory which Mr. 
H. R. Marshall has offered regarding the origin 
of artistic production. He traces it to an instinct 
to " act in such a way as would attract advantageous 
objects to us." 1 Mr. Marshall proceeds to say that 
all selfishness has disappeared from this instinct. 
But we must go a step further. Whether or not 
the artist originally sought to attract objects to 
himself, he has not only ceased to do this selfishly ; 
he is in many cases making other individual things, 
or persons, the centre of attraction. He is lost 

1 JEsthetic Principles, p. 69. 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION- IN ART 21? 

in his work: it is his production — the Madonna, 
or Apollo, or Hamlet — that we are interested in. 
Moreover, it is often the inner life which he presents : 
that is to say, he has become sympathetic, and is 
enabling us to enter into his sympathies. 

20. In sharp opposition to the hedonistic view 
of art is the idealistic theory of writers such as 
Schopenhauer and Hegel, which finds its meaning 
in contemplation of the objective. The defect in 
this kind of theory is that the objective is regarded 
as a system of ideas or categories. Hegel, whose 
view may be taken as typical, says that the beautiful 
is the Idea as it appears to the senses. The meta- 
physics which identifies the reality with the Idea 
need not be criticised at this point. But even were 
it granted that the Idea is the reality it is alleged 
to be, it must still be said that the Idea cannot 
appear to sense. The Idea can be known only by 
reason ; and sense can perceive only what is sensu- 
ous. The theory that beauty is known by sense 
remains a sensuous theory. But, in truth, the world 
contains much more than ideas, in the sense of uni- 
versal; and in the appreciation of the beautiful 
there are many other faculties besides sense called 
into exercise. Sense mirrors sense ; but intellect 
also, as we see in the novel which depicts a phi- 
losopher's mental struggles, mirrors intellect. 






2l8 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

It may be added, that the perception of that 
unity in diversity which has often been thought 
to constitute beauty might coexist with the exer- 
cise of sympathy ; but, when we consider that this 
perception is one of the peculiar activities of the 
abstract intellect, we must hesitate to say that it 
is the distinctive factor in aesthetic appreciation. 

21. The sympathetic method of art being now 
analyzed, it can be seen in what sense art is truer 
than such a science as history. Aristotle said that 
poetry was more philosophical than history because 
of the unity of the action which it presented and the 
typical character which it reached. But it is not 
because of its approach to conceptual science that 
poetry is truer than the recital of the succession of 
phenomena, but because of its closer contact with the 
concrete forms of actual life. History, it is true, 
has much in common with poetry. It may be 
regarded as a development from the epic. Like 
poetry, it deals with what is concrete. While such 
a science as mechanics gives universal laws, without 
reference to any particular individual existence, his- 
tory treats of individuals and of particular facts in 
their experience. Nevertheless, history treats the 
concrete facts according to the abstract methods 
of science. It has become differentiated from the 
epic ; and its ambition is to trace in the sequence 






SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 219 

of human experiences the causal nexus, or that 
complex causality which is indicated by the term 
"development." But how false this historical view 
of the facts is, we can see by recalling the unsat- 
isfactory character of such concepts as causality. 
It can be readily seen that the poet resorts to 
no such methods of rendering the experiences 
which he is recounting. He is not led away from 
them to a study of what are called their relations : 
he is interested in the experiences as they were ex- 
perienced. The transition from one experience to 
another is not for him that which is cogitated by 
an observer of abstract theoretic interest : it is the 
transition as that is in the actual consciousness of 
the individuals he is contemplating. Thus the poet 
is truer to facts. Poetry has its home in the con- 
crete, and its method is the method of truth. 

It follows that the other sciences which deal with 
man, and likewise those which have nature for 
their subject-matter, have not the method of truth 
as it is possessed by poetry and the other arts. 

22. Does art, then, take the place of science? 
Are we, in order to get that truth which is the 
ideal of thought, to leave the laboratory and the 
historical archives, and betake ourselves to the study 
of poetry ? In spite of what has been said, the 
question cannot be answered in the affirmative with- 



220 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

out important qualifications. For there is a sense 
in which art does not imitate the reality. It is 
creative ; it idealizes. The beauty which it pre- 
sents may be a dream. It was not any one indi- 
vidual that served as a model for the sculptor of 
a Greek god, or the painter of a Madonna ; it is 
not the historical Hamlet that Shakespeare brings 
before us. Art does not reveal the world of actual 
facts : it reveals a world of its own making. It 
must not, indeed, be forgotten that art, in dealing 
with the objects which it creates, applies the method 
of truth, and has in regard to them the vision 
divine. Yet the fact remains that it has not held 
itself, after the manner of science, to the concrete 
particulars of the actual world. It has changed 
them in its representation of them. It is one of 
its glories that it is a dreamer of golden dreams. 
It may seem that there are exceptions to this prin- 
ciple. In architecture it is the actual material 
mass that is dealt with ; in sculpture and painting 
the object may be reproduced with great fidelity. 
It is to be noticed, however, that such arts make 
a less direct use of the sympathies. There is sym- 
pathy on the part of the artist, but he is not com- 
mitted to any special form of it. It is in poetry 
that sympathy becomes more definite, and it is pre- 
cisely in poetry that there is the freest departure 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN ART 221 

from the actual world. The poet makes his own 
world that he may enter into sympathy with it. 

While, therefore, we find that art makes use of 
sympathy, and is therefore to be regarded as possess- 
ing the method of truth, it is yet to be acknow- 
ledged that it has not employed the method so as 
to reach knowledge. Art is incomplete when taken 
alone. Its method must be supplemented by other 
methods, that the vision of truth may be attained. 



CHAPTER IX 

SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN MORALITY 

1. The morality of which sympathy may be 
claimed to be a constituent is that which pertains 
to the social relations of human beings. There 
are duties which are binding on the solitary indi- 
vidual : temperance would be obligatory were he 
cut off from his fellows in hopeless isolation. But 
there are other duties which devolve upon the in- 
dividual as a member of society, and for their 
proper discharge he must exercise the faculty of 
sympathy. Thus, in the sphere of social relations, 
sympathy is one of life's ideals. 

2. It is generally conceded that the Christian 
statement of man's social duties is the truest that 
the world has known, and that in important re- 
spects it presents the final and absolute law of 
conduct. Man is to love his neighbour as himself. 
This means first that he is to love those that are 
his friends ; it means also that he is to be kind to 
the unthankful and the evil; the man who is his 
enemy, he is to feed and clothe ; and he is to offer 

222 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION' IN MORALITY 223 

his cheek again to the smiters. This love shows 
itself in ministries of all kinds. It takes upon 
itself the lowliest offices, such as the washing of 
feet; or, by the ministry of teaching and exhorta- 
tion, it makes the souls of others the possessors of 
knowledge and virtue. This Christian love is a 
social ideal which depends for its realization on 
sympathy. 

3. It is true that there is a love which does 
not depend upon sympathy. Human beings are 
attracted to each other by various charms : beauty 
of person, or sparkling wit, or store of instruction, 
or the advantages of wealth. To quote Spinoza : 2 
Amor est loetitia concomitante idea causae externce. 
The most striking example of such a relation is 
found in romantic love : the man delights in the 
beauty of the woman; the woman in the beauty of 
the man. There is not necessarily any sympathy 
in such relations. Each seeks the other for his 
own pleasure; and, were that pleasure to cease, 
the intercourse would lose its charm. The incon- 
stancy of friends, so much deplored, is to be ex- 
plained partly on the ground that the friendship 
consisted in nothing other than the pleasure which 
the individuals could get from each other; they 
ceased going to the well when it became dry. 

1 Ethica, Par. Ill, Propos. 13, schol. 



224 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

This love is not to be condemned in any sweeping 
way. It is legitimate for an individual to receive 
as well as to give, to seek pleasure from others as 
well as to bestow it upon them. Yet it is, at least, 
to be observed that such love is not disinterested 
and sympathetic. It may develop, even in the 
romantic form, into a great selfishness. 

There is a theory adopted by some writers on 
ethics, according to which all so-called love is 
ultimately of this interested character : a man 
does good to others, it is said, in order that he in 
turn may be helped by them. Yet it has come to 
be conceded that, as the effect of habit, a change 
has come over the impulse to such actions, and 
that they are now performed without a view to 
selfish ends. It is obvious that such benevolence 
is not of the same quality as self-interest. In any 
case, the benevolence which is the Christian ideal 
cannot be construed in terms of selfish interest. 
Love is not pleasure derived from others : " If ye 
love them which love you, what reward have ye." 
A man may do many good deeds from a selfish 
motive; he may give his goods to feed the poor, 
and yet, from the ideal point of view, be nothing. 

4. It might, however, still seem that sympathy 
is not indispensable to love or benevolence. It is 
surely possible to do good deeds from motives 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN MORALITY 225 

that are unselfish, while yet there is no exercise 
of sympathy. A man may desire to relieve those 
who have been visited by famine in some distant 
part of the world, and with this end in view he 
may make a donation of money. In giving the 
money he does not think of advantage or renown 
to accrue to himself; yet, on the other hand, there 
seems to be little more sympathy elicited by the 
individuals befriended than there is when he in- 
vests his money in railway stock. It may be 
found, also, in many good actions that are done 
from habit that, while there is no conscious self- 
ishness left, there is likewise no conscious sym- 
pathy. Further, it is noteworthy that those who 
hold up benevolence as the great social virtue do 
not make prominent the element of sympathy, but 
rather point to certain good ends which are to be 
accomplished, and call men to supply the means 
to these ends. Even Christian preachers do not 
magnify the place of sympathy in the ideal life 
which they describe. They exhort to kindness 
and forgiveness in a general way ; they also call 
upon the church to meet the needs of the heathen. 
How often do they handle the theme of friend- 
ship? 

5. Yet, while there is much good to be done 
apart from any direct display of sympathy, and 
Q 



226 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

while the obstacles to sympathy are many, it is 
surely this finer relation, this closer intimacy, that 
is the ideal of Christianity. " Bear ye one 
another's burdens " ; " rejoice with those that 
do rejoice, and weep with those that weep " ; 
"whether one member suffer all the members 
suffer with it, or one member be honoured all the 
members rejoice with it"; the great "captain" 
and "high priest," Jesus, is "touched with a feel- 
ing of our infirmities " : in the light of these 
sayings we should interpret the commandment of 
Jesus, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." 
The highest ethical attainment in the social life is 
friendship ; and a perfect friendship is a perfect 
sympathy. 

6. It is to be noticed that this higher love does 
not conflict with that love which is pleasure derived 
from others. The delight which a man feels in 
others may well bring him to a closer interest in 
them, and ultimately to sympathy with them. 
Romantic love often illustrates this process : the 
mutual delight of man and woman in each other may 
develop, by virtue of the interest which such delight 
awakens, into the most sympathetic friendship. 

7. The love of friendship can be seen to be like 
knowledge. For what is such love ? " Two souls 
with a single thought." Often, indeed, when 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN MORALITY 227 

knowledge has been weighed, it has seemed to be 
less than love ; and this judgment of knowledge 
is just in view of much that claims this name. In 
his Social Evolution, Mr. Kidd represents know- 
ledge and benevolence as opposed to each other 
in their effects. This is because the intellect is 
taken abstractly. When knowledge is at its truest, 
the opposition disappears ; for knowledge is sym- 
pathy. 

8. The reason for thinking that in the moral life 
we reach that acquaintance with reality which is 
denied to the abstract intellect must not be mis- 
understood. Kant taught that, while the theo- 
retical reason fails to reach the noumenal world, 
the eternal realities disclose themselves to the 
practical reason. But the moral conceptions 
which Kant cherishes are not sufficiently criti- 
cised : the moral maxims are not, as he thinks, 
independent of experience, but are the embodi- 
ment of general ideas derived from experience. 
It is therefore into a realm of abstractions that 
Kant conducts us; and ethical concepts fail of 
truth, even as do those of the understanding. If 
we are led to reality through morality, it is not 
because starting from moral facts we make ab- 
stract theories, but because in the very living of 
the moral life, in certain of its highest forms, we 



228 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

are in closest cognitive contact with a reality 
other than our own being. 1 

9. Yet while morality is able to a certain ex- 
tent to meet the demands of knowledge, it has 
certain limitations which render it incapable of 
fully meeting these demands. It is hard for 
morality to separate itself from what is utili- 
tarian ; nor is it desirable for the most part that 
it should. It looks to helpful action ; it sympa- 
thizes that it may succour. 

It is on the same principle that morality is 
limited in respect of the objects with which it 
deals. It restricts itself to human beings; or, at 
the most, it extends its mercy to the needs of 
creatures that have life. Lower in the scale of 
creation it does not go : the vast material uni- 
verse is ignored. It may, indeed, be that, were 
knowledge of the lower forms of existence more 
complete, it would be found that in their case 
also men would recognize duties ; but this sup- 
position only brings into clearness the fact that 
morality is interested in things and persons only 
in so far as it is able to minister to them. 

This principle is further illustrated in the fact 

1 Attention may here be called to Mr. Leslie Stephen's state- 
ment of the relation of sympathy to knowledge {Science of Ethics, 
pp. 228 ff). 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN MORALITY 229 

that morality is interested only in the present 
and future, and does not dwell in the past. It is 
true that for ethical purposes men must be inter- 
ested in the past, but the sympathetic recon- 
struction of the past is not ethical. It may serve 
ethical purposes; yet when done for its own sake, 
it is not ethical. On the other hand, the aspirant 
after knowledge must reconstruct the past, and 
live over again the life of king, and poet, and 
pioneer. 

Knowledge, therefore, is wider than morality : 
they both use sympathy as a method, and at cer- 
tain points they coincide ; yet sjrmpathy for the sake 
of sympathy is not the prerogative of morality. 

10. If morality is compared with art, it is seen 
that, so far as it exercises sympathy, morality 
keeps to concrete living realities, while art tends 
to pass into a realm of its own creation ; yet 
that, at the same time, it is art rather than mor- 
ality which delights in contemplation purely for 
its own sake. 

11. It is not to be forgotten that many of the 
greatest thinkers have put knowledge among the 
virtues. Knowledge, so far from being a means 
to some form of living other than itself, is re- 
garded as itself an end, and, moreover, as the 
highest end in life. Yet it is not precisely this 



230 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

exaltation of knowledge as the highest of the 
virtues that is here advocated. It may, indeed, 
be that knowledge represents the highest ideal 
possible for the human spirit; this view has 
especial justification, if knowledge is to be inter- 
preted as sympathy, for then knowledge, coincid- 
ing in part with morality, yet goes beyond it, to 
take to itself the interests of the whole universe. 
Yet what it concerns us here to emphasize is 
that, even when morality is taken in the more 
restricted sense, it is not merely one virtue to be 
supplemented by knowledge as another virtue, but 
involves in itself the exercise of that sympathy 
which constitutes the essence of cognition. 

12. Morality, to sum up, may be taken to show 
that the sympathetic relation is, in a general 
way, possible ; and also to offer a clear illustration 
of its character as contemplation of the concrete. 

13. It may be appropriate at this point to call 
attention to the important place which sympathy 
has in religion, in the forms which it has assumed 
among us. When fear is the prominent element 
in religion, sympathy with God may indeed be 
regarded as possible, but it is not likely to exist : 
the effort of the worshipper is to adapt himself 
to an unpleasant environment. But when religion 
has become love to God, sympathy finds entrance. 



SYMPATHETIC IMITATION IN MORALITY 23 1 

There is for Christians not only the command to 
love God ; there is the doctrine that God has been 
manifested in a human experience, and that He 
dwells in the hearts of His people. To this teach- 
ing may be added the theory, which is not directly 
scriptural, but which has commanded the support of 
many devout minds, that God is immanent in all 
things. Thus nature in man and in things is the 
"garment of Deity." He "prayeth best," hath 
closest divine communion, 

" Who loveth best 
Both man, and bird, and beast." 

It may be that when religion and knowledge are at 
their highest, they are not two, but one. 



CHAPTER X 

SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 

1. The investigation into the nature of sympathy 
has shown us that it is a method of reproducing in 
the observer a concrete experience other than his 
own. We have seen that this method is essential 
to the higher works of art ; we have also seen that 
sympathy is the life-blood of the higher morality ; 
it has even been found that there is a sense in which 
it is illustrated in the employment of general con- 
cepts. Yet in none of these cases is there offered 
such a use of the principle that the truth is its sure 
result. Morality employs it to determine action 
and control the utilities of life ; in art it does not 
devote itself to what are usually designated facts, 
but reflects the creations of the imagination ; in the 
general concept there is a departure from the con- 
crete facts of which it is supposed to be cognitive, 
and therefore one of the first conditions of truth- 
getting is neglected. It has, therefore, still to be 
decided how sympathy is to be employed that the 
ideal of knowledge may be reached. And since it 

232 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 233 

is science that has shown such zeal in its effort to 
reach facts, and since a certain kind of success, so 
far as the scrutiny of sense-data is concerned, must 
be conceded to it, the problem before us may be 
described as the synthesis of the method of science 
with the method of sympathetic imitation. It is 
still the knowledge that the self has of other per- 
sons and things, and of its own non-immediate ex- 
perience, which is being studied. 

2. Let the psychological process found in sympa- 
thetic imitation be recalled. A man sees the con- 
tortions of his neighbour's countenance, and feels 
the pain which his neighbour is suffering. Here 
there is direct observation by means of the senses, 
and then with the sensations received there is associ- 
ated a feeling or experience which is not directly 
observed. There is, therefore, necessary, first of 
all, exact observation of sense-data. These phe- 
nomena, to call them such, are not, it is true, the 
ultimate reality : the sign and its interpretation 
are not to be confounded. Yet the sign is what 
is immediately given us, and only through it can 
the interpretation be reached ; hence the careful 
study to which it must be subjected. And all is 
necessary that science has done to make more 
minute its observation, and differentiate one ob- 
ject from another. Nor can the work be carried 



234 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

to too great fineness ; for any part may prove 
instinct with new meaning : it may be a seal the 
breaking of which opens another book. 

3. Not only must the phenomena presented to 
the senses be observed as separate and isolated 
facts, their relations must be perceived. Each 
has a definite place in a system, and its environ- 
ment must be studied. The individual letter 
may by itself be meaningless, and may gain mean- 
ing only as part of a word ; the word may not be 
truly intelligible apart from its context. The 
various symptoms of a man's pain may have to be 
noted and taken together that its peculiar quality 
may be apprehended. The coexistences of phe- 
nomena must therefore be made clear. Moreover, 
there are certain coexistences which always recur. 
It is of great moment to discover them that we may 
make right interpretations of the nature of things 
with greater expedition ; just as it helps in the read- 
ing of the printed page to know that certain sylla- 
bles and words always accompany certain others. 

Not only the coexistences of phenomena, but 
also their sequences, must be detected. The 
meaning of each moment is something that exists 
in and for itself : the present is distinct from the 
past, and is lost when the future arrives. Yet it 
expedites the process of interpretation to know 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 235 

that phenomena come in a certain order. Hence 
the importance of discovering the causal relations 
of things. There still remains the task of associ- 
ating with each part of the phenomenal series its 
true meaning; that is, there is still required the 
sympathetic function. But that the fulfilling of 
that function may be facilitated, it is desirable to 
know the order in which the phenomena to be 
interpreted present themselves. 

The statement that the coexistences and se- 
quences of phenomena are of a universal character, 
is the presentation of the true meaning of the 
doctrine of concepts. For what the concept 
really indicates is such constant coexistence and 
succession. And this view is not affected if we 
regard the concept as superseded by the "law." 
The empiricist and positivist are right when they 
maintain that all the facts which science considers 
can be presented in terms of coexistence and suc- 
cession. We must, therefore, use the method of 
concepts, but we must at the same time give this 
interpretation to the concept. 

4. But the question may be asked, are not 
space and time, whi'ch are implied in all statements 
of coexistence and succession, thus made metaphys- 
ical entities? They may be so regarded, and so 
far as they make these metaphysical claims, the 






236 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

criticisms already passed on them still hold. Yet 
they may be regarded in another light. For con- 
venience in discussing this question, let space be 
considered apart from the more complex idea of 
time. Space is an empirical concept with certain 
peculiarities. It is derived from universal expe- 
rience. It is not, like substance or cause, applied 
universally, though having nothing in its origin 
to justify this universality : it can claim that its 
source is all experience. Moreover, it is experi- 
ence with that which is the particular quality 
of each part of it ignored; space is experience 
with its content reduced to indifference, so that it 
seems to be the frame or form of experience. And 
thus, while space is not the a priori form of expe- 
rience, but is the empirical form of it, it is yet 
not the less fitted to represent the relations of all 
phenomena. 

Thus, while space may not be a metaphysical 
entity, it may be entitled to the place it occupies 
in science, and the effort to make science mathe- 
matical may be justified. 

5. The spatial idea, as thus applied to things, 
may be said to have for thought a symbolic value. 
A symbol, as we see in its algebraic employment, 
may represent something which it does not in 
itself resemble. Thought may for the time oper- 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 237 

ate with these symbols as if they were objective 
entities, and may construct from them a world of 
its own. Finally, however, it emerges from this 
series of operations, and finds itself at home with 
the particular reality, which, indeed, from the 
beginning it was its aim to reach. The spatial 
representation of things, the whole mathematical 
treatment of them, is of this symbolic character. 
The spatial relation does not represent the actual 
relation subsisting among the experiences, so to 
speak, of the world ; nor does it represent a rela- 
tion among the sensations which fill human con- 
sciousness : it is their product, other than they, 
and external to them. Yet it is a symbolism 
which thought uses ; and we have seen that for 
knowledge the statement of spatial relations is 
indispensable. 

The time relation may likewise be employed 
without any concession of its claims to metaphysi- 
cal existence. It is still more obvious in the case 
of time than in the case of space that the statement 
of its relations has only a symbolic value, when 
there is borne in mind the peculiar origin of the 
time idea as a combination of space with other 
feelings such as those of reality. Thus, the ele- 
ment of succession which appears in certain con- 
cepts, especially in those of law, is a purely 






238 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

symbolic device which need not be regarded as 
resembling anything in the world which it is used 
to unravel. 

6. The other categories, such as reality, sub- 
stance, and cause, or energy, fail to furnish the 
metaphysical interpretation of phenomena ; and, at 
the same time, they seem to present something other 
than relations of sequence and coexistence among 
the phenomena to which they are applied ; so that 
it might seem necessary to reject them as altogether 
worthless. Yet probably science cannot afford to 
dismiss them altogether from its employment. 
They also have a symbolic value of their own. 

7. Reality is the symbol of knowledge as op- 
posed to imagination. Imagination creates ideas 
which, when recognized as such creations, are con- 
trasted with the facts with which knowledge deals. 
Out of the many phenomena presented to the mind 
some are chosen for knowledge; others are re- 
jected ; those that belong to knowledge are marked 
by the symbol reality. This symbol must not be 
taken for a knowledge of the objects in question, 
but for a sign that they are matter for science. 
Originally betokening the concentration of the 
mind upon that which is in contact with the body, 
it has now a wider application, and, though retain- 
ing its original meaning, associates itself with what- 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 239 

ever is to be taken seriously. This association, 
like others, may often be mistaken, but what it 
concerns us here to note is that, only when it takes 
place, is a phenomenon taken seriously. When 
there is this association with any phenomenon, it 
is then matter for science, with all the methods 
at its command, to study. 

It need not be said that the illusion or the 
fancy may, as much as anything else, become an 
object of science. When it is said that the illu- 
sion is unreal, it is meant that it is such in con- 
trast with mental states which may refer to things 
beyond the individual mind. At the same time 
it may be studied as a mental phenomenon, and, 
looked at from this point of view, it associates to 
itself the category of reality. 

Mr. Bradley has denned judgment as the refer- 
ence of an idea to reality. This definition is very 
valuable, yet it is important to carry psychological 
analysis further. In the judgment there is an 
association of two relatively distinct ideas ; or 
there is the referring of one idea to another. The 
idea, however, to which the other is referred is 
never simple : it has . always the idea of reality 
associated with it. It may, indeed, be a very com- 
plex idea, the product of many judgments whose 
predicates have blended together ; it may also be 



240 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

an abstract concept : in any case, it is taken as a 
form of reality. Nor is this idea of reality ulti- 
mately wanting to the predicate. The predicate 
gives what constitutes, in whole, or in part, the 
being of the subject. The copula indicates that 
the predicate is the reality of the subject. It is 
thus evident that our knowing and thinking are 
concerned only with that with which we have first 
associated the idea of reality. The importance of 
this symbol can be seen to be great. Nevertheless, 
that it is a symbol must not be forgotten. 

8. Substance, likewise, is a useful scientific 
symbol. It may not be entitled to indicate in 
animistic fashion the inner self of objects : it serves, 
however, to indicate the relative permanence of cer- 
tain coexistences in contrast with other coexist- 
ences which are accidental and for a moment. A 
table is a substance ; that is, the qualities of shape 
and solidity and utility are associated in a greater 
or less permanency. On the other hand, the books 
laid on the table do not form one substance with 
it. At the same time, the relativity of this per- 
manence is such that the term substance has no 
very precise definition. While it is a useful ex- 
pression, it is not exact. Even in the case of a co- 
existence which may be regarded as " absolute," the 
term substance, if used, does not of itself denote 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 24 1 

the necessity which is supposed to be embodied in 
the coexistence. 

9. Causality has its value in indicating the order 
which phenomena observe. Apart from human ex- 
perience there may be nothing corresponding to 
that feeling of effort of which it is a modification. 
Yet it serves to distinguish the sequences which 
are invariable from those which are accidental. 

10. Likewise the principles of the conservation 
and transformation of energy may have no value 
as attempts to disclose the reality of nature ; but 
they may yet be taken to indicate certain character- 
istics of the relations of succession and coexistence 
among phenomena. They teach that a certain 
series of phenomena can, in thinkable conditions, 
be given in reverse order : a is followed by b, 
but in certain other conditions b is followed by a. 

11. The category of essence being a feeling 
that associates itself with a given permanent qual- 
ity, or with several such qualities, may still serve 
as the symbol of this kind of permanence. The 
category of similarity does not resemble the ob- 
jects to which it is applied : it is a symbol of a 
group of objects which may be described as being 
such that knowledge of one facilitates, or, within 
certain limits, stands for, knowledge of the others. 
From the analysis given above of the category of 



242 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

teleology it can readily be seen that it is only a 
symbol of a certain species of succession. 

12. We have thus seen that concepts and laws 
resolve themselves into relations of coexistence and 
succession. We have found that these relations 
have merely a symbolic value. We have also 
found that the other so-called categories are of a 
symbolic character, having, for the most part, the 
power to indicate special forms of coexistence and 
succession, and thus being symbols of symbols. 

13. Not only must the symbolic character of 
laws be recognized ; the sense in which they are 
universal must be understood. Many laws (e.g. 
chemical principles) without doubt represent 
averages. They state what is valid within certain 
limits of difference. The individual beings within 
these limits may vary widely, yet they coexist 
with, or are followed by, certain other things. 
The subject of a universal proposition can prob- 
ably be taken to refer to exactly similar things 
only when these are the points of which, as 
centres of energy, the universe might be regarded as 
made up, or are still more hypothetical existences. 
The so-called molecules may be supposed to vary 
in form, and the manifestations of energy in in- 
tensity, to an indefinite degree. It may be that 
every individual thing is unique. While the law 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 243 

of gravitation holds of every particle of matter in 
the universe, it is probably true that no two 
pulls of gravitating bodies are exactly alike. 
Thus the law has limits like those of the crude 
concept. Now, it is the nature of concrete in- 
dividuals that must be studied. The concrete is 
the real, and it is the form of each actual con- 
crete thing that must be observed. Laws may be 
useful in various ways : they are helpful to 
knowledge as they lead us nearer things. They 
present the coexistences and sequences which ob- 
tain among things so long as these things keep 
within certain limits of difference. It is in this 
way that they help us to a presentation of the 
actual forms of things. 

14. With this scientific study of the appearance 
which things present there must, let it be re- 
peated, be conjoined the method of sympathetic 
imitation to reach that which cannot become ap- 
pearance. The phenomenon must be studied, in 
order that that of which it is the phenomenon 
may be revealed. As a man studies the face of 
another that he may have sympathy, so it must 
always be in the cognition of things. The con- 
templation of the outward appearance of things 
must be followed by the sympathetic acquaint- 
ance with their heart. There must be this syn- 






244 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

thesis of the methods that the ideal of knowledge 
may be reached. The sympathy which finds si 
striking illustration in the artist and the moralist 
must be joined to the love of observation for its 
own sake, and the fidelity in the search for facts, 
which characterize science. 

15. In view of this problem of the synthesis oi 
the methods, it is instructive to recall the theory 
of knowledge which Kant propounded. Accord- 
ing to him, all the material of knowledge is 
given by the sensibility : it consists of the sights, 
touches, and other sensations of the external 
senses, and the data of the somewhat indeter- 
minate "internal" sense. The sensibility has two 
a 'priori forms, space and time, in which all sen- 
sations are received. Kant's account of them 
should be carefully noted. He is at pains to 
maintain that they are not concepts, but intu- 
itions, his reason being that they contain a 
manifold ; they are the a priori forms of the 
multiplicity of sensations. 

It is not less important to notice the function 
which Kant assigns to thought in its operations 
upon this material. To think is to judge, and to 
judge is to bring a manifold under a conception : 
it is in this connection that Kant enumerates his 
root conceptions or categories. These conceptions 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 245 

do not reveal the constitution of things in them- 
selves. It is their function as the root conceptions 
of thought to introduce unity into sense-experience. 
" I think " is the original synthetical unity : to say 
that the " I think " unifies is to state an analytical 
proposition. For instance, the category of cau- 
sality has its significance in the presentation of the 
succession of phenomena. The phenomenon a is 
conjoined with the succeeding phenomenon b in a 
causal relation when a conditions 6, or determines 
the possibility of its existence. Not that hereby 
the nature of things in themselves is in any way 
revealed. Causality is simply a rule superimposed 
upon phenomena, which apart from it cannot be 
seen to have any necessary connection ; and its 
peculiar quality as a principle of synthesis is 
derived from the application to special time rela- 
tions of the synthetical unity of apperception. 

16. Kant's doctrine of knowledge is remarkable 
for the account which it gives of the actual attain- 
ment of science : science deals with phenomena ; 
that is, it gives an account of the relations, spatial 
and temporal, which obtain among sensations. 

17. Yet Kant is not entitled to restrict thought 
to the presentation of such relations, for thought 
can reach better results than those which science 
has actually to show. To go to the heart of his 



246 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

theory, he is not entitled to regard thought as 
synthesis. Indeed, it may be gravely questioned 
whether he has been able to develop this view of 
thought with consistency. It is difficult to inter- 
pret his categories and principles of judgment as 
having reference only to conjunction of sensations : 
they refer to something which is indicated by sen- 
sation, but which, at the same time, transcends 
sensation. When he gives as the first analogy 
the principle, that in all changes of phenomena 
the substance is permanent, and its quantum is 
neither increased nor diminished in nature, we 
seem to have, in the very statement of it, the 
traditional contrast between the changing sense- 
phenomenon and a metaphysical entity. Besides, 
Kant has not, in his exposition of the principle, 
been at pains to show that he means that in some 
sense the amount of sensation in the universe re- 
mains constant. Causality can be more easily 
regarded as a mere principle of synthesis among 
sensations, yet Kant, at least, in the second edition 
of the Critique, has connected the relation of cause 
and effect with the successive changes in substance, 
and thereby again transcended phenomena. Kant 
falls into this contradiction, because substance and 
causality are not merely syntheses : they are prin- 
ciples of interpretation, and transcend phenomena. 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 247 

It is only by a rejection of the natural meaning of 
the categories that they are regarded as syntheses. 
Kant did not acknowledge that he was diverting 
the categories from their original use, and hence 
he relapses unconsciously into the original method 
of employing them. And, in truth, thought is not 
merely synthesis ; it is interpretation. There is, to 
use the metaphor of synthesis, a joining of two 
ideas in the judgment, as there may be in other 
conscious states ; but it is characteristic of the 
judgment, as we have seen, that the predicate 
expresses the being or truth of the subject. Even 
spatial and temporal relations are to be taken ob- 
jectively, when they are predicated in a judgment ; 
if we come to recognize that they are merely sym- 
bolic of something, this recognition is, in turn, 
a judgment of interpretation of which they are 
the subjects. 

18. At the same time, Kant has hints of a view 
of knowledge as something which is not merely a 
synthesis of phenomena. The realm of things in 
themselves is not entirely unapproachable, for free- 
dom, immortality, and the existence of God are 
found to be postulates of the moral nature. And 
even if this metaphysic should seem somewhat 
crudely formulated, Kant has other suggestions 
toward a knowledge of absolute reality. He ex- 



248 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

plains our inability to know things in themselve 
by the character of our human means of cogni 
tion : everything which belongs to intuition con- 
tains nothing but mere relations, and the whole 
of our cognition, which is a cognition of places, 
change of places, and laws, contains nothing but 
mere relations : yet by mere relations a thing can 
never be known. 1 Contrasted, however, with this 
knowledge is that of an intuitive understanding, 
such as belongs to the Divine Being, and knows 
things in themselves. The idea is merely prob- 
lematical, but is not contradictory. Kant has 
given the most detailed presentation of this con- 
ception in the Critique of Judgment, in a discus- 
sion of the adaptation of nature to our demand 
for unity in knowledge. Kant tries to show that 
the need for regarding such adaptation as designed 
is due to the peculiarity of our understandings, 
which must proceed from the connection of parts 
to the representation of the whole. In contrast 
with our understanding we may conceive one 
which would proceed from the intuition of a whole 
to the parts. Kant seems to be thinking of uni- 
versal, and even to be anticipating the system of 
absolute idealism. But, in so far as he inter- 

1 Eritik der reinen Vernunft, Transc. Elementarlehre, Erster 
Theil, § 9. 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 249 

prets this intelligence in terms of concepts, he is 
attributing to it the limitations of the discursive 
understanding. May we not say that the function 
of the intuitive understanding is more nearly sup- 
plied by the faculty of sympathy ? Sympathy is 
understanding, inasmuch as it not merely is know- 
ledge of the appearance of things, but transcends 
phenomena. At the same time, it is intuitive, 
and not discursive ; it is directly perceptive of 
reality ; the veil of sensations and categories is 
rent. True, Kant regards this intuition as pos- 
sible only for the Divine Being, in whom it is 
such as to give the existence of that which is its 
object, and thus it means the divine living of the 
world rather than a knowledge of it. Sympathy, 
on the other hand, is not creative, but is know- 
ledge of a created object. Yet, while this is to 
be admitted, it is true that sympathy, in contrast 
with categories, gives knowledge of the object in 
terms of that divine living which is the reality ; 
it intuites that which God intuites. 

19. It may seem that we have made an unjusti- 
fied assumption in supposing that such knowledge 
as we get by sympathy is knowledge of the " thing 
in itself," asserted so strenuously to be unknowa- 
ble. This question as to the existence of absolutely 
unknowable entities may be held in reserve. It 



250 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

must, however, be pointed out here that an account 
of the sympathetic faculty involves precisely this 
distinction between phenomena and things in them- 
selves, though it indicates that the thing in itself is 
knowable. An illustration may be proof of this. 
The wounded man's pain is known to his neighbour 
by certain signs, such as groans, and contortions 
of the countenance. These are phenomena of the 
pain. They are not the pain itself, and bear no 
resemblance to it. Nor can the observer by much 
searching among phenomena come directly to the 
pain. He might even examine the man's brain, but 
the conscious experience of the pain, while it might 
be indicated by new signs, would still not be directly 
brought to light. But were it possible by other 
methods to know the pain, the observer of it would 
then be acquainted with the thing in itself. Thus, 
at the risk of paradox, it must be maintained that 
such a mental state as a sensation is at once a 
phenomenon and a thing in itself. The individual 
A has sensations from B ; that is, in presence of B 
he has certain mental states. These do not resem- 
ble B necessarily ; they are simply A's conscious 
states. But they may be taken for signs of B ; or, 
in technical language, they are the appearance or 
the phenomena of B. But suppose that some one 
now attempts to know A ; he finds him made up 






SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 25 1 

largely, at least, of such states as these which we 
have called phenomena of B. A is these phenom- 
ena. But A is real ; he is a thing in itself. Thus 
the states, which are from one point of view merely phe- 
nomena, are from another point of view things in them- 
selves. There may or may not be things absolutely 
inaccessible to us. Apart from that question, the 
distinction between phenomena and things in them- 
selves is valid. And when the object of our know- 
ledge is the thing in itself, as it is when we seek to 
know other things, it may be legitimate to treat 
sense-data by the method that Kant prescribed, 
while for the knowledge of the thing in itself a 
distinct method may be employed. 

20. The problem of the synthesis of methods may 
be looked at from another point of view ; the history 
of intellect may be considered. In an earlier chap- 
ter, we saw that sensations are originally to be 
described simply as states of consciousness, with no 
necessary cognitive or teleological function ; we also 
saw that, in the period of sifting known as evolu- 
ition, those minds are selected by nature which 
(develop certain sensations, and certain modes of 
1 relating sensations. It was also found later that 
the mind had a faculty for making general concepts 
from the materials of sensation. This faculty is 
of importance in the struggle for existence ; in the 



252 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

business of life it is a great advantage to be able to 
abstract qualities, and to associate those which have 
been often found together. It is important, when 
the man sees a bear, that, though he has never seen 
this particular bear before, he should associate with 
the visual image of its form the idea of its ferocity ; 
or, when he sees a fruit, that he should at once 
think of its edibility. It is not necessary to assert 
that the survival of the concept is due entirely to its 
utility ; it may have been a necessary product of the 
faculties of memory and association ; yet, doubtless, 
its vitality is due in some measure to its utility. 

Another period came when the mental states of 
the individual were employed to reflect or copy the 
being or essence of other things. And for this 
purpose concepts have been the chief resource. But 
the failure of the concept has become manifest ; the 
concrete must mirror the concrete. The concept, 
however, need not be utterly discarded ; it must 
simply be relegated to its original function ; it must 
furnish a more or less exact statement of the rela- 
tions of coexistence and succession that obtain 
among phenomena. 

21. It is specially important to consider this 
problem of the synthesis of methods in connection 
with the doctrine of the correlation of mind and 
brain. It is probably to man's nature that we 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 253 

should turn for the key to the riddle of the uni- 
verse. It will be seen, as we proceed, that we are 
only making more definite the meaning of the 
illustrations already given of human sympathy. 

22. One of the most confidently accepted beliefs 
of modern psychology is that of the correlation of 
mind and brain. It is the object of physiological 
psychology to state all the data of psychology in 
terms of nerve-movements. Our thoughts, our voli- 
tions, our feelings, are taken to represent so many 
movements of nerve-molecules ; not an image can 
float before the fancy, not a prayer can shape itself 
for utterance, without the agitation of a portion of 
the brain. The statement of conscious facts in phys- 
iological terms may not be complete ; but the want 
of completeness is due, it is believed, not to any 
interruption of this correlation, but to the coarseness 
of the methods of observation, or to some more or 
less accidental obstacle. While absolute proof of 
the theory cannot be given, there is a great and 
increasing mass of evidence in its favor. 

It is common to say that the series of brain-pro- 
cesses is parallel to the series of mind-processes ; or, 
at least, the mental has always a corresponding 
material activity, though the material may not 
always have a mental counterpart. They are also 
often regarded as parallel in the sense that they do 



254 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

not affect each other. They are as if belonging to 
two kinds of existence, and cannot affect each other. 
The body does not act upon the mind, and the mind 
does not control the body. 

23. Whatever may be the ultimate interpretation 
of the facts on which the theory of parallelism is 
based, it serves to bring into clearness the distinc- 
tion between the physical and psychical series as 
data for knowledge. For the observer, they are so 
distinct in quality that they are taken for separate 
orders of existence. Yet it does not need much 
reflection to show that the difference is within the 
sphere of knowledge. After all, what is called the 
material series is a series of mental facts : it consists 
of the conscious states of the observer. It is, pri- 
marily, at least, a series of sensations ; other ideas, 
such as substance and cause, may be added, but the 
basis for them is sensation. The observation of the 
brain means, thus, a series of sensations, visual or 
tactile for the most part, in the mind of the ob- 
server ; they are perceived immediately, or an 
inference is made from those so perceived to others 
which in themselves admit of the same immediate 
perception. 

The psychical series, when the observer is looking 
at another person, is not known in this immediate 
way. The observer infers its existence : and he 



i 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 255 

infers it, for it is something which he can never 
immediately perceive. His knowledge of the mate- 
rial series consists in his own sensations ; his know- 
ledge of the psychical series consists of inferred 
states which can never be known directly. It is 
putting the same truth in another way to say that 
in the study of the material series he never comes on 
any fact of the psychical series ; no scrutiny of the 
cells of the brain discloses to him at any point an 
emotion of love or hatred, or a feeling of pleasure or 
pain. The psychical series is a thing in itself, and 
he may extend his knowledge of the phenomenal 
series indefinitely without coming nearer that reality. 
24. Nothing has been said of a possible matter 
which may present itself in connection with these 
two series of facts. We are not directly con- 
cerned with it. And, in truth, the temptation is 
great to adopt the theory that we have in the 
material and psychical series two aspects of one 
reality. Viewed from without, the series is said 
to present itself as material ; viewed from within, 
it is mental. Professor Royce illustrates the 
theory in this graphic way : " Here in my world 
of daily experience is my friend. If one saw him 
through and through, one would experience as the 
describable physical facts about him — a quivering 
mass of molecules. Especially complex with in- 



256 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

tertwined spirals and streams of multitudinous 
molecules would be each of the many tens of 
millions of cells of his brain. Thus my friend 
might be found. Nay, I have as yet found him 
not at all. I did not mean this maze of mole- 
cules by my friend. I meant his intelligence." 1 
The physical appearance is "simply the way in 
which the true and spiritual self must needs ap- 
pear when viewed by a finite being whose conscious 
ness experiences in the forms of our space and our 
time." 2 If we add that the physical appearanc 
owes its peculiarity, not merely to the observer's 
forms of space and time, but to the fact that it is 
the observer's series of sensations, the theory 
seems simple and reasonable. Yet, as has been 
indicated, it does not concern us here to prove 
such a theory, or to refute the dogma of the in- 
dependent existence of matter. It is enough to 
show the character of the two series with which 
we are directly concerned. 3 

1 The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, pp. 405 f. 

2 I6M.,p. 411. 

3 Avenarius argues strenuously against " Introjektion" and the 
distinction of " outer " and " inner "(Der menschliche Weltbegriff). 
His criticisms are important : certain forms of Introjektion are crude. 
Yet it is necessary to insist that the experience of a man, A, does 
not become the experience of his neighbour, B, who observes him 
in the sense in which B realizes the effects of A's experience in his 
own. These effects, to repeat, are B's immediate, private sen- 



i 












SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 257 

25. If, then, we have the two series of facts, 
the sensations of the observer of the brain and 
the psychic experiences of the person observed, the 
question arises, what does knowledge of the per- 
son observed imply ? Since every conscious ex- 
perience in the object of observation has its 
physical counterpart, and since it can be known 
only by inference from its physical counterpart, 
the physical must be carefully studied. Its ap- 
pearance must be noted, and sequences and co- 
existences must be sought among the relations 
which it exhibits ; it must be studied according 
to the methods of positive science. In all this, it 
need not be repeated, the observer is dealing with 
his own sense-impressions, which bear no neces- 
sary likeness to the facts in the experience which 
he wishes to know. How is he to pass to these 
objective facts? By the method of sympathetic 
imitation : he must associate with each phenom- 
enon that experience of which it is the sign, and 
he must realize it as it actually exists. 

26. It might naturally be objected at this point, 
that a knowledge of these objective psychic ex- 
periences need not call for the exercise of sym- 

sations ; the experience of A is inferred. In presence of this kind 
of "dualism," the problem before us is to determine how these 
inferred states can be truly known. 






258 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

pathy. Is not, it may be asked, the science of 
psychology proof that these objective experiences 
can be immediately intuited, and that the knowledge 
of them can take the forms of science ? It may 
be well, in view of such a question, to state more 
explicitly what has already been indicated, that 
psychology is not knowledge. Psychology, like 
other sciences, seeks for laws or statements of co- 
existence and succession. The relations which it 
thus presents do not resemble the conscious ex- 
periences which they are supposed to represent 
It has often been remarked that psychological 
analysis destroys the capacity for the feeling that is 
studied : it is a curious illustration of the breach 
in this sphere between what is called knowledge 
and its object. It is, of course, true that psy- 
chology has its value, just as the scientific presen- 
tation of any set of facts has its value ; but when 
we wish to know any individual conscious ex- 
perience in its truth, we must use, not the 
method of psychology, but the method of sym- 
pathetic imitation. 

We have, then, in this study of the relations of 
mind and brain, an important illustration of the 
synthesis of the methods. The illustration is of 
special significance, for the relations are among the 
most important facts to which the methods can be 






SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 259 

applied ; moreover, when man " knows himself " he 
will be on the way to a knowledge of nature. 

27. Before this investigation into the function 
of each method of knowledge is concluded, there 
is a question of vital importance to be considered. 
The attempt has been made in this criticism of 
categories to discredit them as cognitive factors. 
But, nevertheless, they seem essential to the ap- 
plication of the method of sympathetic imitation. 
They seem to be not merely instruments to be used 
for a truer kind of cognition than they in them- 
selves afford, but to be inseparable elements of the 
cognition for which the claim of truth is here made. 
Thus, it is said that the man who knows another 
by sympathy has a conscious experience like the 
experience of that other. Here the category of 
quantity is employed : the subject and object are 
numerically distinct. The category of similarity 
is also employed. Would not the sympathy col- 
lapse were these categories denied it? It may 
further be objected that we cannot reason without 
the categories : the attempt to overthrow them is 
made in the strength of them. 

It is true that, in the exercise of sympathy, use 
is made of the categories. Yet it does not follow 
that they enter into that which is the peculiar act 
of sympathy. Rather must it be said that to that 



260 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

act they are irrelevant. They may precede, or 
follow, or even accompany, the sympathy ; but 
they are present as reflections on it and the condi- 
tions in which it occurs ; they are present as in- 
tegral parts of it only in those special cases in which 
they appear, not as universals, but as mental facts 
among other mental facts. Thus, when we turn to 
consider the sympathy, and say that in it there is 
one mental experience similar to another mental 
experience, we are treating it according to scien- 
tific methods. It can readily be seen that our 
every-day reflections on it belong to the same order 
of thought. But such categories as similarity and 
number do not represent, save in a symbolic way, 
objective relations. Sympathy transcends catego- 
ries. It cannot be described in terms of them. 
The truth which it gives can be described only in 
its terms. We must not confound the account of 
sympathy which psychology gives with the truth 
which the act of sympathy gives. 

Again, it is true that we use the categories for 
their overthrow. Yet this may be a legitimate 
process. While concepts and categories are use- 
ful for all reasoning, they are useful as algebra is 
useful. When we finally compare the algebraic 
symbols and processes with the realities for which 
they stand, their symbolic character is apparent. 



SYNTHESIS OF THE METHODS 26 1 

So, while concepts are serviceable, it is yet found 
when they are compared with the reality, that they 
are not the counterpart of that reality. It may 
be extremely convenient to count things, yet it does 
not follow that number is an objective entity. It 
may also be convenient to say that one thing is like 
another, though one might refuse to believe that 
likeness, as we think it, is something subsisting 
objectively as a relation between things. So con- 
cepts may by their usefulness in reasoning conduct 
us to a view of things by which it is seen that they 
are not the counterpart of reality. 

28. We can conceive, as Kant says, an intelli- 
gence for which concepts are not necessary : the 
whole universe is present to it as it actually is in 
its concreteness. For us concepts are necessary 
because of our finitude: We cannot have the total- 
ity of the universe present in one state of con- 
sciousness. We know fragments of the universe. 
Experience is narrow ; and it comes to us as a 
stream. Therefore we require " discursive" con- 
cepts ; in them we have threads to guide us among 
the multitude of phenomena which form the larger 
experience of the universe. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 

1. Is the method of knowledge which has been 
expounded an unfailing one ? Is it, as a matter of 
fact, possible by its means to gain a knowledge even 
of our fellow-men? How much of the universe 
beyond man will become so friendly to us that it 
will tell us its secret? Is sympathy the magic by 
which man can understand, not only the song of the 
birds, but also the music of wind and waters, and 
can penetrate the mystery of sun, and stars, and 
those other material masses which have no speech 
nor language ? 

2. In the consideration of the limits of know- 
ledge, it is important at the outset to deal with 
certain views of the possibility of knowledge. First 
of all, there is the view of idealists such as Hegel, 
who teaches that the mind possesses universals or 
categories, and that, therefore, since the world is 
made up of such universals, the mind has absolute 
knowledge. This theory of the place to be assigned 
to universals is not to be sustained. Their presence 



THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 263 

in the mind is not knowledge of the Absolute, any 
more than the presence of any conscious state is 
such knowledge. They have their importance in 
relation to a mind which is incapable of universal 
knowledge. To an " intuitive understanding " they 
are particular mental states among other particular 
states. The possibility of a knowledge of the uni- 
verse is, therefore, not to be demonstrated by the 
mind's possession of so-called universals. 

3. But dogmatic agnosticism still more than 
absolute idealism has been characteristic of modern 
times. Agnostics maintain that, after all the possi- 
bilities of human knowledge have been exhausted, 
there must remain something absolutely unap- 
proachable by the human faculties. 

4. Kant's doctrine of an unknowable thing in 
itself was referred to in the preceding chapter. 
While it was shown that the distinction between 
phenomena and things in themselves is a legitimate 
one within the sphere of the knowable, the question 
was left unanswered, whether there may not be out- 
side of the knowable an unknowable reality. 

It is interesting to observe how Kant's view of 
knowledge as synthetic coheres with his agnosticism. 
Sense-data are furnished us, but it is not the func- 
tion of thought or judgment to interpret them ; 
it can only conjoin or synthetize them. It is 



264 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 






only necessary to recall what has already been 
pointed out, that this is not a correct psychological 
account of the judgment ; for, while the judgment 
is a synthesis of ideas, the predicate is not merely 
joined to the subject, but is given as its truth or 
meaning. 

To estimate fully the value of Kant's agnosticism, 
it is important to see the root from which it springs. 
It seems to come from his treatment of the thing in 
itself. This thing is not a mere blank. It is a 
thing. It is, moreover, in some way the cause of 
phenomena, or their ground. Kant says that our 
intuition consists of the mode in which we are 
affected by objects ; that is, the object acts upon the 
Ego, and starts the Ego's sensuous activity. It can 
thus be seen that the thing in itself has the marks 
of substance. It is only natural that Kant should 
add that this substrate of phenomena is unknowable. 
Not that Kant would allow the thing in itself to be 
named by the name substance ; he expressly de- 
clares that it is not to be thought as substance. But 
when Kant makes this declaration his agnosticism 
tends to disappear. On the other hand, men are in- 
fluenced by principles which, if recognized, would 
be repudiated by them ; and when Kant speaks of the 
thing in itself as a real existence, he seems to have 
recourse to the familiar idea of substance. 



THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 265 

The agnosticism of substance, however, is spu- 
rious ; it is that of vagueness and lack of analysis. 
Substance is an image which lends itself less readily 
than some other images to the methods of scientific 
thinking. But there is ultimately nothing unknow- 
able about it more than about other images. But, 
even if Kant has allowed the thing in itself to 
assume the characteristics of substance, are we 
therefore to deny that there is an unknowable some- 
thing ? Is Kant not justified in keeping in view a 
reality of whose inner being we can in no way form 
a conception ? It is to be said in answer to this that 
the dogmatic form in which Kant presented his 
agnosticism must be renounced. When we speak 
of a "thing," even though we say it is unknowable, 
we are using a mental conception, and thus bringing 
it into the area of knowledge. The conception of 
substance, with all other similar conceptions, must 
be renounced, if the unknowability of things is 
to be maintained. For these are interpretative or 
imitative ideas, and to apply them is, at least, to 
claim knowledge. We cannot speak of unknowable 
things. 

5. There are other representations of agnosti- 
cism, which demand consideration. Mr. Herbert 
Spencer has given a number of arguments to show 
that we cannot know the Absolute. He reasons 



266 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

that such knowledge is for us unattainable, because 
in our knowledge subject and object are related to 
each other ; it is impossible to know in such rela- 
tions the absolute, which exists out of all relations. 
But, as we have seen, knowledge is not to be con- 
strued as a relation in which subject and object 
merely affect each other. It is the function of 
knowledge to equate itself with its object. As we 
have already seen, we may know a man as phenom- 
enon, or we may know him as he is for himself. 
This life of his is a series of facts, and in knowing 
them as they are we have a knowledge of the abso- 
lute reality. It might be objected that subject and 
object are still kept distinct. To this it may be 
answered that, if they are distinct, they yet have 
this peculiar relation, that the states of the one form 
a copy of the states of the other. At the same time, 
it must be admitted that we cannot go beyond this 
principle in claiming knowledge of other things. 
For, while the temptation to resort, in the explana- 
tion of all knowledge, to the doctrine that subject 
and object are identical has presented itself to phi- 
losophers, we are not entitled to assert this identity 
of subject and object in the knowledge of one indi- 
vidual by another. Nor may we assert it, even 
though it is true that numerical distinctness is a 
symbolical idea. 



THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 267 

Again, Mr. Spencer says that we cannot know 
the absolute because to know anything is to 
class it ; thus the absolute, which cannot be put 
in a class, cannot be known. In a similar argu- 
ment it is contended that, as we know things by 
stating relations of likeness, the absolute, as it 
cannot be said to be like anything, cannot be 
known. In regard to these arguments it may 
be pointed out that the real objection to the at- 
tempt to know by concepts is, that we cannot by 
this method know the absolute, unless the ab- 
solute is made of concepts. Mr. Spencer comes 
near a recognition of this fact when he finds 
further support for agnosticism in the essential 
nature of living organisms. Life is defined by 
him as the adjustment of internal relations to ex- 
ternal relations. But, he proceeds, the perception 
of relations is not the perception of the things 
themselves. We need not accept his definition of 
life to acknowledge the value of this criticism of 
relations. But Mr. Spencer has not considered all 
the possible methods of knowledge. 

It may be added that Mr. Spencer also is 
guilty of the fallacy of predicating various cate- 
gories of the absolute which he has pronounced 
unknowable. 

6. Another form of agnosticism, if it may be 



268 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

so designated, is that presented by the positivist, 
who abstains from all dogma regarding meta- 
physical entities, and contents himself with simply 
considering phenomena as they can be stated in 
terms of coexistence and succession ; that is, in 
terms of space and time. His procedure is right 
in so far as it keeps close to facts of experience ; 
yet his fear of metaphysical entities might have 
led him to look with suspicion on space and time. 
Instead, he uses these coucepts in such a dogmatic 
way that he feels absolved from the necessity of 
seeking for any truth beyond them ; and thus 
they become a screen to hide from him the truths 
that are ready to disclose themselves. 

7. A dogmatic agnosticism which declares that 
there is an absolute being beyond the reach of 
knowledge has been found to be unjustifiable. 
The agnosticism is also unjustifiable which simply 
renounces the right to go beyond phenomena. 
On the other hand, a certain form of agnos- 
ticism may be legitimate. If we restrict our- 
selves to phenomena, we may find that, while 
some can be interpreted, there are others which 
cannot be made to yield a meaning. The sense- 
datum is present, but what it signifies may be 
for the present unknowable. Dogmatism as to 
the knowability or unknowability of the universe 



THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 269 

is out of place. The universe presents itself 
primarily as a universe of concrete phenomena; 
whether any one of these admits of interpre- 
tation, is to be determined by experience. 

We are thus brought to the practical question, 
whether experience justifies the idea that the 
world may be known. Are there practical diffi- 
culties in the way of this knowledge ? A long 
series of such presents itself. 

8. The first to be noted is the consideration 
that any part of a whole is not, when taken by 
itself, the same as it is when regarded in view 
of the whole. A letter taken by itself has one 
appearance; it changes its looks when seen as part 
of a word ; a word seems to change when it be- 
comes part of a sentence. This earth, so big and 
important, becomes, from another point of view, a 
very small star in the multitude of the heavenly 
host. It may even be, some think, that evil, 
when seen in the light of the whole, will seem 
part of a greater good ; the discords will seem to 
contribute to a finer music: Therefore, if the 
mind should think to enter into any experience 
by the exercise of sympathetic imitation, and thus 
to know it, it would find that it had been taking 
a part out of its relation to the whole : for an in- 
telligence capable of taking into its grasp a mul- 



270 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

titude of other facts, that original part would 
have a different character ; and thus what 
seemed to be knowledge would, because of the 
flnitude of the percipient, prove to be illusory. 

There is a certain amount of truth in such state- 
ments. If two things are brought near each other, 
they suffer change. If the mind is occupied with 
one experience, and other ideas come in, there re- 
sults a complex mental state in which all the parts 
are modified ; and, if the first conscious state is an 
act of cognition, the coming in of other ideas will 
modify the cognition. But, on the other hand, it 
is to be remembered that the object to be known 
does not of necessity change : it exists as a definite 
fact, and it is to be known as it actually is. And 
this fact must be regarded as knowable in the sense 
that it can be reproduced. Theoretically speaking, 
a man can know his neighbour's experience. Now," 
should he, while he is reproducing his neighbour's 
experience, allow other ideas to enter his mind, such 
as thoughts of his neighbour's relations to his 
family and his country, his imitation or repro- 
duction of the experience may be profoundly 
modified. But it would not thereby be brought 
nearer truth : the modification would make for 
falsehood. An infinite intuition, we may suppose, 
would realize the man's experience just as it is 



THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 271 

realized by the man himself, and that realization 
would not be changed by the presence of other 
conscious experiences. While, therefore, the man's 
experience is influenced by everything in the uni- 
verse, it is a concrete existence to be known in 
itself ; and there is a sense in which that know- 
ledge in the finite knower's mind is not improved, 
but spoiled, by the introduction of other ideas. 

9. But further doubts must arise as to the possi- 
bility of reproducing in the consciousness of one 
individual the concrete experience of another. 
How is it possible for a man to know another in- 
dividual, since in the contemplation of that other 
he gets only his own experiences ? If he has sensa- 
tions of sight and sound and touch which render 
him aware, on the ordinary interpretation of them, 
of the other's existence, he has yet in these sensa- 
tions only his own conscious states. Moreover, if 
he exercises his imitative faculty, and enters into 
sympathy with another, he has still, in what seems 
to be a sympathetic copy of the other's experience, 
only his own conscious states. The individual 
cannot step out of himself ; and the limits of his 
individuality seem to render futile his efforts after 
knowledge. It brings the difficulty into yet clearer 
light if it is asked, whether the individual is en- 
titled to say that there are other individuals besides 



272 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

himself, since for him they are simply states of his 
own consciousness. 

The last question may be referred to first, yet 
need not detain us. It must be admitted that, so 
soon as the individual attempts to pass beyond his 
own states, he is in the realm of the hypothetical. 
He knows that other individuals like himself exist, 
only by a process of association and inference ; and 
this process can make no claim to be infallible. 

It must further be admitted that the individual's 
cognition of another consists of his own states. 
But let it not be concluded from this that all his 
mental states are equally without value as instru- 
ments of cognition. Some of them bear no resem- 
blance to the experience which is the object of 
contemplation, while others are copies or repro- 
ductions of it. It is a matter of great moment 
to gain this resemblance, even though the original 
and its copy remain distinct entities. 

10. But the practical difficulties in the way of 
knowledge are not yet finally disposed of. Prelim- 
inary to sympathetic imitation of an object there 
must be, as we have seen, perception of its phe- 
nomenal aspects. But to know anything in its 
phenomenal aspects is a task of unlimited magni- 
tude. The knowledge of its constitution increases 
in minuteness of analysis, until there is suggested 






THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 273 

an illimitable amount of detail, beyond all the 
power of the mind to conceive. Let the conscious 
experience of an individual man be the object of 
investigation. We look first on his outward appear- 
ance ; but how deceptive this appearance is, there 
is little need to demonstrate. We must penetrate 
beyond skin and nerve-fibre to the cells of the 
brain : could we understand the phenomena of the 
brain, and reach their mental correlates, we should 
perceive what the man is. But what a task is thus 
set ! Even were the difficulties in the way of see- 
ing the brain overcome, it seems impossible to em- 
brace in one intuition the details to be observed. 
The nerve-cells are counted by millions ; they enter 
into endlessly varied combinations ; many of them 
must cooperate to one result. But, further, the 
cell is not simple : it has a complex molecular con- 
stitution. And since the quality of the mental 
experience changes with the condition of the nerve- 
cells, their state of nutrition, and the extent and 
source of their agitation, it is necessary to have in 
view this molecular constitution and the changes 
that it undergoes when exposed to various influ- 
ences. It can thus be seen that the problem, even 
in its simpler forms, is one of infinite complexity. 
There is the same difficulty when the individual 
wishes to know his own past. It is clear that, to 



274 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

have the same experience, he must restore his brain 
to the condition in which it was when he originally 
had the experience. To do this, he has a task of 
inconceivable delicacy. That it is hard for the 
memory even to approximate to the truth, is shown 
by the illusions that beset it. The pictures of mem- 
ory, as "Wordsworth observes, have fairer hues than 
belonged to the original experience ; the spectres it 
hides become more awful. A man's autobiography 
is Wahrheit; it is, at the same time, Bichtung. 

It is impossible to deal with this difficulty in a 
completely satisfactory way, since some of the prob- 
lems involved must be left indeterminate. While it 
is possible to carry analysis to infinity, it is not 
decided how this analysis bears upon the conscious 
correlate. It is interesting in this connection to 
notice the problem raised by Weber's law. It is 
not, according to this law, every addition to the 
stimulus that produces a perceptible difference in 
the sensation. This may mean that there may be 
an addition to the stimulus, while yet the sensation 
remains utterly unchanged ; or it may mean that 
there actually is a change, which yet is not sufficient 
to call up and associate with itself the gross idea of 
difference. On the former view of its meaning the 
task of interpreting the brain might seem in a 
measure simplified ; for, whatever may be decided 



THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 275 

as to the ultimate correlation of the physical and 
psychical series, it would yet be maintained that, 
for our human psychical experience, variations 
within limits of considerable extent in the physical 
series would have no corresponding variation in the 
psychical series ; on the latter view, there would be 
no such simplification; and, moreover, the task of 
determining the mental correlate would be one of 
much greater complexity, inasmuch as we would 
be unable to apply the familiar symbol of difference 
to those variations which really existed, but were 
not such as to elicit this category. 

Yet, while it must be acknowledged that there 
are very great difficulties in the way of applying the 
method of sympathetic imitation, it should be ob- 
served that large part of the difficulty must be felt 
equally by science. For large part of the difficulty 
is in determining the phenomenal aspect of things. 
Science claims that it is dealing with facts. But, to 
give facts, it must not be content to furnish general 
laws. It must present the concrete facts in their 
concrete details. If the labour seems infinite, it is 
at such cost that we are to know "facts." The 
problem, therefore, of becoming acquainted with 
the phenomena of a brain, in their complexity of 
actual condition and variation, is one which must 
be faced by the physiologist. 



276 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

11. It must be said, finally, that it is necessary 
to distinguish between a method and its perfect 
application. The method of truth may be known, 
though perfect truth may not be reached. To the 
acknowledgment that truth is still an ideal, all 
advocacy of whatever method must probably come. 
Knowledge or truth may be what Kant called a 
regulative idea. Yet, nevertheless, it is essential 
to know the right method of truth-seeking. And 
we have seen that on the way of abstractions we are 
going from knowledge, whereas on the way of sym- 
pathetic imitation we are approaching it. And, 
moreover, there is a sense in which we enjoy know- 
ledge, even though full fruition is not ours. If 
knowledge is a copying of the reality, the copy does 
not altogether lose its value because it is imperfect. 
And especially is he who draws the outline of the 
object he is set to copy as it actually presents itself 
to be considered near the truth, rather than he who 
thinks to present it by a series of signs, such as the 
arbitrary symbols of algebra. By the one method 
of knowledge we approach the abodes of the living ; 
and though we may never completely know them, 
we are in their presence, and feel the glow of their 
life ; by the other we are led away to what is illu- 
sory and unreal — to the realm of phantasms. 

12. We are now in a position to determine in a 



THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 277 

general way, how far the method may be applied to 
the various orders of being. A man can sympathize 
most completely with his fellow-men ; and, in the 
circle of humanity, most completely with those of 
his own household, and his own age and interests. 
The youth does not sympathize with the old man ; 
and the old man has difficulty in sympathizing with 
the child. The Anglo-Saxon is little able to under- 
stand the Oriental races. The more diverse the 
physical and mental character, the less possible is 
that common life in which sympathy consists. 

This diversity is still more evident, and the 
barriers to sympathy are seen to be greater, when 
we compare man with the lower animals. It is 
interesting to observe the claim of Keats that the 
poet is able to overpass this barrier. He says that 
the poet is not only a man " who with a man is an 
equal," but is also a man 

" Who with a bird, 
Wren or eagle, finds his way to 
All its instincts ; he hath heard 
The lion's roaring, and can tell 
What his horny throat expresseth, 
And to him the tiger's yell 
Comes articulate, and presseth 
On his ear like mother tongue." 

It is evident that poetry, through one of its most 
poetical representatives, claims to have, in the case 



278 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 






of the lower animals, that knowledge which has been 
called true knowledge, and for illustration of which 
we have turned chiefly to the relations of human 
beings. And it is further to be said that there is 
no theoretical impossibility in such an extension of 
sympathetic knowledge as that spoken of. The 
animals are our kindred, and there are many parts 
of our experiences which probably resemble theirs, 
even as the human nervous system bears so striking 
a resemblance to theirs. It is, however, to be 
noticed that Keats takes his illustrations from the 
higher animals ; the bird and the feline belong to 
the vertebrates, to which division of the animal 
kingdom man also belongs. When we descend to 
animals whose organs of sense differ widely from 
ours, we may well feel that they have sense-expe- 
riences to which we are strangers. It seems neces- 
sary, before the questions raised can be answered, 
that there should be an extension of the sciences of 
comparative anatomy and comparative physiology. 
It is surely by a comparison of the structure of the 
bodies, and especially of the nervous systems, of 
man and the other animals, that we shall come to 
a comparison of their conscious lives. 

13. Another problem that may be referred to here 
concerns our knowledge of our own bodies. The 
greater part of the body is, in its absolute being, 



THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 279 

utterly unknown to us. Consciousness is associated 
with a part of the nervous system. If our sentience 
constitutes the inner being of this portion of the 
nervous system, as some think, we may be said to 
know it in its truth ; but the rest of the body re- 
mains strange to us. It works for us, but keeps its 
secret. It may be, indeed, that every cell in the 
body has a sentient life of its own. Such a hy- 
pothesis is to be tested by finding the molecular 
constitution of the nerve-cells which is the correlate 
of sentience ; and while its absence would not prove 
conclusively the absence of consciousness, its pres- 
ence in other parts of the body would be strong 
evidence in support of the view that they are 
sentient. Were the existence of such sentience 
regarded as probable, it would remain to be asked, 
how far it could be rendered in terms of our con- 
scious life ; that is, how far it could be known 
by us. 

14. The inorganic world seems, at first, a sealed 
book. Sun and star, mountain and sea, — the mys- 
tery of their being seems hopelessly dark. Yet the 
theory that matter is not dead, but sentient, is one 
which has often been held. It was the view of 
Leibnitz that matter, while having an independent 
existence, is constituted by thought, albeit thought 
in a swoon-like condition. Clifford thought of the 



280 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 



sen 1 



universe as made of mind-dust. Professor Paulsen 
writes thus : " Ultimately the same forces act in 
inorganic as well as in organic bodies, only in the 
latter they appear in extremely peculiar and intri- 
cate combinations. . . . When the excitation of 
the auditory nerve causes an animal to start up, the 
act is as much the mechanical effect of purely 
physical causes as when a billiard ball in motion 
sets another in motion by impact. If, now, the 
movements are accompanied by sensations in the 
one case, no reason can be seen why they should 
not be in the other." Again: 2 "The corporeal 
world is phenomenal ; that which appears in it is 
something akin to our own inner life." Poetry 
also has lent its sanction to this interpretation 
of inorganic nature. The lyrics in which nature 
is called upon to weep or to rejoice may only in 
an indirect way express this view of nature ; but 
there is other poetry which is inspired by the intui- 
tion of a spiritual essence in nature. Wordsworth, 
the great nature-poet, has made it his song that : — 

" To every form of being is assigned 
An active principle : — howe'er removed 
From sense and observation, it subsists 
In all things, in all natures, in the stars 

1 Introduction to Philosophy, translated by F. Thilly, p. 104. 

2 Ibid., p. 111. 



THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 281 

Of azure heaven, the unenduring clouds, 
In flower and tree, in every pebbly stone 
That paves the brooks, the stationary rocks, 
The moving waters, and the invisible air . . . 
Spirit that knows no insulated spot, 
No chasm, no solitude ; from link to link 
It circulates, the Soul of all the worlds." 

It must be acknowledged that all this is stated in 
language that is of the most general, or even vague, 
kind. Yet it suggests the possibility that some day 
the vague and general may give place to what is 
more definite. But much labour of observation and 
comparison must be accomplished before men can 
read the book of inorganic nature. 

15. We have found that knowledge of other 
things is confined at present within narrow limits. 
It may be that it will always be limited as it is now. 
Yet it is also to be remembered that, if men desire 
to exercise the faculty of sympathy, they will find 
the power to do so increasing. In the evolution of 
the individual, and in the evolution of the race, 
faculties develop according to the premium set upon 
them. This principle bears more or less directly on 
the development of imitation and sympathy. Yet to 
say how far the evolution will reach, is at present 
impossible. 



CHAPTER XII 

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 






1. There is now to be considered the problem, 
which has been so long awaiting us, of the know- 
ledge which the self has of itself. The expo- 
sition of the method of knowledge that has 
been advocated has had reference to the know- 
ledge by an individual of other individuals. This 
method might, indeed, be applied also in the effort 
which the individual makes to gain knowledge of 
his past : that past which has become separated 
from him must, to be known, be reproduced as it 
was actually at first experienced, and may thus be 
said to be known in a sympathetic way. But 
there is a knowledge which the self has of 
itself in every conscious state, and the nature of 
this self-knowledge must be determined. 

2. It may be said that there is in self-conscious- 
ness the distinction of the self from the not-self, 
and that there is a cognition of the self through 
this idea of it as a particular entity. In view 
of such opinions, it is necessary to consider the 

282 



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 283 

place of this self-idea and its significance when it 
occurs. An analysis of experience shows that it 
is not found in all the phases of the conscious 
life, and that when present it is not in the true 
sense self-knowledge or self-consciousness. 

3. It is not found in the beginning of conscious 
experience. When the world of the child first 
emerges into being, it consists of sensation or 
feeling, with little or no differentiation in it. It 
is difficult to realize the infant's experience ; yet 
it is safe to assert that the infant does not char- 
acterize its sensations as objects, and does not 
distinguish itself as subject from a world of ob- 
jects. 

" The baby new to earth and sky .... 
Has never thought that ' this is I.' " 

There is, therefore, one stage in the conscious ex- 
perience of human beings at which the distinction 
of the self from other things, and the awareness of 
it as such, do not present themselves. 

4. Another stage in mental development is 
reached when the child knows itself as distinct 
from other things. The ground of this dis- 
tinction, as we saw when the genesis of the 
category of substance was under consideration, 
is the recognition by the individual of the 
spatial distinctness of his body. With this spatial 



284 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

width are associated the feelings which are desig- 
nated the "somatic consciousness." We thus get 
the core of the idea of the self, alike in the mind 
of the child and in the mind of the more mature. 

Round this central idea are associated those 
which pertain to the individual's activities. These 
do not all, indeed, have reference, in the individual's 
consciousness, to the idea of the self, but very 
many of them have. They are thought of as 
emanating from the actor, and gaining results for 
him. The self thus becomes the centre of activ- 
ities. The idea of the self is therefore present 
when activity refers to personal well-being ; it is 
peculiarly a feature of the life of utility. When 
it is considered how large a place the utilities 
have in conscious experience, it can be seen with 
what constancy the idea of the self must appear. 

5. When, on the other hand, the intellectual 
life is considered, it is found that the feeling or 
idea of the self is not a necessary part of con- 
sciousness. The intellect may, of course, be directed 
to subjects with which this idea is naturally as- 
sociated. But there are many things which have 
no such association, and in proportion as at- 
tention is concentrated on them, the idea of the 
self tends to disappear. Illustrations of this ten- 
dency can be found in sensorial activity. When 



, 



SELF-CONSC/OUSNESS 285 

the vision is absorbed in the colours of a beauti- 
ful sunset, there may not be any distinct thought 
of the self, or any contrast of the self with a 
not-self. The lover of music finds his existence, 
when he is listening to the orchestra, to consist 
in sounds. Likewise, in the operations of the ab- 
stract intellect there is the same abandonment of 
the self feeling : when the mathematician, for in- 
stance, is occupied with his problem, there may 
be no thought of the self present to his mind. 

In view of all these facts it can be seen that 
there is no warrant for the supposition that there 
is an awareness of the self as separate subject in 
all the conscious activities of the mind. 1 

6. For the analysis of the idea of the self 
shows us that it is a particular idea among other 
particular ideas. Even when the original body- 
consciousness has been enriched by the addition 
of other ideas pertaining to the intellectual or 
moral or religious life, the idea of the self thus 
gained still remains a particular idea. And since 
the number of ideas to which attention can be 
given is limited, the entrance of one often means 

1 It may "be here remarked that illusions as to personal identity 
do not arise from intellectual or sympathetic absorption as such ; 
they appear when the self-idea is present and is associated with 
experiences that do not relate to it. 



286 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

the driving out of another, and hence the idea of 
the self may in its turn suffer exclusion. It is 
true, there are some ideas which are very per- 
sistent, and from the nature of the idea of the 
self we may expect it to show this persistency. 
And there is a sense in which it is, save in the 
extreme cases of rapt attention, seldom entirely 
absent from consciousness. Often, however, it is 
not so much the idea of the self that is present 
as that body-consciousness of which the self-idea 
is the resultant. The body-consciousness, since 
the body is always with us, is not readily eclipsed. 
And as these body-feelings are so intimately con- 
nected with the self-idea, there is a sense in 
which the idea may be said to have great per- 
sistency, even when in its rounded, determinate 
form it is not present. 

7. But it may be contended that the idea of the 
self must be present, since to it all experiences are 
referred, and since, moreover, it is only through this 
reference that the conscious life has its unity and 
sense of identity. This reference of conscious experi- 
ences to the self must be admitted to take place very 
frequently, in a more or less direct way. The idea 
of the self is the centre of the conscious life, and it is 
by the association of the various experiences with 
this constant quantity that the continuity of the 



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 287 

soul's life is attained; for, being a part of the mem- 
ory of the past, and also a part of the present experi- 
ence, it is the bond which unifies past and present. 
Yet while all this is to be recognized, it is to be 
noticed that the association may be remote and in- 
direct; and also that, when present, the self -idea may 
not have its complete and developed form: the asso- 
ciation may be with a fragment of the idea, or with 
something that serves for the time as a sign of the 
idea. It is only in this qualified sense that the self- 
idea is to be taken as the centre of reference for our 
experiences. 

8. We come now to the question, whether a 
knowledge of the self is yielded by the self-idea. 
Such knowledge cannot be given by the idea when it 
is absent. Nor is this knowledge given by it when 
it is present. It presents itself as one idea among 
other ideas, and knowledge of it is not knowledge of 
them any more than knowledge of the pen which I 
now see is knowledge of the paper which I also see. 
The idea is usually the product of a fraction of ex- 
perience. And should it not merely represent the 
body-consciousness, but be made to include elements 
of a different character, it still has the limitations of 
the general concept, and fails to mirror the soul's 
life. We cannot by it gain knowledge of the self, 
when by the self is meant the actual experiences of 



288 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

consciousness. If the self has a knowledge of itself 
in every conscious state, it is not by this idea that 
such knowledge is to be attained. 

9. It is scarcely necessary to do more than refer 
here to the transcendentalist's view that the self is 
not to be regarded as something apart from the 
soul's experiences, but as given in these experiences, 
being the one in the many. The doctrine is of value 
in so far as it calls attention to the concrete, whether 
we call it " many " or not. Its weakness is in its doc- 
trine of the one. The one is a category, determined 
to be, say, reason; it is then regarded as realized in 
the manifold actual experiences. The illusion of the 
one in the many need not be again exposed; nor 
need it be again demonstrated that it is not by the 
employment of such categories that knowledge of 
the self is to be attained. 

10. Yet it may seem that in knowledge there must 
be the antithesis of object and subject, and that, there- 
fore, if the self is the concrete manifold of experi- 
ence, it must be copied, if not by a general concept, 
by a cognition which has the manifold for its con- 
tent. Let it be observed, however, that there is not 
in the self-cognition now being considered any 
consciousness of such an antithesis. We do not set 
ourselves over against ourselves in the ordinary 
course of experience. We may observe ourselves 



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 289 

when certain feelings are active in our minds ; but 
such observation is usually little entitled to the 
name knowledge ; besides, even it is exceptional. It 
is not in these rare glimpses that the continuous 
knowledge of the self is to be found. 

There is a further difficulty in the way of such 
knowledge. If the objective experience is to be 
copied, it must be copied by a similar experience. 
But this means that the same faculties are exercised 
in precisely the same way, both in the original 
experience and in its copy : that is, the two collapse 
into one, and the antithesis is rendered impossible. 

Even were this difficulty not insuperable, there is 
another to be encountered. If there is to be a 
knowledge of each conscious state as it is experi- 
enced, this knowledge must be known by a new con- 
scious state, and the new state must be known by yet 
another, and so ad infinitum. It need not be shown 
that the method which involves this infinite progres- 
sion is not the method of the self-knowledge which 
we are seeking to explain. 

11. Is it then an unwarrantable assumption to 
say, that the self knows itself in each conscious 
state? The nature of this self-knowledge and its 
possibility are understood, if we consider the nature 
of any fact of conscious experience. A conscious 
state is essentially knowledge of itself. Its reality is 



290 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

constituted by consciousness, and being a fact of con- 
sciousness, it is felt or known, A sensation is in itself 
an absolute fact, and, being a conscious experience, 
it is in the experience of it known as it is ; thus 
it is self-knowledge. Our feelings exist only as 
feelings ; and as the feelings are, so are they felt ; 
and as they are felt, so they are. All the conscious 
states which constitute the self are known in their 
reality in and through the experience of them. Their 
esse is at once percipere and percipi. In them 
" knowing and being " are identical. Consciousness 
is self-consciousness. 

12. The doctrine of sympathetic imitation lends 
confirmation to this view of self-knowledge. For 
knowledge has shown itself to be a function of every 
conscious state. Each element of the mind is cog- 
nitive in respect to the experience of other individuals : 
it is through its sensations, emotions, volitions, that 
the mind knows the corresponding elements in the 
experience of another. Each one of these elements 
can fulfil this cognitive function because it is by 
its very nature cognitive. If through it we can 
know other things, it is because, first, its being is 
knowing. 

13. It is, therefore, not alone in concepts of the 
self that knowledge of it consists. These have their 
value : the science of psychology has its value and 



SELF-CONSCIO USNESS 29 1 

utility. But, apart from the service they render as 
symbols of the connections obtaining among psychic 
facts, they offer no special cognition of the self. 
They also are conscious facts, and therefore the self 
is known in them ; but they are only a few among 
many such facts. Any sensation, any fancy of the 
imagination, is, as truly as any category or law of 
psychology, a knowledge of the self ; nay, the sensa- 
tion of the amoeba is as truly self-knowledge as the 
category of the philosopher. 

Kant believed that knowledge of things in them- 
selves was possible, not for an understanding that 
used concepts, but for an "intuitive understanding." 
Kant, in claiming for this understanding knowledge 
of things in themselves, failed to see that every con- 
scious experience is a thing in itself. It cannot be 
disposed of as a mere appearance, for an appearance 
cannot be only an appearance ; if it is an appear- 
ance, it is thereby a fact in itself. This series of 
facts of consciousness is known in the conscious 
experience of them. That intuition by which " the 
existence of its object is given" is thus offered in 
every conscious state. We found 1 that an ap- 
proximation to this intuition is made in sympa- 
thetic imitation ; yet we also found that sympathy 
does not constitute, but only copies, the object. We 

l Chapter X, § 18. 



292 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

can now see that the intuition which at once con- 
stitutes the object and knows it is given in every 
state of consciousness as such. 

14. It is in this self-knowledge, in which being 
and knowing are one, that there is to be found such 
justification as can be furnished of that idealism 
which makes the universe consist simply in the 
states or forms of the ego. They are not objects to 
the ego ; they are not more its knowledge than 
its life. It is this self-knowledge which constitutes, 
we may suppose, the knowledge of the absolute 
being, for which there can be no separation of 
subject from object. Nevertheless, it need scarcely 
be recalled, this theory of knowledge breaks down 
when the knowledge of one individual by another 
is to be explained. 

15. It need not be pointed out how absolute is 
this self-knowledge. No agnostic objection, that we 
know only phenomena, avails here. The conscious 
state is a fact, and it is known or felt absolutely 
as it is. It has no being except as it is felt. It 
may seem different when it is examined more 
closely, but that is because it has itself changed 
in the process of analysis. It was felt absolutely 
as it was in the original experience : and the new 
experience is absolutely as it is felt. 

16. It was seen earlier that there is a sense in 



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 293 

which all experience is a knowledge of the self, for 
it all consists of the knower's conscious states. 
Earth and sky and all they contain — these are for 
the knower, in the first instance, his ideas, and thus 
bits of himself. Even his most sympathetic feelings 
are yet his own feelings. 

At the same time we have contemplated the great 
efforts made by the mind to transcend this subjec- 
tivity and reach the world of other things. And 
we are now in a position to see the relation of this 
self-knowledge to that other knowledge. 

That the mental states of the knower are a copy 
of the states of the object, is the conclusion as to 
knowledge which we reached. It will be ob- 
served, however, that the duality of subject and 
object is still to be recognized. Efforts have been 
made to annul the distinction between them, and 
declare their identity to be a fact, or regard it as 
an ideal. The idealistic doctrine which reaches 
their identity by denying the independent existence 
of external objects is familiar. On the other hand, 
the mystics, separating God from the world, and 
regarding it as their ideal to reach absolute unity 
with Him, deny, in substance at least, the absolute 
reality of things. But neither the idealistic nor the 
mystic denial of the reality of individual things or 
persons must be allowed to obscure the fact that 



294 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

the universals for which individuals are sacrificed 
are concepts or abstractions derived empirically 
from observation of these very individuals. It is 
the individual that is real. Knowledge is know- 
ledge by individuals; the problem of knowledge, 
as we saw at the outset, concerns itself first with 
the knowledge of individual human beings by other 
human beings. And when the problem is thus 
presented we can see that one individual is not 
merged in another. If we regard the brain as the 
manifestation or sign of consciousness, we can see 
that the brain of the knower cannot take the place 
of the brain of the person known. Even so, the 
consciousness of the one cannot be lost in the con- 
sciousness of the other. The individual distinctness 
is preserved. Knowledge of the experiences of 
another is a copy of them. 

Not that there is here being asserted any hard 
metaphysical dogma of the unity and continuity of 
the soul's life. We know too little whence our 
experience cometh, and whither it goeth, to assert 
such principles even in a symbolic signification. 
It is simply to be noted that certain phenomena are 
distinct, and remain distinct, notwithstanding their 
parallelism. 

Yet, at the same time, this distinctness is not to 
be characterized as isolation. The isolation is tran- 



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 295 

scended in sympathy. The two souls (to continue 
the use of the symbolic language of number) may 
remain two, yet are they possessed of like thoughts 
and feelings. The one who shows sympathy re- 
mains himself, but his self is now a reproduction 
of the life of another. May it not be said that this 
is the closest unity which we can conceive as exist- 
ing between spirits ? It is not, indeed, annihilation 
of the self ; but such annihilation would be the 
negation of this unity. In sympathy the soul is 
not lost, or annihilated, yet is it at one with the 
object. 

The soul, therefore, cannot lose its flnitude or 
individuality. Yet it transcends this individuality 
by sympathy; for while retaining the limits of 
individuality it yet mirrors the world of other 
individuals. 

It may be appropriate at this point to refer to 
certain statements made by Lotze 1 regarding the 
relation of knowledge to the object. He declares 
that a thing can never be known as it is, but only as 
it appears to the knower. Knowledge is never the 
thing itself, but always consists of ideas about the 
thing. And even, Lotze adds, if one should become 
the object, one would not know the object : to 
become metal would not be to know metal. We can 

1 Logik, § 308. 



296 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

now see how such statements are to be corrected. 
The knowledge of the self does not consist of ideas 
about the self ; every state of consciousness is known 
absolutely in itself. And by imitation we gain a 
knowledge of other things, not as they appear to us, 
but as they are. We do not, indeed, become things, 
but we copy them in their objective constitution. 
It may be added that Lotze's reference to metal is 
fitted to be misleading. It is not too much to say 
that we are absolutely ignorant of the inner being 
of metal. If we say that metal is non-sentient, it 
has no meaning to talk of a man's changing into it. 
If metal is sentient, he who becomes metal knows 
himself absolutely even in this metamorphosed state. 
17. It may be pointed out that there are two ten- 
dencies in the development of the self. The one is 
toward individuality. New sensations, new emo- 
tions,. new ideas of all kinds, are welcomed. All that 
lies in the potency of the soul to think and feel is to 
be realized. On the other hand, there is the ten- 
dency to sympathy, to the assertion of kinship with 
men and things, to the knitting of the world in the 
bonds of unity. It might not inappropriately be 
said that there is in the self the centrifugal and the 
centripetal tendency. Each of these tendencies or 
functions must have scope for itself. It is as they 
are both realized that the fulness of knowledge is 



SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 297 

reached. The life of the self as it is lived for itself 
may be called the lyric of the soul. The perception 
which it has of the life of others is its epic or 
drama. It is in the combination or alternation of 
these that the true music of the soul is uttered. 

18. The complete definition of knowledge with 
which we started may now be recalled. Knowledge 
was said to be the presence in the mind immediately, 
or in copy, of that which constitutes objects. In 
self-knowledge the object is immediately present in 
the mind ; for, in the experiences of the self, knowing 
and being are one. In the knowledge of other per- 
sons and things the object is present in copy ; for 
the individuality of the knower is not lost in the 
individuality of the object, even as the brain of the 
man knowing remains distinct from that of the man 
who is the object of observation. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PEOBLEM 

1. What is the bearing of the theory of know- 
ledge which has been propounded upon the problem 
of philosophy ? It is to be remembered, first of all, 
that epistemology or the science of knowledge is 
a part of philosophy. It does, indeed, cover the 
ground of psychology, in so far as it considers the 
origin and content of the various cognitive factors ; 
but probably all would agree that it is a peculiarly 
philosophical problem to determine how the cogni- 
tive state must be constituted, in order that it may 
represent its object. We have, therefore, been deal- 
ing directly with one of the problems of philosophy. 

2. Further, epistemology is to be regarded as the 
first part or foundation of philosophy. If we wish 
to know the being of things, it is essential that our 
first endeavour should be to decide the question, 
what mental elements are to enter into the cog- 
nition, and what the method of their employment 
is to be. This may seem like a demand that 
we should know before we know ; or, in Hegel's 
language, when he censures Kant for requiring a 

298 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 299 

preliminary criticism of knowledge, it is like the 
requirement that we should learn to swim before 
entering the water. But it can be readily seen that 
in systems of knowledge there is presupposed a 
certain view as to the nature of knowledge. There 
are, for instance, certain assumptions peculiar to the 
unreflecting period of the mind's development ; it is 
then generally assumed that sensations, such as 
those of colour and sound, are the truth of objects. 
On the other hand, in the period of reflection, there 
has been, as we have seen, an almost universal as- 
sumption that the method of concepts is the true 
method of knowledge ; this was the fatal assump- 
tion of Hegel. It is true that a correct theory of 
knowledge is likely to be reached only after many 
attempts have been made ; and in this sense it is 
true that we must proceed with the work of know- 
ledge, in order that experience may eventually dis- 
close to us the true content and the true method 
of knowledge. But it must, nevertheless, be main- 
tained that the true system of knowledge presup- 
poses the conscious, or unconscious, use of the right 
method; and it is surely possible to hasten that con- 
summation by detecting the faults of the methods 
that have been employed, and by showing some of 
the new instruments which are needed that the 
desired result may be attained. 



300 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

The dependence of philosophy upon epistemology 
is likewise made evident by a survey of the history 
of philosophy, from which it is seen how the great 
epochs in philosophy have been associated with 
activity in the study of epistemological questions. 
The belief of Socrates, that knowledge consisted in 
clearly defined concepts, bore fruit in the idealistic 
philosophies of Plato and Aristotle ; Locke's theory 
of knowledge was followed by the metaphysical 
theory of Berkeley ; Kant's reassertion of the value 
of categories was the natural preparation for the 
great German idealistic systems. When it is deter- 
mined what the elements are in which knowledge 
consists, it is natural to construct a system of the 
things which such knowledge can represent. The 
conclusions embodied in such theories may not be 
satisfactory. But the theories bear testimony to 
the influence which a study of the cognitive instru- 
ment exercises upon philosophy. It is, therefore, 
proper to inquire whether the doctrine of knowledge 
which has been expounded helps in the effort to 
state and solve the philosophical problem. 

3. It is the first object of this inquiry to gain as 
clear a view as possible of the function which in the 
course of history has been assigned to philosophy. 
The view adopted as to this function will be illus- 
trated by reference to the chief forms of philo- 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 301 

sophical doctrine ; and these forms of philosophy 
will be criticised from the standpoint of the theory 
of knowledge. 

4. Philosophy is, literally, love of wisdom. The 
wise man is he who can understand his affairs so 
correctly that he can control them to satisfactory 
issues. It was probably this practical knowledge 
which was loved at first by the Greeks, as by the 
Jews. But wisdom came to take a wider range than 
the practical. When men began to meditate upon 
the world, they found delight in contemplation for 
its own sake, and the name " wise man " was given 
to others besides those who were distinctively 
moralists. 

Philosophy or the love of wisdom thus became 
transformed into the love of knowledge. Know- 
ledge was sought wherever it could be found. The 
physical world was studied as well as the mental. 
The early systems of philosophy were to a large 
extent theories about material things : the stars, 
for instance, were a perpetual source of wonder, 
and one thinker after another gave his pathetic 
guess as to their nature. 

5. As knowledge increased, the work of knowing 
the world became too great for one individual. 
Division of the labour was necessary ; and the 
special sciences co.rae to have separate territories. 



302 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

They seem now to be independent of philosophy, or 
even hostile to her. Yet she has not ceased to claim 
their allegiance as their ancient mother and queen. 
While each science has its allotted sphere, and 
brings into order the facts in that sphere, philosophy 
claims that such a science by itself is partial and 
incomplete, and that the works of the sciences must 
be made part of her larger work. This claim on the 
part of philosophy to include science finds recogni- 
tion in the uses to which the name philosophy is 
put. In the expressions, "Philosophical Faculty," 
and "Doctor of Philosophy," the term "philoso- 
phy " refers to the whole circle of the sciences. 
" Natural philosophy " is still used to denote phys- 
ical science. 

In view of the claims which philosophy has made, 
and the work which it has attempted to do, that 
definition of it expresses most clearly the func- 
tion which it has assumed, which represents it as 
the science of the sciences. Science is philosophy 
applied to a particular problem ; philosophy is 
science made universal and complete. If science 
seeks the unity of law in a particular sphere, philos- 
ophy seeks the law of laws. It may not be appar- 
ent how this definition of philosophy covers the 
investigation of such subjects as the existence of 
matter. But it must be remembered that the sig- 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 303 

nification of science has not always been the same. 
Science means at present chiefly an inquiry into 
laws, but it was wont to mean an inquiry into the 
nature of things or substances. When this latter 
point of view is adopted, it is natural to inquire 
what the substance is, and even whether it exists at 
all. The problems of philosophy change as the cate- 
gories which it uses change. Science is affected by 
this change equally with philosophy. At all stages 
at which the sciences are differentiated from philoso- 
phy, it can be seen that philosophy claims to be the 
science of the sciences. 

That this is the true interpretation of philosophi- 
cal claims and methods will be still more clear when 
we consider the chief forms which philosophical 
doctrine has assumed in modern times. 

6. One of the great types of modern philoso- 
phy is presented in materialism. This system of 
thought is not, indeed, peculiarly modern : in one 
form or another it is as old as philosophy. It is, 
however, in modern times that materialism has 
gained its great triumphs. It has had the advocacy 
of such philosophers as Hobbes. It is the creed of 
many scientific men; and it is probably correct to 
say that it is the creed of many more, so far as their 
views of the universe have been systematized, 
though, at the same time, they have admitted into 



304 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

their minds fragments of belief little consistent 
with their scientific doctrines. 

7. This reign of materialism in modern times 
seems to be due to the extension of physical science. 
One of the most striking phenomena in the modern 
intellectual world is this extension of science. 
While metaphysicians may seem open to the charge 
that they are floundering as they have done for two 
thousand years, the labourers in physical science 
have been making sure and steady progress. They 
have pushed farther and farther into chaos, and have 
seldom been obliged to retrace their steps. The 
soil they reclaim is thenceforth fruitful and habit- 
able. And not only have they accomplished much; 
they have a wonderfully clear conception of the 
general character of the work that remains to be 
done. They have come to think of the world as 
made up of atoms and energy, or as ultimately ana- 
lyzable, it may prove, into mere forms of energy; 
and, as the great fundamental doctrines of science 
are the principles of the conservation and trans- 
formation of energy, the task of the sciences is 
prescribed to them. It is to trace the forms of 
this energy and its transformations. The history of 
the physical world is the history of these trans- 
formations; and it is believed that, should new 
phenomena disclose themselves, they will prove to 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 305 

be forms of energy correlated with, or convertible 
into, the forms now familiar. 

8. It is not necessary to illustrate at great 
length the meaning of this doctrine as it applies 
to the inorganic world. It is scarcely too much 
to say that the tendency of science is to reduce 
all forms of energy to mechanical energy. The 
attempt has been made to divest gravitation of 
the mystery which envelops it, by showing, not 
merely that it is convertible into other forces, 
but that in itself it is explained by the impact 
of particles. The distinction between mechanical 
and chemical forces is considered to be a vanish- 
ing one. Thus a remarkable simplification of the 
physical universe is being reached. 

9. It may seem that this account of the uni- 
verse finds the limits of its applicability when 
the phenomena of life present themselves. Yet 
the progress of research has gone to show the 
continuity of such phenomena with those of the 
inorganic world. The beginning of life may be 
in many senses a mystery ; that is, the historical 
conditions in which life first arose have van- 
ished without leaving any record. But of life, as 
it is known to us now, a complete account can 
be given on chemical and mechanical principles : 
there is no process in the body of any plant or 



306 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

animal which cannot be so explained. Life is not, 
on this view, to be regarded as something sepa- 
rate from the material elements, using and con- 
trolling them : it is only a name to indicate the 
peculiarities of this special set of physical phe- 
nomena. The evolution theory is a purely mechani- 
cal theory; the struggle for existence and survival 
of the fittest mean that the machine which fits its 
environment best, and responds best to stimuli, is 
the one that lasts. It is therefore urged that 
nothing in organized bodies can be pointed to 
which contradicts this materialistic theory of the 
universe. 

10. In the* case of human consciousness, ma- 
terialism still follows its own mode of explanation. 
The physiological theory of the mind has many 
facts to support it. The conscious life is found 
to be dependent on the brain. The kind of con- 
sciousness depends on the portion of the brain 
called into exercise. When the activity of the 
brain is suspended, consciousness ceases. Like- 
wise, the retention of experiences in the memory 
is a physiological process ; the retention of im- 
pressions made on the brain-cells is memory ; the 
particular memory-function known as recall means 
the renewal of the activity of the cell which was 
modified by the original impression. From all 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 307 

this it seems natural to infer that thought is an 
effect of which the brain is the cause. It may 
therefore be said that the brain secretes thought 
as the liver secretes bile ; or the more careful ex- 
pressions of Buchner may be preferred, when he 
teaches that thinking is a mode of motion charac- 
teristic of the substance of the central nervous ele- 
ments, as the motion of light is of the universal 
ether. 

When this conception is gained, the appeal to man's 
freedom and sense of responsibility has little weight. 
The proofs that all human actions are subject to law 
are many and strong. The materialist can, in regard 
to this subject, claim the support of very many who 
differ from him in other articles of their creed. 

11. Materialism thus can be seen to make the 
attempt to offer a science of the sciences. It intro- 
duces into all the spheres of existence the unity of 
mechanical conceptions. 

12. Many criticisms suggest themselves, but at- 
tention may be restricted to those which arise from 
the special theory of knowledge that is now before 
us. In the first place, this philosophy is made up 
of general concepts. But we have seen that know- 
ledge, to be true, must be of the concrete. This 
philosophy, therefore, fails of the truth. Let any 
one compare its concepts with his actual experiences, 



308 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

and he will see how little it is fitted to give an ade- 
quate copy of the reality. Again, if knowledge is 
gained by sympathetic imitation, we cannot know 
matter at all, except as it is given in thought. 
Ideas, as Berkeley said, can only be like ideas. 
But, according to the materialist, thought is a mode 
of motion peculiar to the special combination of 
elements found in the brain. The other modes of 
motion and forms of matter cannot be known by 
this. If they can be known, it must be because they 
resemble thought. But if we adopt this point of 
view, we no longer regard matter as a substance, 
independent of thought, which has thought for one 
of its " accidents " ; we are forsaking the position 
of the materialist, and are becoming idealists. 
Materialism thus suffers from a fatal contradiction ; 
if it postulates a matter which is unlike thought, 
it is postulating something which, from the condi- 
tions of knowledge, is absolutely unknowable, and 
about which, therefore, it is impossible to make any 
statements whatever. 

13. Dualism is another form of philosophical 
doctrine. It was the doctrine of Descartes and 
Reid ; in a more or less vague form it is a very 
widespread belief. According to it, there are two 
substances, or forms of being. Matter and mind 
both exist. Science thus has two spheres : the 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 309 

science of the sciences does not reach absolute unity. 
It is not necessary to offer a lengthened criticism of 
dualism. In so far as it maintains the existence 
of material substances, it is asserting the existence 
of something intrinsically different from mind, 
which yet, in being known by mind, is found to 
be like mind ; it thus contains a contradiction 
similar to that which we found in materialism. 
On the other hand, in so far as it deals with the 
facts of the spirit, it is akin to idealism, and may 
be treated under that head. It may be added that, 
while a thorough-going dualism is a possible doc- 
trine, dualism is generally not thorough-going. 
Generally matter is referred for its origin to a 
supreme being that has the properties of spirit. 
Thus, dualism is usually an implicit idealism. 

14. Idealism is the fruit of reflection upon our 
ideas. It examines the conception of matter, and 
finds that it is due to the feelings of different senses, 
which have been elaborated and compounded, and 
also in part, it may be thought, to conceptions born 
within the mind. Material substance is thus, in the 
first instance, a cluster of mental states. The atom, 
of which the materialist makes so much, is a nest of 
conscious feelings that have been ejected into space. 
Likewise, the other categories of materialism, space, 
time, energy, are, in the nature of the case, mental 



310 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

facts. The idealist does not deny or ignore any fact 
to which science can point ; but he yet finds that 
in knowledge the knower does not escape from the 
circle of his ideas. If he comes to recognize an 
objective system independent of his experience, he 
yet holds that that system is constituted by ideas 
like his own. 

15. Idealism as a science may take more or less 
developed forms. Its attempt to state the ultimate 
law obtaining in the multiplicity of mental facts 
may consist merely in the assertion of their common 
character as ideal. The groupings of phenomena 
which the sciences have effected may be accepted, 
but no further connection may be seen between 
these groups than the possession of this common 
quality. Berkeley and some empiricists present an 
idealism of this undeveloped kind. 

16. Idealism may, however, advance to a system 
in which the relation of the various thoughts or 
ideas is presented. The philosophy of Hegel offers 
the completest form of this more elaborate idealism, 
and may be considered in illustration of it. Hegel 
regards the doctrine that the world exists for, and 
in, thought, as only the beginning of philosophy; 
the law of thought must be found, and the motions 
of thought must be traced. Thought is essentially 
knowledge, and the object of this knowledge is 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 31 1 

thought itself. The Absolute is subject ; it is a sub- 
ject which has itself for its object, the object being 
given in the thought of the subject ; in other words, 
the absolute is self-consciousness. But the absolute 
does not know itself immediately; this knowledge 
must be mediated, or given through a process. The 
significance of the process is that it is constituted by 
a series of attempts on the part of the absolute to think 
or know or define itself. Each definition is tried, and, 
as it is found wanting, a truer definition takes its 
place. These definitions do not come at haphazard ; 
the process of thought has a beginning, and it has 
a climax. The first definition is being ; in knowing 
itself the absolute first thinks this of itself. This 
thought is the first, because it is the barest and 
emptiest ; it is " immediate " ; or, it is not due to 
any preceding activity on the part of thought. But 
this thought is not an adequate representation of the 
absolute. Being is too poor a category to apply to 
God. Whatever truth there is in it will be found 
preserved in higher categories ; it, in its first crude 
form, is discarded, or is retained only as the medi- 
ator of something better. Other categories appear 
to take its place. The absolute thinks itself as a 
world of determinate qualities, such as colours and 
sounds ; again, it thinks itself as substance ; again, 
as a causal series ; finally, it reaches the true, ade- 



312 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

quate idea of itself when it knows itself as the sub- 
ject that in its object meets only with itself. 

Further, this process from one category to another 
is logically necessary. Each imperfect definition 
contains in it a contradiction ; we must think with 
it something that negates it. Thus, to think being 
is also to think nothing. To think determinate 
being is to think other determinate beings which 
limit or negate it. In the highest category, that of 
spirit, the contradiction is harmonized, for in self- 
consciousness the self and its other, or subject and 
object, are identical. It is thus that spirit proves 
itself the necessary climax of this logical evolu- 
tion. 

It is not to be forgotten, if we would do full 
justice to Hegel, that this system of categories is 
actual only in concrete human experience. Our 
experience is the thought of the absolute. Our 
observation of the world is not that of spectators of 
the absolute; it is the self -cognition of the absolute. 
When we think of the world as full of sights and 
sounds, and pleasures and pains, it is the absolute 
that is thinking so of itself. When we think of the 
world as a causal series, the absolute is defining 
itself in our category. When we reach the defi- 
nition of the absolute in a true philosophy, the 
absolute has become self-conscious. 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 313 

It can be seen that this system allows the amplest 
room for the particular sciences. The sciences are 
the developments of the lower categories. If we 
try, for instance, to know the absolute through 
the category of causality, we may follow out the 
conception in an indefinitely prolonged series. The 
conception is a distorted medium through which to 
look upon the absolute, but if we wish to remain 
constant to this category, it is in one sense possible 
for us to adhere to it. At the same time, there is 
no final logical rest in this category. 

Thus, this system of idealism takes all our ideas, 
those that are unreflecting, and those that are of a 
scientific or philosophic character, and strives to 
reduce them to unity of principle. Regarding spirit 
as the highest conception, and joining with it the 
conception of evolution, it finds spirit embodied in 
each stage of the logical development. In this con- 
cept of concepts it reaches the absolute unity. 

It can be seen with what propriety such a philos- 
ophy may be designated the science of the sciences. 
For Hegel, indeed, science is not restricted, as it is 
for the positivist, to relations of coexistence and 
succession. He recognizes many universals, and 
tries to find the synthesis of them all. He believes 
that he offers the absolute science. 

17. When we inquire what the value of idealism 



314 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

is, when tried by the theory of knowledge, we find 
that its principles are in part justified. If knowledge 
of things consists in sympathetic imitation of them, 
they, to be knowable, must be of the nature of 
thought. It may be presumptuous to say, with the 
idealist, that there are no realities inaccessible to 
thought ; but it must, at least, be said that by ideas 
nothing but ideas can be known. Idealism does not, 
indeed, always allow that there are objects inde- 
pendent of the knowing subject, but, in so far as it 
does, it is faithful to the epistemological principle in 
proclaiming their idealistic character. 

18. But, on the other hand, idealism has sought 
the constituents of knowledge in categories. This 
is no necessary result of idealism, but it is the result 
which history has brought forth. The inadequacy 
of this account of knowledge need not again be set 
forth. 

19. It may seem that the system of Hegel is not 
exposed to such censures. For Hegel has con- 
demned abstractions, and has declared that the real- 
ity is concrete. His universal is not abstracted from 
other ideas, in comparison with which it is bare and 
poor : it is not being, but spirit. 

The value of this doctrine, in its recognition of 
the fact of self-conciousness, should be recognized, 
but it should not be forgotten that for Hegel the 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 315 

instrument of cognition and the object to be 
known are at once the category or concept. His 
logic is an account of categories : they constitute 
the essence of God. Nor in the realms of nature 
and spirit have we escaped from categories. In 
nature the idea has passed into its "other"; 
the categories of the logic are thought as other, 
or viewed in another aspect, and, consequently, 
have a movement as if they were liberated and in- 
dependent beings, and not, as in the logic, mere 
moments in the evolution of the idea. Neverthe- 
less, they are still categories. Likewise, the spirit 
has its being in categories ; its ideal is reached 
in the categories of an absolute philosophy. Yet 
the highest category is not raised above the limita- 
tions of the lower. The idea of spirit or reason is, 
as we have already found, a general concept, and is, 
by its generality, untrue to the concrete cases of 
intellectual experience. It is, also, as associated 
with that particular form of experience, the more 
unfit to be regarded as the truth of all the facts 
of the universe. 

20. Again, it is necessary, in presence of He- 
gel's idealism, to recall the empirical origin of the 
categories. Hegel speaks of the system of them 
as a pantheon of godlike figures. It is not neces- 
sary to attempt to detract from the celestial dig- 



316 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

nity accorded to them ; yet it is found that their 
origin and function are not those which Hegel 
assigned to them. It follows, moreover, from the 
fact of their empirical origin, that there is no 
such connection among the categories as that in 
which Hegel believes when he says that each 
category gives rise to another by an absolute logi- 
cal necessity. There is this appearance of neces- 
sity only when the new category forms part of 
the one that is thought to precede it. Some de- 
terminate being gives the thought of other being, 
because to think the limit of the one is to think 
what is beyond the limit. On the other hand, 
substance does not give rise to causality, unless 
the substance is already thought of as having 
efficient agency. There is no reason why mech- 
anism should give rise to chemism, or chemism to 
teleology. The transition from one to the other 
is determined by the contingencies of human ex- 
perience. 

21. The Hegelian system may be taken to 
present, as no other system does, the ideal which 
philosophy has been striving to reach. Philos- 
ophy has always been construed as the science 
of the sciences, but sometimes there has been 
only a vague apprehension of this signification. 
By Hegel, as by no other, the requirement of a 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 317 

science of the sciences lias been understood in all 
its comprehensiveness. All the more does he 
afford the most striking evidence that philosophy 
has been moving in the wrong direction. It has 
become divorced from truth, for it has forsaken 
the concrete things in which reality consists. 

22. The results of this criticism and the true 
function of philosophy may now be briefly indi- 
cated. First, philosophy is not a system of the 
universe. The demand for a system is born of 
the belief that abstract principles or general laws 
contain the truth. If the facts of the universe 
can be resolved into a definite number of general 
laws, absolute knowledge of the universe is pos- 
sible, and the search for the system of such laws, 
and for the ultimate law of laws, is justified. 
But inasmuch as this system of laws is not ade- 
quate to the revelation of the reality, it cannot 
satisfy the demands of philosophy. Because it 
seeks truth, philosophy must renounce its satis- 
faction with systems of the universe. 

23. Again, if philosophy is not a system of the 
universe, it is still less to be regarded as giving 
an explanation of things. The explanation of a 
thing is its sufficient reason. It may refer to the 
subjective necessities of the mind, as when a geo- 
metrical construction is the ground or reason of 




318 METHODS OF KNOV/LEDGE 

certain deductions from it. Or it may refer to 
what is objective, and then to give an explanation 
is to tell the causal agency. It has been already 
shown 1 that, both in deduction and in empirically 
discovered relations, the idea of necessity is a form 
of the causal feeling : our association of production 
with the idea of effort is so persistent that even 
in the conception of logical necessity we are con- 
fronted with a form of causality. But philosophy 
cannot allow itself to be mocked by the illusions 
and spurious pretensions of this category. Nor may 
it be said that causality is a bond which unites one 
concrete fact to another concrete fact, for thus there 
is involved the fallacy of explaining one thing by 
another thing. It is the thing in itself that we 
should know. The reference from one thing to 
another is necessary in so far as association is neces- 
sary to truth-finding ; but, except as the minister of 
sympathy, it leads away from truth. 

In short, if science is the statement of general 
relations, philosophy must not be called the science 
of the sciences. 

24. But it must always remain the function of 
philosophy to present the ideal of thought. Logic 
also fulfils this function, but it f ulfils it because it 
has first learned of philosophy. If knowledge con- 

i Chap. V, § 26. 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 319 

sists in sympathetic imitation, philosophy must pre- 
sent the ideal of such imitation in respect of the 
intensity and completeness which it exhibits, and, 
also, its ideal in respect of the range of objects to 
which it is applied. It shows how a perfect know- 
ledge of the individual is to be coveted, and it seeks 
an extension of that knowledge to the whole uni- 
verse. If the truth is with God only, philosophy yet 
has for its ideal to know the truth as it is known to 
the absolute being whose life it is. And if this 
knowledge comes to man part by part, it is the 
philosopher's ideal that each part shall be cleansed 
of the alloy of falsehood. 

25. It is implied in this, that philosophy must 
give a doctrine of method. It must show how 
the knowledge which is desired is to be attained. 
We are thus brought back to the principle laid 
down at the beginning of the chapter : the basis 
of philosophy is epistemology. Yet, at the same 
time, epistemology is only the propedeutic to phi- 
losophy. 

Further, philosophy must use the results of 
science in the doing of its peculiar work. It is 
unnecessary to show again how valuable, in the 
work of knowing, the methods and attainments of 
science must be accounted. For economy in the 
work of the intellect, we cannot afford to dispense 



320 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

with science. In episteroology and kindred studies, 
in attempts to define philosophy, we relapse of 
necessity into the categories of science. But philos- 
ophy cannot accept such categories as other than 
symbols, and, while it may look with more or less 
satisfaction on scientific systems of the universe, it 
believes that these are not the truth, but are, at 
most, only a means to truth. Philosophy attains its 
end, not in the formulation of general conceptions, but 
in the realization of the concrete life of the world. 

It follows that philosophy must keep itself free 
from the prejudice that cognition is constituted by 
only one set of mental factors. Philosophy must 
use all the resources of the mind that it may find 
that wherewith to copy the objects contained in the 
world. 

26. When philosophy has this view of truth, we 
can see how idle are the fears that truth may be 
exhausted. Such fears are justified only if the 
truth consists in a system of laws. The well-known 
paradox of Lessing, who said that, had he to choose 
between truth and the search for truth, he would 
unhesitatingly choose the latter, becomes an unmean- 
ing statement when the right conception of truth is 
attained. If truth is knowledge of the concrete 
facts of the world, the declaration of any one that 
he would not accept truth were it offered him, is, 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM 32 1 

in view of the world's vastness, like a declaration 
that one would decline to be God. We may not 
fear an end to knowledge ; we may rather fear 
that, beyond our subjective experiences, we shall fail 
to make a beginning. 



CHAPTER XIV 

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 

1. There are certain practical questions which 
arise in connection with the account of knowledge 
which has been offered. What is the effect of this 
view of knowledge on scientific work ? How does 
it help to determine the function of art ? What 
course should be given to education in that which 
pertains to the intellect, and, also, in that which 
pertains to the moral nature ? 

2. The first question has been answered by the 
discussion of the nature of knowledge, and need not 
be asked here, save that the answer brings the prac- 
tical conclusions of the doctrine to a focus ; and, 
also, recalls what must be borne in mind in the study 
of the other practical problems. It is, first of all, 
to be remembered that science has other functions 
besides that of truth-seeking. It subserves the 
great utilitarian interests of life, and these can be 
secured equally well, or much more expeditiously, 
if there is offered only a symbolic statement of the 
facts. When the sailor wishes to guide his ship 

322 



PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 323 

aright, he studies the stars and ocean currents. He 
does not care for a knowledge of them beyond what 
is necessary to determine his course, and for this 
purpose it may be sufficient to have a purely alge- 
braic representation of the facts. Thus, science has 
a large work for the doing of which the subject of 
sympathetic imitation need not be considered. 

3. But science must proceed otherwise in so far 
as it lays claim to the high function of truth-seeking. 
In all the sciences, save some forms of psychology, 
phenomena, and not things in themselves, are con- 
sidered ; and in all the sciences, including psychol- 
ogy, the search is for laws. Now, for knowledge 
it is important to study the relations of coexistence 
and succession which obtain among facts. But in 
order to possess truth it is necessary to combine 
with the method of science that of art ; and as the 
art which penetrates most directly into the inner 
life of things is poetry, it may be said that there is 
needed for truth a poetical science, or a scientific 
poetry. One of the great intellectual wants of the 
world is a poetry that is not a mere opposition to 
science, but that follows the work of science, and 
supplements it with the results which its own pecul- 
iar method yields. Such a poetry must keep to 
facts even as science does. It must observe them 
with the same scrupulous care ; it must, also, to 



324 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

expedite its interpretations, find their relations even 
as science does ; oyer the schools of such poets should 
be inscribed the words, like those which formed the 
legend on the portals of Plato's academy, Let no one 
enter who is ignorant of mathematics. At the same 
time, it must keep to the concrete, reproducing it 
as it actually is, and thus giving that imitation of 
the reality which alone is knowledge. 

The lesson for science, therefore, is that it must 
not isolate itself or think itself sufficient by itself. 
The abstract intellect is imperfect, being alone ; it 
needs the cooperation of the other faculties. 

4. On the other hand, there is a lesson to be 
learned by art. It is necessary that poetry, to 
speak at present more especially of it and of the 
prose epic or novel, should understand its sympa- 
thetic function. It should not become philosophic 
or scientific, in the usual sense of these terms. We 
may need a poetical science and philosophy, but we 
do not need an abstract philosophy in rhyme. Not 
that poetry is to limit itself to the so-called emo- 
tional part of our nature, — it must mirror the other 
processes of the mind ; and, accordingly, there are 
poems and novels which reflect the problems and the 
reasonings which have occupied consciousness. If 
the hero represented has been occupied with theories 
and arguments, it is legitimate to reproduce in the 



PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 325 

poem that current of opinions and arguments. It 
may well be as worthy a theme as the passions of 
the knight engaged in the tournament. A poem or 
a novel that is philosophical in this sense is to be 
commended for its realism. Let it be observed, 
however, that such a work of art does not offer 
abstract formulae as if they represented reality. 
The truth that is given is in the presentation of 
the life of the thinker; not in any solution of 
abstract scientific or philosophic problems. The 
picture is meant to be true to the thinker, and not 
to the objects about which he is thinking. 

5. A question presents itself here which it 
may be well to consider. If scientific reflections 
can thus be reproduced in poetry, is not the scien- 
tific treatise, the manual of mathematics or logic, 
a poem, inasmuch as it reflects the ideas of 
the author ? Must it not, on the above sup- 
position, be regarded as either an epic or a 
lyric ? It is to be answered, that such a treatise 
does not disclose the author's mind as the poet 
would disclose it. The treatise is meant to dis- 
close a set of objective facts or relations ; and 
the reader has his attention directed, not to the 
writer's mind, but to this objective system. More- 
over, the statements in the treatise are excerpts 
from the writer's experience, and its calm pages 



326 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

do not, save to this limited extent, reflect his expe- 
rience. The fancies that came and went, the hopes 
and donbts of life that hung like clouds of light 
and darkness about the horizon of consciousness — 
none of these are reproduced; and, since he felt 
their influence in all his thinking, his reader may 
not be in a position to copy his thought. But 
suppose the treatise could be taken for a true 
picture of his thoughts, and suppose the reader 
should follow the train of thought, — then for such 
a reader, so taking it, the book is poetry. And 
probably it is only to the mind to which thoughts 
of a treatise in logic or mathematics are repellent 
that such a statement seems strange. To the 
mathematican, the mathematical process is beauti- 
ful and fascinating. Apart from common prej- 
udices, it is only a mind alienated from the 
mathematical mode of thinking that would deny 
that a series of mental events such as this 
might rightly be presented in the epical or lyr- 
ical fashion. Even if the sensuous form of rhyme 
were wanting, there might yet be recognized 
what is known as a prose poem. 

And let it be added that, were science and 
philosophy true, they would be the poem of the 
objective universe. But they are not true ; and 
men have sharply distinguished them from the 



PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 327 

poetry which has its truth in the concrete. 
When poetry treats them as facts, they are taken 
merely as facts in a thinker's life. 

6. But poetry has not always been faithful to 
its peculiar method of perception. Even the 
poems of great poets sometimes degenerate into 
.rhyming philosophies. Poetry cannot altogether 
withstand the influences of the times. Science 
and philosophy have often turned it aside from 
its proper path. It is the more easily diverted 
when it has not clearly formulated to itself its 
destiny. When poetry thus identifies itself with 
the modes of thought that are in vogue in sci- 
ence, the blunder is fatal. One of the most con- 
spicuous illustrations of this kind of blunder is 
afforded by Wordsworth. He is a poet of the 
finest aesthetic feelings, and capable of the truest 
sympathy with certain orders of human experi- 
ence. But in such a poem as The Excursion he 
devotes himself very largely to the reproduction 
of the abstractions of a somewhat commonplace 
metaphysics. There are, indeed, human figures 
moving in the poem ; but it is not the poet's in- 
tention that interest should linger with them. 
He has a certain wisdom to communicate to us, 
and he chiefly wishes to express that wisdom in 
the formulas of philosophy. Many other poets 



328 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

might be named who have, for longer or shorter 
periods, relapsed into the scientific mode of 
thought. Doubtless it has seemed to such that 
the principles they present are the true foun- 
dations of the universe, and that, therefore, in 
calling attention to them, they are making poetry 
the minister of truth. All the more is it neces- 
sary to show that, when poetry neglects the 
actual forms of concrete existence, it fails to ful- 
fil its true function. 

7. It is necessary, therefore, that poetry should 
realize that it depends upon the faculty of sympa- 
thetic imitation. Poetry should also realize that, 
while it is its privilege to be free, and rejoice 
in the world of its own creation, it may find not 
less glory in joining itself to science, and taking 
up the task of interpreting the actual facts of the 
universe. 

What has been said of poetry applies to the other 
arts. Poetry, however, has the preeminence of most 
directly conveying the meaning of inner experience. 

8. While it is necessary that art should realize 
its sympathetic function, it must also remember its 
more sensuous function. There seems, indeed, little 
reason at present for fearing that this will be for- 
gotten. In painting and music especially, there is 
a demand for sensuous effects. It is important to 



PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 329 

see the true justification of the search for such 
effects. By all the activities of the senses, the con- 
sciousness of the self is enriched, or the self is more 
fully revealed. It is true that in a sense the self 
is revealed in all its activities. Scientific formulas 
are activities or states of the self. The self, also, 
becomes conscious of itself in its sympathies, for, if it 
mirrors the whole universe, it is thereby at the same 
time discovering the riches of its own nature. But 
it is yet, in a measure, true that it is revealed most 
directly in its sensuous activities. All other revela- 
tions follow upon these. It is through them that 
the imaginings are possible by which the imitation 
of the sense-experiences of others is achieved. The 
concepts of the intellect, so often thought to be the 
peculiar revealers of the self, are the pale and faded 
products of sense. It is, therefore, important that 
this part of man's nature should be cultivated, in 
order that the greatest wealth of experience may be 
won. Sensation should be taken in its first inten- 
tion; it should be realized in all the fulness of its 
own inner meaning. It is the function of sensuous 
art to find for the eye the fairest and most interest- 
ing colours ; and for the ear the sweetest sounds ; 
and to minister to each other sense according to its 
capacity ; and, doing all this in harmony with wis- 
dom, to give the soul more abundant life. 



330 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 






9. The bearing of this theory of knowledge on 
questions of education must now be considered. 
The education of the intellect may be most ade- 
quately understood, if it be regarded as having in 
view two objects, which, though not ultimately 
separable, are yet relatively distinct, and may even 
appear to come into conflict ; they are the two 
referred to above, utility and truth. 

10. Considerations of utility have a very large 
place in human life. The struggle for existence 
makes it necessary that it should be so. Farms, 
factories, advertisements, are, in a large measure, 
illustrations of this struggle. Since man is under 
the law that he shall seek what ministers to his 
existence, or, in other words, what is useful to him, 
it is one of the first duties of the educator to fit the 
young for the search. The child must, therefore, 
be taught to read and write and cipher; that he 
may be still better equipped, he must learn foreign 
languages, and study science ; he must also have 
training in his craft. In all this education there is 
a certain end in view, and other facts are considered 
only as they minister to this end. It is one refine- 
ment of this utilitarian view to claim that the object 
of education is mental discipline : the facts studied 
are as the food of the mind, valuable only when con- 
verted into mental muscle. It is not necessary to 



PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 33 1 

enter further into the details of this utilitarian 
scheme of education. The importance of its place 
in human life must be recognized. 

11. At the same time, the precise significance of 
this place should be understood. The ultimate end 
of useful actions must, when consciously present to 
the mind, be a conscious state. There may be 
reflex and instinctive actions which are useful, and 
yet have not this characteristic ; but actions due to 
man's device have generally some form of conscious 
well-being as their end, either that of the worker 
himself, or that of some one for whom he works. 
The end of such activities is thus the enlarging and 
perfecting of self-consciousness. And, if there are 
actions planned by man which have no personal 
good in view, but are planned from the habit of 
planning, they yet, as ideo-motor, have it as their 
end that self-consciousness be more fully realized. 
We thus see that the great utilities of life minister 
to that self-consciousness which is in a preeminent 
sense the truth. Utility and truth were said to be 
relatively distinct : we now see that, so far at least 
as utility is a conscious scheme, they ultimately 
merge in one. We also see how the utilities of life 
are related to the fine arts, so far as these are sensu- 
ous : both contribute directly to the subjective life. 
It can also be seen that both require that the 



332 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

educator should aim primarily at the cultivation of 
the senses. This cultivation is necessary for all 
knowledge ; what must be pointed out here is its 
strange neglect by those who, while training for the 
life of utility, neglect the faculties by which the re- 
sults of these utilities are appropriated. It should 
be the aim of the educator to train the senses ; to 
develop the activities, and thus gain the finer per- 
ceptions which accompany these activities; and 
to cultivate those sense-experiences which are 
spoken of as more internal and subjective, and 
which go to constitute the emotional life. In so far 
as education is the drawing out of the self, it is in 
this way that its function is in part fulfilled. 

12. But not only must the educator aim at the 
development of the self in its more subjective aspect, 
he must also aim at the development of conscious- 
ness as it is determined by the movement of objects 
independent of the mind. He must teach facts, not 
only as they are in their use, but also as they are 
in themselves apart from this use. For the draw- 
ing out of the soul means that it is enriched in 
sensuous, subjective experience, and, also, that it 
is enriched by sharing the experience of other 
persons and things. 

13. We have seen that science implies a certain 
alienation from truth. Emerson writes in his essay 



PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 333 

on Beauty : 1 " The spiral tendency of vegetation 
infects education also. Our books approach very 
slowly the things we most wish to know. What a 
parade we make of our science, and how far off, and 
at arm's length, it is from its objects ! . . . We 
should go to the ornithologist with a new feeling 
if he could teach us what the social birds say when 
they sit in the autumn council talking together in 
the trees. The want of sympathy makes his record 
a dull dictionary. His result is a dead bird. The 
bird is not in its ounces and inches, but in its rela- 
tions to nature ; and the skin or skeleton you show 
me is no more a heron than a heap of ashes or a 
bottle of gases, into which his body has been re- 
duced, is Dante or Washington. The naturalist is 
led from the road by the whole distance of his 
fancied advance." Emerson does not hold steadily 
to a precise idea of that which is lacking in scien- 
tific education ; yet he indicates that one thing that 
is needed is sympathy. The present investigation 
has enabled us to see how much emphasis should be 
put on this faculty when education aims at truth. 

14. It may in this connection be of interest to 
consider the much-discussed question of the studies 
that should be included in a course of education. 
It used to be commonly held that the classics must 

1 The Conduct of Life, Chap. VIII. 



334 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

constitute an essential part of any education which 
had more than the primary utilitarian elements. 
The natural sciences, however, forced themselves 
into prominence, and the claim was made for them 
that they were as good instruments of education as 
the classics, or even better. It is now frequently 
said that all subjects are of equal educational value. 
If, in the comparison of these studies, attention is 
given simply to a restricted view of their disciplinary 
value, it lies outside of our present purpose to dis- 
cuss their merits ; it may be that the study of chem- 
istry is neither more nor less disciplinary than the 
study of the Latin grammar. But when we con- 
sider the different studies with respect to the direct- 
ness with which they conduct to truth, we must 
hesitate to put them all on the same plane. We 
have seen that poetry and science are each imperfect 
being alone. Therefore, education must join the 
studies which by their combination give truth. 
Moreover, we cannot even say that all studies are 
of equal disciplinary value, when a broader view 
is taken of mental discipline. If the discipline is 
to result in a mental aptitude for truth, that apti- 
tude must surely fail to be secured when there is 
no exercise in one kind of perception that is essen- 
tial to truth-getting, k. training in literature with- 
out science is defective ; an education that consists 



PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 335 

merely in scientific training is still more gravely at 
fault. 

15. It is also to be noticed that the objects of 
which the truth can be most surely attained are 
human beings. It is, therefore, to the studies which 
deal with these objects that we must turn for the most 
complete truth. That is, the humanities must be 
regarded as yielding, in combination with the scien- 
tific study of man, the clearest perception of truth. 
It must, indeed, be remembered that the same prob- 
lems arise when other objects in the organic and 
inorganic world are considered. But the fact re- 
mains that we do not know these so easily; other 
things, or other souls, are not known at present as 
the human soul is ; the farther we go from man, the 
more impenetrable is the mystery of things. We 
may hope some day to know other things as we are 
known, but it must be acknowledged that this ideal 
is still far off. 

16. It is necessary to bear in mind a qualification 
of this statement regarding the excellence of the 
humanities. It is possible to study the literature 
of the world in a purely scientific way. The study 
of poetry often becomes a research into grammar 
and philology and history. Of such research it 
may justly be said that its claims to superiority over 
chemical or biological research are, at least, very 



336 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

doubtful. But it is when poetry is understood in 
its true nature, and is regarded as being in some 
of its forms an interpretation of objective existence, 
that its value in education is recognized. 

17. It need scarcely be pointed out that at 
present such a scheme of education provides in- 
struction in the method of truth rather than truth 
itself ; for a literature or a science that is truthful, 
in the absolute sense, is still in large measure to 
seek. 

18. It is further necessary for the perception 
of truth that the faculty of sympathetic imitation 
should be carefully cultivated from childhood. 
It shows itself early, but as a rule it soon loses 
its first vigour. It is laughed at by a thought- 
less world, and shrinks from observation. The 
need of struggling for existence, and of clearing 
away everything which does not help in that 
struggle, is fatal to its finer activities. The 
shades of the prison-house begin to close upon it. 
But were this faculty valued according to its 
worth, the loss of it would be deplored as the 
loss of sight or hearing. No pains would be 
spared to preserve and refine it in those in whom 
it shows itself, and to rouse it into life in those 
in whom it seems dormant. Something has been 
done, as in certain forms of kindergarten instruc- 



PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 337 

tion, to develop this form of perception, but such 
efforts have been unsystematic and incomplete. An 
education is needed which shall make the power of 
sympathetic imitation one of its grand objects. 

19. There is a further lesson to be learned, 
which has reference to the cultivation of the 
moral life. We have already seen that love is 
the fulfilment of social duty, and that the centre 
and heart of love is sympathy : we have also 
seen that by true knowledge intellectual selfish- 
ness is in large measure excluded. It may now 
be pointed out that it is by sympathy that men 
receive the strongest impulses to virtue. It is 
customary to teach morals by abstract precepts ; 
and these are useful, or even, in a sense, indispen- 
sable. They are, however, of the nature of scien- 
tific generalizations, even when they wear the form 
of the categorical imperative. They are able to 
move men to moral action, for general principles 
have the power of determining action; but they 
are not the great inspirers to morality. Men are 
moved by examples. When Dante is describing 
the sanctification of the penitents in purgatory, 
he is careful to tell what is done to inculcate 
the virtues that are to be acquired. It is inter- 
esting to notice that almost invariably this is 
done by means of examples. The penitents are 



338 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

not told to be humble : David, the king of 
Israel, is seen dancing before the ark. To pass 
to the highest illustration of the influence of 
sympathy in the ethical life, how many from 
whom moral exhortations have glanced ineffective 
have had their religious enthusiasm kindled to 
flame when they have "seen Jesus." Nor are 
we to say that this is owing to the weakness of 
men, and that it were better could they obey the 
dictates of pure reason. It is in accordance with 
the true nature of morality, which has its being 
in the fellowship of human souls, and draws its 
deepest inspiration from such fellowship. Moral 
precepts, while of great utility, are only means 
to ends, and to rest contented with them is to suf- 
fer a desiccation of spirit. Let the moral train- 
ing, therefore, of young and old be conducted in 
view of the principles of human nature. Let 
them be compassed about with a cloud of those 
in all ages who have lived the good life. Let 
them be the familiar friends of the world's saints 
and heroes, in whose fashion their spirits may 
thus be formed. Or let them be placed in the 
society of living men and women who are aiming 
at perfection, and still more quickly they will 
know, through imitation, what goodness is, and 
let it find a place in their lives. 



PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 339 

20. An ethical question of another kind may be 
raised : Is knowledge desirable ? Is it good for men 
to enter into the thoughts of the wicked, and live 
over their injustice and uncleanness ? It can be seen 
that men must choose, as far as possible, what they 
wish to know. There may be many things which it 
is not well for them to know, except in a symbolic 
way. It is for each one to decide how far, for the 
sake of his spiritual well-being, he must restrict his 
sympathies ; for to one that may be life-giving 
which to his neighbour brings death. 

21. A deeper ethical question still remains. Is 
knowledge of other things, after all, an end in itself ? 
Conduct is often said to be the supreme end of life ; 
and, if it is, knowledge must be ultimately a means 
to that end. The question, therefore, how truth is 
to be attained, must seem a relatively unimportant 
one ; for if truth is subordinate to something else, 
a set of symbols, or anything by which we can be 
guided to the supreme end, must seem sufficient for 
us. A full justification of the assumption that 
knowledge is an end in itself cannot be here 
attempted. However, the whole discussion in this 
work has, in a measure, provided this justification ; 
we have also seen that to a large extent the antithe- 
sis of knowledge and conduct is false. It may 
further be suggested that that life is most divine 



340 METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE 

which most feels the world as it is felt by the 
absolute being; and that it is by such feeling or 
knowledge that man can reach that religious exal- 
tation when it may in truth be said to him, " All 
things are yours." 



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